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 Abstract 
 
 
Between 1989 and 2011, the three neighboring West African countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Côte d’Ivoire each experienced at least one major civil conflict; and the combined devastation 
of the conflicts claimed over a million lives, generated millions of refugees, and crippled 
infrastructure in ways that continue to impact the development of the sub-region today. The 
occurrence of conflict in the three countries and the fact that they share borders has raised questions 
about whether the conflicts were caused by domestic factors or were the result of transborder 
processes of conflict diffusion. This paper will assess the causes of conflict through a political 
economy lens, paying particular attention to foreign economic intervention in the colonial and 
post-colonial period and focusing specifically on the impacts of structural adjustment programs on 
processes of conflict and conflict diffusion. Based on the findings of this paper, conflict in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire can be attributed to two factors. The first of these is the 
establishment and institutionalization of unequal and exclusive economic and political structures 
during the colonial period, and the second is the magnification and exacerbation of these 
inequalities that occurred as a result of neo-colonial economic intervention in the form of structural 
adjustment programs. Importantly, the findings of this paper also suggest that conflict spillover 
was not a primary cause of conflict in the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 In the decades following the Second World War, Africa saw a wave of decolonization 
and the establishment of independent states across the continent. However, domestic and global 
optimism about the economic and political progress of these newly independent countries was 
quickly tempered by a rise of violent conflict in the post-colonial period. Beginning with anti-
colonial violence in 1946, the incidence of large-scale conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 
skyrocketed, and over 40 percent of the region’s countries were involved in a conflict at the peak 
of the violence in 1993 (Marshall, 2005). After 1993, conflict trends decreased somewhat, but 
they remained significantly higher than the rest of the world throughout the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 2000s. In 1996 alone, war-related deaths in Africa accounted for more than half of 
all war-related deaths in the world, with 14 out of 53 African countries experiencing a conflict in 
that one-year period (Annan, 1998).  While civil war was spread widely throughout the continent 
during this period, conflict in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa also demonstrated a particular 
pattern of regional conflict clustering in which civil war was concentrated in neighboring states 
in Southern Africa, the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa (Marshall, 
2005).  
In West Africa specifically, the three neighboring countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Côte d’Ivoire experienced large-scale violent conflicts in the post-colonial period. Between 1989 
and 2011, all three countries experienced at least one civil conflict; and the resulting death toll of 
these conflicts amounted to over one million deaths. While they shared somewhat similar 
experiences with domestic instability and violent conflict, a closer look at Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Côte d’Ivoire reveals that each of the three countries had more differences than similarities 
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with regard to economic and political conditions, both in the colonial and post-colonial periods. 
Each country was dominated by a different colonial power, had a unique history and experience 
with ethnic and regional tensions, and had varying levels of success with domestic economic 
development and integration into the global economy in the latter half of the 20th century. Given 
the divergent development trajectories of the three countries, a puzzle emerges surrounding the 
occurrence and persistence of violence in the region. Two related questions arise: (1) Why did 
conflict develop in three neighboring countries with different economic and political histories 
and circumstances at around the same time; and (2) were the civil wars isolated occurrences of 
conflict caused primarily by domestic conditions or instances of conflict spillover across national 
borders?  
Attempts to answer such questions about the proliferation and regionalization of conflict 
have been prominent across various academic disciplines in recent years, and there is a wealth of 
literature on the causes of conflict and conflict diffusion in the region. The majority of 
scholarship on conflict and its spatial distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa has presented three 
main causes for its occurrence: (1) colonial legacy and its impact on the ability of newly 
independent African states to develop and maintain strong economic and political institutions, 
(2) ethnic and tribal tensions rooted in historical enmity and exacerbated by the colonial drawing 
of arbitrary borders, and (3) the presence of valuable natural resources that facilitate competition 
over wealth and power. However, despite relative consensus on the primary underlying causes of 
conflict, there has been intense disagreement over the concept of conflict spillover, which is the 
spread of civil war across international borders that causes an eruption of civil conflict in 
neighboring countries. This debate has centered on whether the phenomenon truly exists or is 
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simply thought to be occurring as a result of clustering of conflict in neighboring countries with 
similar domestic characteristics. 
Despite disagreement over conflict spillover, conflict theories involving colonialism, 
ethnic tensions, and natural resources have provided useful lenses through which to understand 
and analyze conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. However, there are a number of 
areas in which this literature falls short. One of the most important of these that it has failed to 
draw sufficient connections between the separate explanations for conflict and their interactions 
in creating the ideal conditions for instability and violence, instead relying on one explanation 
for each individual occurrence of conflict. In the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, theories on 
conflict have largely relied on explanations involving the existence of a resource curse; and in 
Côte d’Ivoire, conflict has largely been viewed through the lens of ethnic and religious tensions. 
However, these explanations are somewhat simplistic and provide only a partial picture of the 
causes and mechanisms through which violence erupted and progressed in the three countries. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, the literature on conflict in the three countries has largely 
failed to account for the role of foreign actors in facilitating conflict through the evolution and 
continuation of unequal power relationships following colonialism, paying insufficient attention 
to the intersections between domestic development and global economic and political processes.  
Specifically, research on conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire has 
understudied the impact of colonial and post-colonial foreign involvement on processes of state 
formation, economic development, and long-term stability; and it is these processes that I will 
analyze through my research. Though foreign involvement in the region has taken many forms 
that include political, cultural, and economic domination, I have chosen to focus on the economic 
dimension of foreign intervention through examining the role of International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment programs in promoting conflict in each of the three 
countries. I will argue that, in the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, 
colonial/pseudo-colonial economic intervention both constrained and shaped domestic state 
formation, facilitating the institutionalization of unequal and exclusive economic structures in the 
post-colonial period. I will further argue that it was the consequent reinforcement and 
magnification of these systems of exclusion through the imposition of structural adjustment 
programs by neo-colonial powers that served as the true catalyst for the eruption of violent 
conflict. Lastly, I will analyze the possible role of spillover effects, arguing that it is in fact 
similar domestic conditions and not transborder diffusion that explain the clustering of the three 
conflicts in the sub-region.  
Uneven Development in a Global Capitalist System 
 The impact of development processes on stability and conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Côte d’Ivoire is intricately tied to the history of development in the global South and the 
ways in which that development was constrained and shaped by hegemonic Western powers. 
Prominent theories on development in the global South have presented underdevelopment as a 
consequence of historical processes of capitalist development and exploitation. Rodney (1982) 
posits that the underdevelopment of Africa was a deliberate process facilitated by European 
powers who benefitted from the raw materials and cheap labor obtained through colonial or 
semi-colonial relationships with African countries. Through these relationships, Western states 
used the labor of African states to produce raw materials for Northern manufactured goods, 
deliberately designing a system that allowed for a continually widening gap in prosperity and 
development between the two regions (Rodney, 1982). Dependency theorists such as Wallerstein 
(1974) and Frank (1967) argue that this system of unequal economic exchange continued after 
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the decolonization of the global South and was characterized by the consolidation of economic 
prosperity and power in the global North. Within this system, economic advances in the Western 
world took place at the expense of the developing world, further widening the gap in economic 
and political power and preventing the development of diverse and stable economies in the 
global South (Wallerstein, 1974).  
  The above form of Western domination and exploitation was transformed with the oil 
crises of the 1970s and the global North’s simultaneous shift away from manufacturing in favor 
of the development of finance and technology markets. With this shift, the global North became 
less dependent, and therefore less interested, in the extraction of physical resources from the 
global South (Duffield, 2001). This prompted a significant change in the North’s approach to the 
development of the global capitalist system. Relieved of their previous reliance on southern 
goods, Western powers, who formed the backbone of the global economy, increasingly viewed 
the global South as economically irrelevant, prompting them to isolate the economies of the 
South through decreased investment and increasingly high barriers to entry in exclusive global 
markets (Castells, 1996; Duffield, 2001). In describing the extent of the developing world’s 
isolation and the consequences of that isolation on their development, Castells (1996) states: 
“The architecture of the global economy features an asymmetrically interdependent world… 
increasingly polarized along an axis of opposition between productive, information-rich, affluent 
areas, and impoverished areas economically devalued and socially excluded” (p. 145). Given the 
prevailing view of developing economies as having limited potential and value, development in 
the global South was increasingly dependent upon the willingness of the global North to provide 
development assistance through the provision of development aid and loans (Duffield, 2001). 
Under this system, the governments of developing countries were increasingly limited in their 
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ability to introduce domestically designed development programs, and the underdevelopment of 
much of the developing world continued unabated.   
 One of the most salient developments of this particular period of global economic 
development was the introduction of conditional structural adjustment loan programs in the 
global South beginning in the early 1980s. Modeled on neoliberal market structures and 
implemented by international financial institutions that were controlled by hegemonic Western 
powers, these loan programs were presented to the developing world as the only solution to the 
economic challenges they faced. Though marketed as the key to promoting economic growth 
through the liberalization and restructuring of developing economies in order to effectively 
integrate them into the global economic system and provide improved living standards and 
economic conditions, structural adjustment had significant consequences in the majority of 
countries in which it was introduced. The most common ‘side effects’ observed in the initial 
adjustment period included large increases in the prices of essential goods, decreases in export 
revenue, and decreases in government spending on public goods such as education and 
healthcare (Riddell, 1992). Compounding the unpleasant shocks associated with the adjustment 
period, structural adjustment largely failed to deliver the promised economic growth, and much 
of the developing world continued to experience dire economic conditions throughout the 
following two decades. In addition, the loans that accompanied structural adjustment agreements 
contributed to rapid increases in foreign debt that further undermined the financial stability of 
already struggling economies throughout much of the developing world.  
Development and Conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire 
 It was within the above global system that Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire 
developed in the colonial and post-colonial periods; and it was also as members of this system 
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that the three countries descended into conflict. As previously mentioned, there have been a 
number of explanations for conflicts such as the ones that occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Côte d’Ivoire, the most popular of which include colonialism, ethnic tensions, and natural 
resources. In the case of these three countries, it is clear that colonialism, resources, and even 
ethnic tensions to a certain extent, played a role in destabilizing the countries and facilitating the 
spread of violent conflict. However, theories that rely solely on these explanations lack one vital 
component, which is a connection to the global context in which these variables shaped and 
directed the trajectories of the countries in the pre-conflict years. In order to account for this 
global context, examination of conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire must 
recognize and explore the continuation and evolution of colonial and capitalist modes of power 
in the region in the pre-war period. In these countries, the role of foreign economic intervention 
did not end with the end of colonialism, but became embedded in the structures and institutions 
of the state and economy in the post-colonial period. Through this process, foreign intervention 
that occurred during the colonial period continued to impact and constrain the ability of the 
countries’ domestic governments to pursue successful means of economic and political 
development. However, it was not just the vestiges of foreign economic intervention in the state 
and economic sphere that made instability and violence possible. Instead, it was the exacerbation 
of these problematic legacies of colonialism through neo-colonial economic intervention in the 
form of structural adjustment that made the occurrence of conflict possible in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Paper Organization 
 In the next chapter, I will briefly summarize the literature on conflict and conflict 
diffusion, as well as outlining the methodology used in my research. In Chapter 2, I will provide 
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a qualitative analysis of each of the three case study countries’ experiences with development 
and conflict through individual country profiles that include the colonial, post-colonial, and 
conflict periods, paying particular attention to the domestic-global interactions occurring during 
each of these time periods. In Chapter 3, I will provide an overview of structural adjustment in 
each of the three case study countries, and I will measure the impact of SAPs on economic 
structures and conditions in the three countries. In Chapter 4, I will explore the possibility of 
conflict diffusion across borders in the three conflicts to determine whether they were individual 
conflicts caused by similar domestic experiences or instances of violence being transmitted 
across borders. I will then conclude with a chapter summarizing my findings and their 
implications for future studies on conflict and conflict diffusion.   
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Chapter 1 
Literature Review and Methodology  
1.1 Literature on Conflict and Conflict Spillover 
Conflict “Spillover” or Conflict Clustering? 
 There is a large body of literature on conflict and its spatial distribution in the post-
colonial world. Within this literature, there is a robust debate about whether conflicts tend to 
cluster in space as a consequence of shared regional economic and political characteristics or are 
clustered in space as the result of a process of conflict diffusion in which violent conflict is 
transmitted across national borders into neighboring countries. In assessing the prevalence of 
conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Colonial period, Collier (2003) argues that low levels 
of economic development are the single most important indicator in determining whether a 
country is likely to experience civil war. While he does acknowledge that civil conflict has some 
spillover effects, Collier (2003) maintains that domestic conflict due to low economic 
development is the primary explanation for the high incidence of conflict observed in Sub-
Saharan Africa, arguing that the occurrence of conflict in one country does not significantly 
impact the likelihood of conflict in neighboring countries. 
The types of underdevelopment that Collier (2003) finds are most likely to contribute to 
instability and conflict include low levels of income and wealth, poverty, low rates of domestic 
economic growth, and a lack of economic diversification and dependence on primary export 
commodities (Collier, 2003). According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), these forms of economic 
underdevelopment facilitate conflict through their direct impact on the opportunity costs of 
participating in violent conflict; and countries with low earnings and limited opportunities for 
economic advancement through alternative means have a higher risk of experiencing civil 
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conflict. Collier’s claims about the impact of economic underdevelopment on the incidence of 
civil conflict were supported by Fearon and Laitin (2003), who argue that poverty and slow rates 
of economic growth create the ideal conditions for rebel recruitment and make conflict possible 
through their crippling impacts on the financial and bureaucratic capabilities of developing 
states. They tie these processes to the rise of insurgency, or guerrilla warfare specifically, 
arguing that this type of warfare is incentivized in countries with weak states, large populations, 
and economic issues such as unemployment and lack of economic opportunity (Fearon & Laitin, 
2003).  
In contrast to the relatively direct relationships between development and conflict posited 
by the above authors, Hegre and Nome (2010) suggest that underdevelopment and conflict are 
tied to the relationship between democracy and conflict; and they argue that underdevelopment 
creates a greater risk of conflict in countries with lower levels of democracy. They tie this 
finding to the opportunity costs and abilities of domestic governments to prevent conflict, 
arguing that the opportunity costs of participating in violent conflict are lower in autocratic 
regimes in which the state does not have the ability to control and enforce peace. The 
relationship between development, governance, and conflict is supported by authors such as 
Hegre et al. (2001), who claim that there is little evidence of conflict contagion from neighboring 
states, attributing conflict clustering to domestic factors such as economic conditions and regime 
types. Through a quantitative analysis, they find that levels of development, regime changes, and 
regime types are the primary determinants of civil conflict, arguing that conflict diffusion 
explains very few of the civil conflicts that have been observed in the post-colonial period 
(Hegre et al., 2001).  
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While theories that rely on explanations of conflict clustering and not diffusion enjoy a 
significant amount of support among scholars, there is also a wide body of quantitative and 
qualitative research that suggests the existence of neighborhood effects and conflict diffusion 
across international borders. In a statistical analysis of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Carmignani and Kler (2014) find that, when controlled for similar regional characteristics such 
as poverty and regime type, Sub-Saharan African states are three times more likely to experience 
a civil conflict if they share a border with a country experiencing conflict than states in the rest of 
the world. The quantitative analysis found that, in Sub-Saharan Africa specifically, sharing a 
border with a state involved in a civil conflict increases the likelihood of conflict by at least one 
percent (Carmignani & Kler, 2014). This suggests that, at least in the case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, conflict clustering cannot be entirely explained by domestic conditions. 
State Failure 
One of the prominent explanations for conflict diffusion in the post-Colonial world 
focuses on the internal capacity of states and their ability to prevent conflict from erupting within 
their borders. Braithwaite (2010) uses a quantitative analysis of civil conflict to assess the 
relationship between state capacity and conflict contagion, arguing that the likelihood of conflict 
diffusion across an international border is tied to the neighboring state’s economic and political 
capacity to prevent the physical and ideological spread of conflict. Braithwaite’s (2010) 
definition of state capacity includes “(1) sovereign integrity; (2) financial resources; (3) skilled 
and loyal officials; (4) administrative and military control; and (5) authority and institutional 
mechanisms to employ resources,” and he argues that the weaker each of these elements is in a 
given state, the more likely it is that the state will be unable to maintain peace in the face of 
regional conflict (p. 314).  
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  Similarly, Iqbal and Starr (2008) argue that state failure, defined as the collapse of 
central state authority, is one of the main causes of conflict diffusion across borders; and they 
attribute the relationship between the two variables to several interrelated processes. First, they 
argue that the outbreak of conflict in neighboring countries often exacerbates existing instability 
in failed or failing states, increasingly the likelihood that violent conflict will erupt. Second, they 
argue that failing states are often unable to stop the geographical spread of conflict from 
neighboring countries due to a lack of physical control over the entirety of the state’s territory. 
Perhaps most importantly, Iqbal and Starr (2008) find that the impact of state failure on conflict 
diffusion is not limited to states that share borders, and that it is a regional phenomenon through 
which conflict spreads throughout a region.  
Colonial Legacy 
 While there is a significant amount of support for theories of conflict diffusion that focus 
on domestic variables, many scholars have also criticized the lack of attention paid to 
international processes in such theories. One explanation of conflict that attempts to take account 
of international processes focuses on the lingering impacts of colonialism on contemporary 
African states. Rodney (1982) argues that underdevelopment in Africa is the direct result of an 
exploitative capitalist system in which Western powers benefit from African underdevelopment. 
He then goes on to tie the underdevelopment of the region during the colonial period to a 
problematic political environment and the growth of tribalism in the post-colonial period, 
arguing that this directly caused a number of conflicts that occurred in Africa following de-
colonization (Rodney, 1982). While he does not explicitly tie Europe’s underdevelopment of 
Africa to the phenomenon of conflict diffusion across borders, Rodney’s analysis does suggest 
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that colonialism in Africa impacted national and transnational political dynamics in ways that are 
not limited by international borders. 
 The consequences of colonialism on conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are further explored 
by Achankeng (2013), who argues that the inherently violent and undemocratic nature of politics 
and power relations in the colonial period has become embedded in the post-colonial African 
state, providing the context for the majority of inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the post-
colonial period. She suggests that colonialism was legitimized through the Western world’s 
monopoly on violence, and that their control of colonies in the global South was only made 
possible through the use of divisive strategies that took advantage of existing class, ethnic, and 
religious cleavages. According to Achankeng (2013), the complete absence of non-coercive 
governance experienced during the colonial period was not addressed during decolonization, 
leaving newly independent African leaders to pursue state building with the same coercive 
strategies of their former colonial powers.  Wong (2012) further argues that the post-colonial 
African state structure is virtually indistinguishable from its preceding colonial state structure, 
claiming that the post-colonial African state continues to engage in an exploitative core-
periphery relationship with Western powers at the expense of domestic political and economic 
development. He argues that the combination of these global power structures and domestic 
tensions along ethnic, tribal, and socioeconomic lines make the neo-colonial African state 
particularly vulnerable to conflict. Most importantly, the regional nature of neo-colonial 
economic and political ties via resource trade and cross-border political and ethnic interests 
causes conflicts to spill across borders, creating regional conflict systems (Wong, 2012).  
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Transnational Ties and Refugee Flows 
Perhaps the most prominent explanation for conflict diffusion in Africa is transnational ethnic 
ties. Carmignani and Kler (2016) argue that the high level of ethnic partitioning caused by the 
arbitrary drawing of boundaries in Sub-Saharan Africa makes the diffusion of ethnic conflict 
across borders much more likely in this region than the rest of the world, highlighting that ethnic 
partitioning in Sub-Saharan Africa is 53 percent compared to the rest of the world’s average of 
17 percent (p. 111). Some of the possible mechanisms through which ethnic ties across borders 
increase the likelihood of conflict diffusion are the potential for conflict in one country to make 
similar ethnic groups in neighboring countries more aware of their own marginalization, as well 
as its potential to raise expectations and fears of ethnic conflict within bordering countries 
(Kuran, 1998). In addition, ethnic conflict in neighboring countries can change perceptions about 
the plausibility of using violence to change existing power dynamics, leading ethnic groups to 
believe that they will be able to achieve similar ends through similar forms of violence (Lake & 
Rothchild).  
 In addition, beliefs about the salience of ethnicity in politics and social life can also shift 
in problematic ways when groups in bordering countries observe the conflict dynamics of ethnic 
groups in neighboring countries (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). In particular, ethnic conflict in 
neighboring countries may result in shifting beliefs about the ability of political safeguards to 
maintain existing “ethnic contracts,” leading to increased motivation to use violence on the part 
of the majority and greater fear of being targeting on the part of the minority group, both of 
which may lead to the choice to participate in violence (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). Further, 
authors such Forsberg (2008) argue that mobilization by ethnic groups on one side of the border 
may actually alter the physical capacity of the same ethnic group in a neighboring country in 
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ways that permit and facilitate the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) 
support the findings of the above authors, adding that transnational ethnic and tribal ties tend to 
make the diffusion of certain kinds of conflict more likely. Specifically, they argue that 
transnational ties increase the likelihood of separatist conflict in neighboring countries more than 
the likelihood of conflicts centered on control of the government (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008).  
 Another explanation for conflict diffusion that is often tied to transnational ethnic ties is 
refugee flows. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that international refugee migration often 
transports conflict across borders through two related processes. The first of these processes is 
the expansion of social networks from the refugees’ countries of origin to the host state through 
continued ties to the homeland, which extends the geographic bounds of the conflict beyond the 
country of origin. This expansion of social networks and conflict is often exacerbated by the 
forging of new social networks between refugee populations and local populations who share 
similar ethnic or political ties. The second process through which refugees are thought to 
facilitate conflict diffusion into neighboring countries is the experience of negative externalities 
associated with their arrival, such as economic decline, the spread of infectious disease, and 
shifting ethnic demographics of receiving areas (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006).  
 Refugees may also facilitate conflict diffusion across borders in cases of refugee 
militarization. Ansorg (2014) asserts that militarized refugees often bring conflict into the host 
country by using refugee camps as bases from which to attack the country of origin, as well as 
utilizing humanitarian aid to fund military campaigns. She suggests that this often leads to 
violent reactions from the government of the country of origin and the host government, both of 
which view the armed refugee groups as a threat to national security. In addition, she claims that 
militarized refugees may contribute to an escalation of violence in the region in which they are 
 16 
operating by raising security concerns and increasing militancy among the local population 
(Ansorg, 2014).  
 Adding to the above theories on refugees and conflict diffusion, Fisk (2014) finds that the 
manner in which refugees are settled in host states impacts the likelihood that they will 
contribute to conflict spillover. She argues that refugee crises in which refugees are self-settled 
rather than being placed in refugee camps are less likely to result in conflict diffusion into the 
host state, attributing this finding to a decrease in the negative economic and social impacts of 
refugee inflows when they are dispersed among the local population (Fisk, 2014). In this case, 
the conflict-inducing nature of refugees is attributed primarily to the negative externalities 
caused for host populations, rather than the expansion of social, political, and economic networks 
from the country of origin to the host country.  
Natural Resources and Transnational Economies 
 Another explanation for conflict diffusion focuses on transnational economic networks. 
Ansorg (2014) argues that relatively weak state structures in Sub-Saharan Africa facilitate the 
establishment of regional economic networks by non-state actors, which leads to regional 
funding of armed violence and its extension into neighboring countries. She claims that 
neighboring territories often become transit sites or markets for valuable resources that are a 
source of conflict in the producing country, suggesting that conflict diffusion occurs when the 
government of origin or neighboring government engages in conflict with armed groups in 
response to illegal cross-border trade. An alternate dynamic that may occur to induce conflict is 
the support of these networks and groups by neighboring governments, who have an economic 
and political interest in supporting the activity of armed groups in control of regional resources 
(Ansorg, 2014).  
 17 
 
 Balestri and Maggioni (2014) also assess the role of natural resources in conflict 
diffusion, using an analysis of West Africa to assess the impact of diamonds, gold, and other 
resources on conflict in the region. They find that resource economies driven by gold and 
diamonds played an instrumental role in conflicts in neighboring countries throughout West 
Africa between 1989 and 2006, arguing that the existence of porous borders between Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Côte D’Ivore, and Gineau allowed for the establishment of economic networks 
through which easily exploited resources facilitated the spread of weapons, combatants, and 
conflict across borders (Balestri & Maggioni, 2014). Harpviken (2010) also uses West Africa as 
a case study of natural resources and regional conflict, paying particular attention to the role of 
the state in instigating and supporting transnational violence. He argues that government officials 
often deliberately support armed groups in their own states and in neighboring states in order to 
maintain control of illegal natural resource markets, contributing to the spread of conflict 
throughout the region. In addition, Harpevin (2010) suggests that governments may also become 
involved in conflicts in neighboring countries in order to distract their own populations from the 
failures and corruption of the state. According to Harpevin (2010), these actions on the part of 
governments combine with the destablizing cross-border flow of weapons, goods, and political 
ideologies to create the conditions for regional conflict systems.  
Structural Adjustment  
 One of the least explored explanations for conflict and conflict diffusion focuses on the 
role of international economic policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly structural adjustment 
programs and loans from supranational economic organizations. While its direct relationship to 
conflict and its spatial distribution has been understudied, there is a wide body of literature on 
the overall impacts of structural adjustment for African politics and economics. Riddell (1992) 
 18 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the implications of the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) structural adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, arguing that they negatively alter the 
lives of individuals, as well as reshaping the economic and political landscape of states in 
detrimental ways. According to Riddell (1992), structural adjustment results in a decreased 
standard of living, increased rural-urban divides, exacerbated poverty, and underdevelopment. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, he argues that structural adjustment programs weaken the 
state apparatus by causing a loss of power and removing the state from involvement in 
development processes, which renders the state unable to provide services such as education and 
employment. Bangura (2007) further studies the impact of IMF structural adjustment programs 
on domestic governments, arguing that their structure pushes African states toward increasingly 
authoritarian policies and undermines democratic development. Beckman (1989) also argues that 
structural adjustment leads to authoritarian governments, further claiming that the necessity for 
authoritarianism in structural adjustment makes African governments undertaking it inherently 
unstable in the long run.   
 With regard to West Africa specifically, authors such as Meagher (2003) have tied the 
impacts of structural adjustment in the region to shifting patterns in transborder trade and the 
growth of the region’s informal economy. Meagher (2003) argues that structural adjustment had 
a number of macro level consequences on fiscal and monetary disparities between countries, as 
well as creating large price disparities for goods across the sub region. These trends resulted in 
an increased incentive to use informal transborder trade to gain access to foreign exchange and 
commodity markets with higher prices for goods. In addition to these structural impacts, 
Meagher (2003) also suggests that the micro level impacts on employment and standard of living 
that accompanied structural adjustment encouraged increased participation in transborder trade, 
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both as a means to generate income and a way to cut consumer costs. Importantly, though she 
does not directly tie the growth of the informal economy to conflict, Meagher (2003) does tie 
structural adjustment and the shift toward informal trade that it causes to processes of state 
collapse and loss of control, arguing that structural adjustment is designed to dismantle the state 
and removes the ability of developing governments to provide an economic alternative to 
transborder markets. Given the above arguments about the role of transnational resource 
economies in the conflicts of West Africa, this link between structural adjustment, state failure, 
and informal economy also suggests a possible link between structural adjustment and conflict 
diffusion across borders.  
 While the above authors clearly outline a number of relationships between structural 
adjustment and political economy conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, they do not directly link 
these outcomes to conflict in the region. However, Ndulo (2003) does extend his analysis of 
structural adjustment processes to make a connection between adjustment and conflict, arguing 
that structural adjustment programs exacerbate poverty and rural-urban divides, as well as 
depriving governments of the resources necessary to develop strong and democratic political 
institutions. When this occurs, governments and populations become vulnerable to domestic 
conflict and conflict diffusion due to the lack of checks and balances on governments throughout 
the region, as well as the increased political and economic incentives for participation in 
conflicts in neighboring countries (Ndulo, 2003).  
 Adekanye (1995) also argues that international economic interventions increase the 
likelihood of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, tying their impacts to the growth of ethnopolitical 
struggles across the continent. He argues that the growing debt of African states, internationally 
imposed structural adjustment programs, and the economic crises that often accompany such 
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economic policies often lead to violent struggle over the distribution of power and wealth. He 
further claims that structural adjustment programs in particular have a number of internal 
contradictions that undermine their practical success and facilitate conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 
through the exacerbation of existing ethnic divides and ethnicallly driven political processes. 
With this argument, Adekanye (1995) suggests that many of the African conflicts that have been 
characterized as ethnic and political struggles are in reality a manifestation of resistance against 
structural adjustment and its implications for African economies and political relationships 
(Adekanye, 1995).  
 In exploring the impact of structural adjustment on ethnic conflict in particular, Storey 
(1999) uses an analysis of ethnic conflict and genocide in Rwanda to assess the conditions under 
which economic restructuring can lead to ethnic violence, arguing that the case of Rwanda 
suggests that structural adjustment programs designed to favor one area of the economy over 
another can exacerbate ethnic tensions in economies in which the division of labor occurs along 
ethnic lines. For example, in the case of Rwanda, societal perceptions that one of the two major 
ethnic groups was concentrated in the public sector and the other major ethnic group 
concentrated in the private sector increased ethnic tensions when structural adjustment resulted 
in the favoring of the private sector over the public sector (Storey, 1999). However, Storey 
(1999) also found that the impacts of structural adjustment in the agricultural sector, which did 
not have an ethnic division of labor, also increased ethnic tensions by creating additional 
competition for already scarce land through the commercialization of agriculture. While these 
findings on structural adjustment and conflict are limited to one country, they suggest that 
structural adjustment’s economic consequences may be an underlying factor in ethnic conflict.  
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Gaps in the Literature 
 While the existing bodies of literature on  conflict and conflict diffusion are extensive, 
there are a number of problematic tendencies and gaps in theories explaining its prevalence and 
persistence in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, there is a reliance on explanations involving 
transnational ethnic ties, which results from a focus on the Great Lakes region in the majority of 
studies. While the Great Lakes is an important case study of the dynamics of conflict diffusion, 
the region has a number of unique characteristics that do not apply to the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the most important of which are a particular colonial history and experience of ethnic 
tensions. Given this fact, studies including the Great Lakes tend to conclude that those particular 
dynamics explain conflict diffusion throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, despite their lack of 
applicability to the other sub-regions. Further, the literature that does examine cases other than 
the Great Lakes overwhelmingly focuses on individual explanations in each particular case of 
conflict, such as natural resource economies and state failure. While these variables may in fact 
contribute to conflict, individual explanations often pay insufficent attention to the overarching 
intersections between constellations of global power and domestic economic and political 
dynamics, failing to capture the importance of global and regional processes in conflict 
development and diffusion. This results in a lack of theoretical framing of the issue and an 
overreliance on region-specific explanations. 
1.2 Methodology  
Case Studies 
 Informed by the above bodies of literature on conflict and conflict diffusion, this thesis 
will explore the processes of conflict development and its possible transborder diffusion in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire through a political economy lens. The choice of West 
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Africa as a region, and the above three countries in particular, was deliberate; and the case 
studies are designed to avoid several biases common in studies of Sub-Saharan African conflicts. 
First, the cases were selected to avoid the overreliance on ethnic tensions that often results from 
studies on the Great Lakes region. Though the West Africa region has a complex history of 
ethnic tensions, the dynamics at play in ethnic interactions and struggles in West Africa in the 
colonial and post-colonial periods were significantly different from those experienced in the 
Great Lakes region, providing alternative case studies in which ethnic tensions may have been 
present without becoming a driving factor in the conflicts. In addition, the conflicts in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire were contemporary to those in the Great Lakes Region but have 
been understudied in comparison, providing an ideal location to reconsider questions of conflict 
and conflict diffusion.  
The choice of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire also addresses the possibility of 
bias related to specific colonial powers by providing varying experiences with colonialism and 
neo-colonialism under the British and the French, as well as a unique experience of pseudo-
colonialism under the United States in the case of Liberia. By analyzing countries with unique 
colonial legacies, I will be able to more easily isolate the varying impacts of those experiences 
on conflict and its distribution. The variation in colonial experiences also means that the three 
countries experienced different pressures leading up to the introduction of structural adjustment 
programs, as well as diverse experiences with types of adjustment policies and degrees of 
implementation in the adjustment period. This will allow for an exploration of the degree to 
which adjustment impacts conflict based upon the nature of the adjustment policies and the level 
of implementation of those policies.   
 
 23 
Data Collection 
The analysis of conflict in the three countries is based on a combination of historical data, 
ethnographic accounts, and political economy indicators. First, I provide an in-depth qualitative 
analysis of the historical processes of development in each of the countries using historical texts 
and scholarship on the region. This historical data will be focused on three distinct periods: (1) 
the colonial period, (2) the post-colonial, state-building period leading up to the onset of conflict, 
and (3) the conflict period(s) themselves. I will focus primarily on the first two periods in 
analyzing potential causes of conflict, only providing a brief outline of the conflict periods in 
order to ascertain whether the conflicts themselves shared similar characteristics and whether 
developments in one conflict impacted developments in the others. For each of the three periods, 
I will focus primarily on political and economic development, paying particular attention to the 
intersections between domestic and international power dynamics. However, in order to provide 
sufficient context for an analysis of the political economy contributors to conflict, I will also 
provide some assessment of social aspects of life and how they were impacted during the distinct 
periods of development.  
 Having provided the historical context for the development of the three countries as 
colonial and then independent states, I conduct an analysis of structural adjustment in the three 
countries and its impact on development and stability. This assessment contains analysis of 
changes in living standards measured by income levels, education, health, and various other 
socioeconomic indicators. I also measure the impact of structural adjustment on debt levels for 
the three countries, assessing how these levels impacted economic conditions and political 
stability. The political economy indicators are supplemented by qualitative analysis of changes to 
social and political experiences and structures that occurred in the post-adjustment period in 
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order to determine whether foreign economic intervention in the form of structural adjustment 
programs was a causal factor in the outbreak of civil conflict. Lastly, I use measures of formal 
and informal trade to assess whether the negative impacts of structural adjustment were 
transmitted across borders through shifting trade patterns, attempting to answer the question of 
whether conflict diffusion or domestic conditions were the primary cause of conflict in the sub-
region.  
Limitations 
In conducting this research, I faced a number of limitations, one of the most important of 
which was a lack of complete and accurate data on the case study countries. Due to a lack of 
state capacity in all three countries in the immediate post-colonial period, the statistical offices of 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire did not consistently track and publish statistics on basic 
development indicators such as poverty rates, primary school enrollment, and unemployment for 
the time periods I will be studying. While organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have filled some of the data gap with estimates and figures 
gathered by international NGOs and financial institutions, including themselves, there remain 
significant gaps in these indicators from independence in the 1960s to the latter half of the 1990s. 
The area with the largest information gap is poverty, and there is no comprehensive set of 
poverty data for any of the three countries in the decades following structural adjustment and 
leading up to the outbreak of conflict. Due to these data constraints, I have chosen to use proxy 
indicators such as GDP per capita and primary school enrollment to measure changes in standard 
of living caused by structural adjustment programs. I also include indicators on poverty and 
health, where available, though they were not gathered or measured in a consistent manner, thus 
making direct comparison difficult. 
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 In addition to a lack of domestic data, there is also a gap in available data on transborder 
relationships, both formal and informal. IMF datasets do provide some intermittent statistics on 
levels of formal trade between the three countries, but the statistics have a large margin of error 
and are missing for many of the years during which structural adjustment occurred. However, I 
will utilize the statistics that are available to determine whether there are any possible patterns, 
addressing the additional information needed to arrive at a definitive conclusion on shifts in 
formal trade. For Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire specifically, there is also very little 
measurable data on informal networks between the three countries; and this is a significant 
barrier to a definitive assessment of whether informal trade between the three countries served as 
a mechanism through which conflict was spread. However, there are some available statistics on 
the overall size of the three countries’ shadow economies, and I will utilize these to determine 
whether there is any possible relationship between structural adjustment, informal trade, and 
conflict spillover. 
Another important limitation in my research is the number of possible variables that may 
have contributed to the occurrence and spread of conflict and the fact that the scope of this 
project does not allow for a comprehensive exploration of all of those variables. As stated above, 
I have narrowed my focus to the political economy in the form of foreign economic intervention; 
and the primary reason for this is that it will allow me to address many of the variables outlined 
in the literature review such as colonial legacy, domestic underdevelopment, natural resource 
economies, and structural adjustment. However, there remain a number of factors that will not be 
addressed in a comprehensive manner due to the limited scope of this research. One of those is 
the role of refugees and transnational kinship networks in the occurrence of conflict and conflict 
diffusion in the three countries. The choice to exclude these variables was based on several 
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factors. First, there is a limited amount of available data on numbers of refugees and 
transnational kinship networks in all three cases. Second, international political economy 
explanations focusing on global power dynamics have been understudied in comparison to 
explanations focusing on refugees. For these reasons, I will not conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of data on those variables.  
In addition to the above limitations, the exploration of structural adjustment as a causal 
variable in conflict and conflict diffusion presents two important limitations. First, the complex 
and varied nature of structural adjustment programs limits my ability to argue that structural 
adjustment as a whole is a primary cause of conflict. As previously stated, structural adjustment 
varies by country and can mean significantly different things in different countries. Given the 
diversity of experiences with policies and implementation, it is difficult to determine whether the 
programs as a whole drive conflict, or whether there are particular aspects of the programs that 
contribute to instability and violence. Though this is a significant limitation, I will attempt to 
address it by examining the differences and similarities in policies and implementation in the 
three separate countries in detail in order to isolate the particular policies and processes that have 
the potential to contribute to conflict. In addition, there is the issue of the counterfactual and 
what would have happened had structural adjustment not been introduced. Given the absence of 
comparable cases in the region in which structural adjustment was not implemented, it is not 
possible to prove definitively that structural adjustment is the primary cause of conflict in the 
three countries. It is, however, be possible to determine whether structural adjustment impacts 
domestic and regional processes in ways that have the potential to contribute to conflict; and this 
will be the focus of my argument.  
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1.3 Concluding Remarks  
 The literature review on conflict and conflict diffusion outlines several key findings and 
debates regarding the incidence of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, the literature highlights 
disagreements over whether conflict clustering in neighboring countries is primarily attributable 
to similar domestic conditions or a function of conflict diffusing across borders. The literature 
review also highlights the wide variety of explanations for conflict that include factors such as 
colonialism, state failure and underdevelopment. In studies on West Africa specifically, the most 
common explanations for conflict involve natural resource economies and their impact on flows 
of illegally produced valuable resources, weapons, and combatants. In addition, the literature 
review highlights findings on the negative impacts of structural adjustment and how they 
contribute to the growth of transborder economic networks blamed for conflict in West Africa. In 
the following chapter, I will set the stage for the exploration of these possible mechanisms 
through which conflict occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire through qualitative 
historical profiles of the three countries.  
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Chapter 2 
Colonialism, State-building, and Conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire 
 This chapter is comprised of historical profiles of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire that are designed to provide context for the conflicts analysis of the countries’ colonial 
and post-colonial histories leading up to the outbreak of conflict. The historical analysis for each 
country includes two main components. The first component is a timeline of events beginning 
with the colonial period and ending with a brief summary of the conflicts themselves; and the 
second component is an analysis of key factors that contributed to the immediate outbreak of 
conflict in each country. I organize the countries in order of the occurrence of conflict, beginning 
with Liberia, following with Sierra Leone, and ending with Côte d’Ivoire. At the end of the 
chapter, I briefly summarize the findings on the three countries, highlighting the similarities 
across cases and discussing their relevance for my argument on the political economy causes of 
conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.  
The profiles of the three countries demonstrate several important historical trends. First, 
the country profiles suggest that the historical development of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire was significantly impacted by the focus of Western colonial powers on lucrative 
industries such as mining and commercial agriculture during the colonial period of economic 
defelopment.  The historical analysis further demonstrates that colonial experiences shaped 
group dynamics based on regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic differences that were necessitated 
and encouraged by the economic dynamics at play under the colonial powers. Importantly, 
qualitative analysis of the three countries suggests that these developments of the colonial period 
combined to create unequal post-colonial states, where economic and political opportunity was 
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limited to certain segments of the population. Finally, the sections detailing the factors 
contributing to the outbreak of conflcit suggest that the above processes resulted in the 
marginalization of a significant proportion of the population, particularly youth, who were a 
driving force behind the violent conflicts.   
2.1 Conflict in Liberia  
Introduction 
 Given its history as a country that was not formally colonized by a Western power but 
shared a formative, and unequal, relationship with the United States, Liberia is an interesting 
case study of foreign intervention in the colonial and post-colonial periods. Analysis of its 
historical development highlights several key factors regarding its experiences with instability 
and violent conflict. In the case of Liberia, the early period of ‘independence’ was characterized 
by the solidification of settler-hinterland divisions along socioeconomic lines, which was 
facilitated by external political pressures and particular economic relationships at the domestic 
and global levels. These divisions were expanded along regional and ethnic lines as the country 
further developed as a peripheral capitalist economy and were then highlighted by the economic 
challenges of the 1970s and 1980s. By this point, inequalities between groups were deeply rooted 
and institutionalized; and marginalized groups such as Liberia’s youth saw conflict as an avenue 
through which to address their exclusion from economic and political opportunities. 
American ‘Colonialism’ and State Formation 
 The territory of contemporary Liberia was first settled in 1822, with the arrival of freed 
slaves from the United States, Barbados, and the Congo and the creation of a settlement in the 
future capital of Monrovia (Harris, 2012). These settlers, who became known as Americo-
Liberians, inhabited only the coastline of the country for nearly a century following their arrival, 
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and interactions between the settlement and hinterland territories occupied by indigenous groups 
were limited. This pattern was not significantly altered when the Americo-Liberian government 
declared independence in 1847, and the newly independent state of Liberia maintained its 
disinterest in the indigenous population in favor of coastal development for almost forty years. 
However, following the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, the purpose of which was to regulate 
European colonization and trade in Africa, Liberia’s settler leadership was compelled to attempt 
the subjugation of the indigenous African community and the territory they occupied (Harris, 
2012). The necessity for these actions on the part of the Liberian government was fueled by 
increasingly aggressive attempts by the British and the French to acquire territories in Liberia’s 
hinterlands with the justification that the government was not effectively occupying those areas; 
and the resulting 19th and 20th century settlement-hinterland relations would play a large role in 
shaping the political landscape of Liberia in the years leading up to the country’s two civil wars 
(Akpan, 1973).  
 The Americo-Liberian quest for control over indigenous Liberians was characterized by 
institutionalized attitudes and policies of settler superiority. This is evidenced by the inclusion of 
statements of the role of the settlers in the “enlightenment of the benighted continent’ in the 1847 
constitution, as well as persistent portrayals of Americo-Liberians as pinnacles of enlightenment, 
progress, and democracy in artwork and statues throughout the settlement. By the early 1900s, 
the combination of pressure from external colonial powers and prevailing attitudes about the role 
of Americo-Liberians in the development of Liberia had resulted in paternalistic attempts to 
‘civilize’ the indigenous populations and bring them into the nation-state of Liberia. One method 
through which this was attempted was the conferral of citizenship on all potential Liberians and 
the extension of central government control over the hinterland during the first decade of the 
 31 
1900s (Harris, 2012). However, increasingly aggressive threats from Britain, France, and coastal 
indigenous populations soon resulted in a shift in policy on the part of the Liberian government, 
and coercion rapidly replaced persuasive and paternalistic approaches to relations with 
indigenous communities. Within this system, it became increasingly difficult for indigenous 
Liberians to obtain wealth or political power. This was in part due to restrictive policies on 
citizenship, which only allowed citizenship and the rights that accompanied it to be given to 
Liberians who could prove that they were ‘civilized’ through exchanging traditional religious 
practices for Christianity, adopting an Americo-Liberian “lifestyle,” and owning land (Harris, 
2012).  
 While settlement-hinterland relations were primarily characterized by coercion and 
domination, the Americo-Liberian approach to Liberia’s hinterland populations also involved a 
significant amount of cooperation from indigenous rulers in a system of indirect rule. This 
system of rule was solidified under President Barclay in the early 1900s and was predicated on 
two main modes of control. The first of these was a provincial administrative system through 
which the settler government was able to achieve control and sovereignty over the interior 
through the reorganization of indigenous communities into clans and the installation of clan 
chiefs in positions of political and administrative power. The central government then assigned 
clan chiefs the responsibilities of maintaining order in their clan territories, collecting taxes for 
the central government, and recruiting labor for public projects (Munive, 2011).  
In addition to these changes, larger existing chiefdoms in the hinterland were transformed 
into districts, and each district was assigned a commissioner responsible for performing both 
executive and judicial functions for the territory under his control. Through these administrative 
and political changes, the settler leadership provided an incentive for indigenous elite to carry 
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out its interests in the interior, while simultaneously transforming the hinterland into a source of 
wealth and revenue for political leaders in the capital. The political transformation also provided 
the opportunity for local leaders to establish economic and political hierarchies based on systems 
of patronage and privilege, a process that resulted in continually widening gaps in political and 
economic power among indigenous populations, as well as competition between ethnic groups 
over political favor from the central government (Munive, 2011).  
 The second component to the central government’s control of the hinterlands was the 
establishment of the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) as a military force to support and enforce the 
newly established political and administrative systems in the hinterlands (Munive, 2011). Prior to 
the establishment of the LFF, Liberia’s territory was protected by a militia that was confined to a 
forty-mile coastal area called the “constitutional zone”; and it was used during the nineteenth 
century to defend the Americo-Liberian settlement against indigenous groups, expand the 
authority of the Liberian state, and prevent slave traders from operating within the borders of 
Liberia. Importantly, the Liberian militia was not comprised of full-time soldiers, but was made 
up of male colonists who became combatants only in times of danger or crisis. This arrangement 
was a conscious decision made to reflect the Liberian constitution, which prevented the creation 
of a standing army with the justification that standing armies in peacetime posed a threat to 
liberty and political stability (Nevin, 2011). 
 While reservations about the dangers of standing armies remained prominent throughout 
the nineteenth century, increasingly contentious relations with foreign powers and persistent loss 
of territory to Britain and France placed pressure on the Liberian state to extend its power and 
military presence throughout its claimed territory. With the original establishment of the 
Republic of Liberia, the settler colony had claimed territories “northeast from the Atlantic littoral 
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all the way to the headwaters of the Niger River” (Nevin, 2011, p. 279).  However, colonial 
armies of the British and French gradually established control of much of this claimed territory 
through the signing of treaties with local indigenous chiefs, claiming that it was necessary to 
create secure borders that allowed for the control of tribes in conflict with one another in the 
interior. This justification became an institutionalized policy with the Liberian-French Treaty of 
1907, which allowed the French to place their own forces on Liberian territory in the event that 
the central government could not adequately police borders through a frontier force. This 
development left the Liberian government with little choice but to establish a standing army, and 
the Liberian legislature passed a Joint Resolution for the creation of the LFF in 1908, allocating 
$60,000 dollars for the creation and maintenance of frontier garrisons (Nevin, 2011).  
 While the original purpose of the LFF was to maintain border security and central 
government control over the interior, it soon became a vehicle through which the central 
government created divisions and rivalries among ethnic and tribal lines. As with the 
administrative system of indirect rule, the LFF was organized in a hierarchy based on ethnicity. 
Americo-Liberian men were placed in officer positions, while members of ethnic groups deemed 
most likely to be “loyal” to the central government were recruited for enlisted positions. Despite 
being placed in positions inferior to those of Americo-Liberians, indigenous LFF soldiers and the 
tribes that allowed military garrisons in their districts benefitted both economically and 
politically, gaining superior positions to other tribes and districts. In addition, as the LFF became 
larger and more powerful, indigenous groups increasingly chose to align themselves with LFF 
conquests in order to further their own objectives with regard to acquisition of territory and 
resources. Through this process, traditional tribal warfare was magnified to an unprecedented 
 34 
level and the rivalries caused by the introduction of the indirect administrative system of rule 
exacerbated (Nevin, 2011). 
 In addition to the increased regional tensions that accompanied the central government’s 
activities in the hinterland, settler-indigenous relations were further complicated by the legacy of 
slavery and its de facto continuation through a system of forced labor in the 20th century. During 
this time, indigenous populations were conscripted for labor both within and outside of Liberia in 
a system that was only slightly different from the traditional forms of slavery that had existed in 
the country prior to the 1900s. The use of forced labor internally was justified by the central 
government’s need for manual labor in public works and the construction of infrastructure such 
as bridges and roads; and the responsibility of supplying that labor fell to the newly established 
paramount chiefs through an official system of government requests and labor quotas (Munive, 
2011). Beginning in 1912, two forms of exported labor also became common. The first of these 
was the use of laborers as stevedores on steamers up and down the coast of West Africa, and the 
second was the shipping of contracted indigenous laborers from Liberia to plantations and mines 
in English, German, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies in neighboring countries. The central 
government relied largely on the LFF to recruit labor to be exported; and under this system, 
cooperating chiefs, soldiers, and central government officials accumulated large amounts of 
wealth (Akingbade, 1997).  
 Another occurrence that shaped the economic and political development of early Liberia 
was the introduction of the rubber industry and the foreign ties that accompanied its expansion. 
The rubber industry in Liberia boomed beginning in 1926 when the government invited the US-
based Firestone company to establish a presence in the country in exchange for economic favors 
(Lindberg, 2014). This economic exchange took the form of a loan to the Liberian government 
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from a Firestone subsidiary in the amount of $5 million dollars. In return, the government 
granted Firestone Company “the right to lease up to one million acres of rubber growing land for 
ninety-nine years [with] a 2.5 percent revenue tax [to] to be paid on the value of all products 
shipped after the first six years” (Chalk, 1967, p. 31). However, low rubber prices resulted in a 
lack of production by Firestone for seven years following the agreement and the Liberian 
government found it impossible to repay the loan without the expected revenue of the rubber 
export tax, causing a loan crisis in 1933. While this was resolved without violence between the 
United States and Liberia, the consequence of the loan was long-term economic dependence on 
the United States and a loss of control over one of the country’s most valuable resources (Chalk, 
1967).  
Pre-War Political Landscape (1971-1980) 
Despite internal and external political tensions during its development, Liberia 
experienced relative political stability from the time of independence until the early 1970s. 
During this time, the government was dominated by a single political party, the True Whig Party 
(TWP). Comprised of Americo-Liberian settlers and their descendants, the TWP was founded in 
1869 and was predicated on Western ideals of Christianity and capitalist markets. As a result of 
the unequal power dynamics between the settler population and indigenous populations, the 
party faced little competition in national politics until the death of President William Tubman in 
1971. Also a member of the TWP, Tubman’s successor, William Tolbert, attempted to diffuse 
increasing tensions caused by economic and political disparities between regions and ethnic 
groups through halfhearted reforms in government and education. When he took office, Tolbert 
expressed a desire to “dismantle his predecessor’s patronage network… [and establish] for 
himself a base of support consisting of a broad coalition of the newly emergent groups in 
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Liberian society who would most benefit… including educated young professionals and students, 
entrepreneurs, educated rural dwellers, and the professional military” (Pham, 2004, pp. 74-75).  
However, while he showed some inclination to expand economic and political 
opportunities beyond Americo-Liberian groups, Tolbert’s continuation of the government’s 
historically autocratic approach in the face of these limited reforms resulted in increasingly 
widespread opposition to the government in both the capital and the interior. In addition, the 
benefits promised to the groups Tolbert was attempting to incorporate into the state structure 
were slow enough in coming to fruition that those groups were not fully committed to supporting 
his regime for most of the 1970s. However, the changes made by his administration were enough 
to alienate the Americo-Liberian elite who had traditionally formed the core of the political and 
economic structure of the country. The combination of these two factors significantly weakened 
Tolbert and resulted in a general lack of support for his leadership throughout the decade (Pham, 
2004).  This opposition was further fueled by Tolbert’s blatant exploitation of the country’s 
resources for his own personal gain and the gain of his inner circle of political elites (Waugh, 
2011). The extreme extent of Tolbert’s exploitative rule is evidenced by the fact that, during his 
presidency, inequality increased steadily increased until 4 percent of the population, most of 
which was Americo-Liberian, owned over 60 percent of the country’s total wealth (Harris, 
2012). 
 Tolbert’s failure to address issues of inequality and political domination resulted in the 
development of a number of opposition groups throughout the 1970s. One of the first of these 
was the Pan-Africanist Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), which was a left-wing party 
founded by native Liberian, Togba-Nah Tipoteh, at the University of Liberia in 1973. Over the 
next seven years, groups such as the All People’s Freedom Alliance and the Progressive Alliance 
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of Liberia (PAL) were also created by dissident members of the population; and the PAL became 
the official opposition party to the TWP in 1978. There were also a number of student 
organizations that developed during this time, including the Student Unification Party for Free 
and Fair Elections (SUP) and the Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY). At the same time, a 
significant proportion of Liberia’s population continued to show support for the government; and 
Americo-Liberian students formed the All Student Alliance Party (ASAP) with the purpose of 
lobbying for the continuation of Americo-Liberian domination (Waugh, 2011).  
 During this period of political proliferation, Tolbert’s attempts to maintain power against 
the opposition were further compromised by the country’s problematic economic situation. 
During his decade of rule, the country experienced the negative impacts of a downturn in 
primary commodity prices and global oil crises, both of which highlighted the country’s 
detrimental reliance on exports for economic growth and stability. Tensions over economic 
issues continued to grow, and in April of 1979 there were riots over a 50 percent increase in the 
subsidized price of rice, necessitating a military intervention of contracted Guinean troops to 
maintain Tolbert’s control. In response to the growing instability, Tolbert ordered the arrest and 
detention of several opposition group leaders, who were subsequently charged with treason. 
However, this failed to quell opposition to his government; and in April of 1980, junior military 
officer Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe seized power in a military coup, killing President Tolbert 
and thirteen high ranking officers of the TWP (Harris, 2012).  
 Initially, Doe justified the coup with claims of his intentions to spearhead a “Liberian 
Revolution” through which the living conditions and political rights of all Liberians would be 
enhanced. He then appointed indigenous opposition members to ministerial positions in his new 
cabinet. Among these leaders were Togba Nah Tipoteh and Charles Taylor, who had returned 
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from schooling in the United States and military training in Libya to take up arms against the 
Liberian government. However, despite this promising beginning, Doe quickly turned to 
authoritarian tactics in an attempt to maintain complete political and economic power, beginning 
a systematic campaign against dissident Liberians. During his first several years in office, he 
killed and exiled important leaders of political parties and ethnic groups that he viewed as a 
threat, eventually removing the majority of indigenous representatives from his cabinet and 
replacing them with members of his native Krahn tribe. Doe’s tactics drew international 
condemnation in 1984, when he announced his intention to run in the 1985 general elections as a 
member of the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL); and in 1985, the only surviving 
member of the original fourteen coup participants, Thomas Quiwonkpa, made an unsuccessful 
attempt to remove him from power. In response, Doe ordered the deaths of over 3000 people 
from Quiwonkpa’s home region, sparking anger and protests from Liberian civilians. The coup 
also resulted in Charles Taylor’s flight to the United States, where he subsequently escaped 
while awaiting extradition to Liberia for corruption charges in 1985 (Sesay, 2009).  
In addition to his problematic authoritarian tendencies, Doe also failed to deliver on 
promises to reverse the economic decline that was occurring in the country at the time of his 
ascent to power. Within five months of taking office, Doe had entered into the first of a series of 
devastating structural adjustment lending programs with the IMF in an attempt to combat the 
combination of economic stagnation and growing foreign debt that had characterized the 
Liberian economy throughout the 1970s. However, these programs caused economic shocks 
throughout the economy and added to the already strenuous burden of repayment faced by the 
government, exacerbating the economic situation in the country (Kieh, 2009a).  It was within this 
context of worsening economic and political conditions that Taylor returned to West Africa; and 
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in 1989, he and his NPFL troops launched an attack on Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire (Sesay, 2003). 
The NPFL’s presence in Côte d’Ivoire was ignored by the government, who viewed Tylor as a 
potential ally in a region that was increasingly dominated by the former British colony of Nigeria 
in both the political and economic spheres (Huband, 1998).  
Civil Conflicts (1989-1997 and 1999-2003) 
 Given the lack of success of the 1985 coup attempt, Doe initially dismissed the NPFL 
threat to his government. Instead of using the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to remove Taylor’s 
forces from the territory, Doe chose to deploy the AFL to target members of the civilian 
population in the NPFL rebels’ home of Nimba Country in retaliation for the attacks. However, 
this strategy ended up further alienating indigenous populations and causing the Gio and Mano 
ethnic groups to join the NPFL’s cause. With their participation, the NPFL began to target 
civilians of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups with the justification that they were 
supporters of the Doe regime and that the AFL was comprised of mostly members of the Krahn 
ethnic group. Within six months of the invasion, the conflict had reached the capital of Monrovia 
and Taylor had gained control of over 90 percent of Liberia’s territory (Sesay, 1996).  
 By this time in the conflict, the relatively clear division between the NPFL and AFL had 
become blurred by a proliferation and splintering of armed groups, often along regional and 
ethnic lines. One of the first instances of this splintering occurred in July of 1991, when a group 
of rebel fighters broke away from the NPFL to create Prince Johnson’s Independent NPFL (Call, 
2010). As the conflict became more complex, the damage and loss of life in Monrovia continued 
to increase, prompting the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to stage a 
peacekeeping intervention in August of 1990 (Mgbeoji, 2003). This initially took the form of the 
ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), whose mandate was centralized in the 
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capital city and restricted to maintaining peace, reinstating a system of law and order, and 
ensuring compliance with a ceasefire. However, the refusal of the NPFL and other groups to 
recognize the legitimacy of any form of external intervention made it impossible for ECOWAS 
troops to enforce a ceasefire, and they were quickly drawn into military engagement with rebel 
troops in the capital (Edu-Afful & Aning, 2015). The ECOWAS mission in Liberia was 
effectively controlled by Nigeria, creating increased hostility on the part of Côte d’Ivoire and 
prompting them to allow the flow of weapons from Burkina Faso to Liberia through the northern 
part of the country (Huband, 1998).  
The ineffectual nature of ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts was further highlighted in 
September of 1990, when Prince Johnson’s Independent NPFL successfully captured, tortured, 
and murdered President Doe in Monrovia (Call, 2010; Sesay, 1996). Over the next several years, 
a number of other armed groups emerged to take part in the conflict, one of the more powerful of 
which was the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). Comprised of 
Krahn and Mandingo elements, as well as refugees from Sierra Leone, ULIMO was founded in 
1991 with the aim of removing Taylor from Liberia. To achieve this, ULIMO fighters joined the 
ECOMOG troops to retake strategic areas of Monrovia from the NPFL (Adeleke, 1995). The 
ULIMO splintered along ethnic lines in 1993, with Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups creating 
separate movements under leaders of their respective ethnic groups (Call, 2010).  
 Though peace talks began in the early months of the conflict, the successful 
implementation of a ceasefire agreement was not achieved until 1996. Between 1990 and 1996, 
there were at least 11 peace agreements made and broken by the multiple parties to the conflict, 
and ECOWAS played a significant role in each round of negotiations. However, despite its 
mandate to facilitate peace, the Nigerian-led ECOWAS force repeatedly stalled the process by 
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refusing to incorporate Taylor and his forces in the peace process. After several failed accords, 
the Nigerian government finally yielded to pressure from Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina 
Faso to incorporate Charles Taylor in the peace process, gaining the cooperation of the NPFL. In 
1996, the Abuja II accord established a framework to end the conflict, and Taylor’s election as 
president in 1997 signaled the official end of the war (Call, 2010). 
 Despite hopes for sustained peace, Taylor’s return to old modes of political elitism and 
exploitation in the years following the accord resulted in a resurgence of political opposition and 
an increasingly unstable political system by 1999 (Dunn, 2011). Tensions were exacerbated by 
Taylor’s repressive response to criticism of the government, and Liberian dissidents both within 
and outside of the country began to demand his removal from power. Another key component to 
Taylor’s unsuccessful leadership was his continuing involvement with Sierra Leone’s rebel 
group, the RUF. During his time in power, he supported their military efforts in Sierra Leone by 
providing logistical support, weapons, and a route through which the rebels could export 
diamonds in order to fund their military campaign (Silberfein, 2004).  
Events came to a head in April of 1999, when a militia called the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launched armed attacks from neighboring Guinea and 
proceeded to gain control of most of the countryside. As the conflict continued, regional tensions 
caused by Taylor’s interference in the politics of Sierra Leone and Guinea resulted in both 
countries providing support for anti-Taylor forces, prolonging the conflict and allowing LURD 
to gain a significant amount of territory over a two-year period. However, in 2002, LURD 
suffered important defeats in several towns and experienced internal divisions that weakened 
their hold on the countryside (Call, 2010). In March of 2003, a group of rebels broke off to create 
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and proceeded to launch attacks into Liberia 
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from Côte d’Ivoire (Kieh, 2009b). Later that year, Taylor was indicted for war crimes by Sierra 
Leone’s Special Court, resulting in his resignation from power and flight to Nigeria. Within two 
weeks of his departure, a peace accord was signed between the two rebel groups and a 
transitional government instated, effectively ending the second civil war (Call, 2010). 
Factors Contributing to Immediate Outbreak of Conflict 
 Several related issues stand out in the conflicts in Liberia. One of the most important of 
these was Liberia’s position as a peripheral capitalist state in the global political economy of the 
19th and 20th centuries. Peripheral capitalist states are defined as states that serve the economic 
needs of core metropolis states through an exploitative international division of labor; and 
Liberia’s role in this system was that of a producer and exporter of “raw materials such as rubber 
and iron ore that [were] used to promote socio-economic development in the metropolis” (Kieh, 
2009a, p. 75). This role had several consequences for the economic and political development of 
the country leading up to the first civil war. First, it ensured the perpetual economic 
underdevelopment of the country by facilitating the funneling of the countries’ resources to 
wealthy Western states and generating an influx of foreign corporations interested in benefitting 
from the countries’ industries. It also had the effect of creating a political environment that 
enabled elite members of the Liberian government to accumulate personal wealth through 
corrupt practices and patron-client relations with the Liberian population and foreign actors 
(Kieh, 2009a).  
 While Liberia’s peripheral status in the global capitalist system was a major component 
to the prevailing political climate of corruption and elitism, the state’s domestic political 
structure also contributed to an exclusive political system through which only elite members of 
society could exercise power. This was largely due to the hegemonic power given to the 
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president through the 1847 constitution and subsequent legislation. One of the most important 
institutional developments was the 1904 Barclay Plan, which allowed the president to act 
autonomously to control the administration of the interior and its indigenous populations. The 
state also established the military under the authority of the president, failing to institute any 
checks on the executive’s use of military force against the population. Further legislation in the 
1930s gave the president the power to suspend constitutional rights in emergency situations, 
effectively allowing the president to commit illegal acts against citizens suspected of opposing 
the government. Through this series of institutional developments, the possibility of political 
inclusion and opposition was severely restricted, paving the way for numerous abuses of power 
by the government (Kieh, 2012).  
 Another factor that contributed to Liberia’s instability was the country’s economic 
relationships with international financial institutions and Western donors. Beginning in the pre-
independence period, the Liberian government amassed crippling debts to the United States and 
other European states, a pattern that continued unabated throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. 
The country’s external debts grew again when it began to engage in business arrangements with 
foreign corporations such as Firestone, granting them rights to some of their most profitable 
industries in exchange for large loans. Following World War II, international finance institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF joined the growing list of creditors to Liberia; and in 1980 
and 1984, the IMF instituted heavy-handed structural adjustment programs in the country. The 
combination of the government’s astronomical loan payments and the negative economic 
impacts of the IMF’s structural adjustment programs resulted in countrywide economic 
hardships such as decreased wages, increased unemployment and a lack of access to public 
services throughout the 1980s (Kieh, 2009a).  
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 While the components and consequences of structural adjustment in the Liberian conflict 
will be addressed in full detail in the following chapter, it is important to note the importance of 
Doe’s response, or lack of adequate response, to the economic shocks and declines that 
accompanied the programs. There is evidence to suggest that, despite issues such as decreased 
wages, increased unemployment, and lack of access to education and health care services, Doe 
and his fellow politicians continued to fund increasingly extravagant lifestyles for themselves 
and a small class of elite at the expense of the majority of the Liberian population, who were 
provided with little government support to ease the negative impacts that accompanied the initial 
adjustment period. This is evidenced by the fact that, between 1980 and 1983, the years 
immediately following the introduction of the first SAP, Doe increased civil service salaries by 
100 percent, while the salaries of the rest of the population were decreasing (Pham, 2004).  
 One of the groups most impacted by the economic and political climate of pre-war 
Liberia were rural youth, and they went on to play key roles in both the first and second conflict. 
In the case of the first civil war, the majority of youth combatants were voluntarily recruited, and 
there is evidence to suggest that their participation was driven by the desire to remove an urban 
elite from power and receive access to education and better economic opportunities. With the 
end of the first conflict and the brief period of peace, young ex-combatants found themselves in 
positions with little social and economic mobility once again, and these youths were the driving 
force behind the attacks that began the second civil war (Utas, 2003). The proportion of youth 
combatants in the Second Liberian Civil War was significantly higher than that of the first, with 
child soldiers constituting only 29 percent of all combatants in the first conflict and 53 percent of 
all combatants in the second conflict (Achvarina & Reich, 2006). 
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 The socioeconomic challenges faced by Liberian youth in the pre-conflict period were 
rooted in historical processes of labor sector development that reached as far back as early 
independence. With the country’s independence, the government began to engage in efforts to 
become urban and modern members of the global capitalist system, and urban centers along the 
coast sprang up as locations for trade, production, commerce, and shipping. All of these sectors 
required manual labor, driving an influx of young males into coastal areas and establishing a 
system of wage labor in the country (Utas, 2010). However, at the same time that this new, 
Western system of wage labor was being established, traditional systems of informality and 
patrimony persisted, and youth were used as the backbone of a labor force designed to 
consolidate wealth and power in the hands of the Americo-Liberian elite and the tribal chiefs 
who had decided to cooperate with them in order to strengthen their own positions in the 
hinterland (Utas, 2010). As the state and economy continued to develop, youth were also 
incorporated into the national military, and later, into the plantation economy in order to provide 
the labor necessary for large-scale resource extraction. This pattern continued throughout the 
first century following independence, with youth increasingly concentrated in resource extraction 
and military work (Munive, 2011; Utas, 2010). Importantly, beginning in the late 1960s, the 
Liberian government began to focus on the recruitment of a very specific demographic for 
military careers, targeting an increasingly large population of unemployed and semiliterate urban 
youth (Sawyer, 2005). This led to a rapid increase in the number of youth with little 
socioeconomic mobility and easy access to arms.  
 With the economic decline of the 1970s, Liberian youth who had previously relied on 
work in shipping yards, plantations, and other unskilled industries found themselves increasingly 
unable to find employment and to generate the income necessary to support themselves. In 
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describing the precarious economic status of Liberian youth in the 1970s, Utas (2010) states: 
“[y]oung men [that] had earlier been able to rely on the income generation of a few years’ work 
on plantations—or similar forms of employment—in order to establish themselves in their home 
villages by investing their saved income… in a farm, a house, wife (or wives) and family… 
[found it] increasingly difficult to obtain funds and the benefits that followed… and were thus 
forced… to survive on underpaid contracts in towns and plantations” (p. 116). The circumstances 
of youth were not improved under Samuel Doe’s leadership after the 1980 coup, and his 
administration expanded the plantation economy and use of contracted, often unpaid, labor 
(Lindberg, 2014).  
 It was these combined processes that led to a significant population of politically, 
socially, and economically marginalized youth in both urban and rural areas of Liberia in the pre-
conflict period. There is evidence to suggest that these youth were recruited for war through 
similar patrimonial networks that were historically used to recruit them for menial labor jobs on 
plantations and in similar industries; and there is equal evidence to suggest that their 
receptiveness to recruitment was largely a consequence of their belief that war would make it 
possible to achieve a level of mobility that was impossible under the existing structure (Munive, 
2010). Essentially, marginalized youth with few alternative options perceived conflict as an 
opportunity to become the powerful and wealthy players in the Liberian political and economic 
structure, making them ideal candidates for participation in conflict.  
Conclusion 
 An examination of the historical trajectory of development and conflict in Liberia 
highlights a number of problematic processes. First, analysis of development in the immediate 
post-independence period illustrates the existence of unequal and contentious relationships 
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between Americo-Liberians and indigenous populations that developed as a result of the 
government’s attempts to subjugate indigenous populations. Importantly, the analysis also 
suggests that, though Liberia was not technically the colony of a Western power, the interference 
of Western powers in the sovereign territory of Liberia was a driving factor in the creation of 
these settler-indigenous divisions. This was evidenced by the military attempts of the French and 
the British to claim Liberian territory. It was also evidenced by the economic intervention of the 
United States in the rubber industry and the corresponding impact of the rubber industry on the 
development of unequal labor structures. Perhaps most importantly, the historical profile of 
Liberia suggests that these inequalities were institutionalized and expanded across a growing 
number of groups as the country continued to develop and be influenced by its status as a site for 
Western resource extraction in the 20th century.  
2.2 Conflict in Sierra Leone  
Introduction 
 Like Liberia, analysis of Sierra Leone reveals a number of interesting patterns of 
development and conflict. In the case of Sierra Leone, the historical profile suggests a particular 
trajectory of state and economic development that was shaped by colonial interests in the 
extraction of valuable resources. It also reveals key social divisions along regional and tribal 
lines that can be directly tied to the above processes of development. Perhaps more importantly, 
analysis of Sierra Leone’s post-independence period highlights the existence of institutionalized 
inequalities that were exacerbated by the corrupt patron-client tendencies of the central 
government, which relied almost exclusively on informal and coercive modes of control over the 
population. Lastly, examination of Sierra Leone in the two decades immediately prior to the 
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conflict suggests a pattern of underdevelopment and increasingly limited opportunities in 
education and employment for large segments of the population, particularly the country’s youth.  
British Colonialism 
 Sierra Leone was a British colony that first came under European control with the 
establishment of the city of Freetown in the late 1700s (Harris, 2012). In the following years, 
groups of former slaves from Britain, the United States, Jamaica, and Nigeria established 
settlements in Freetown. This population eventually developed a Creole, or Krio, identity based 
on Western education, religion, and economy, as well as a number of traditional African 
influences passed down from the original settlers. The distinct Krio identity led to a separation 
between the Krio population of Freetown and the indigenous Sierra Leonean population, which 
was magnified by the unequal treatment they received from the British Colonial administration 
(Harris, 2012). The Krio were disproportionately benefitted by their relationship with the British, 
gaining extensive education and prestigious economic and political positions in Sierra Leone. 
During this time period, the British used a relatively hands-off approach to governing, allowing 
the Krio population a significant amount of freedom in trade and governance (Harris, 2012).  
 However, following the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, Britain shifted toward establishing 
complete control over the territory and trade of Sierra Leone (Harris, 2012). In 1896, the territory 
outside of Freetown was established as a British protectorate, creating further division between 
the populations of the Freetown colony and hinterland protectorate. Importantly, the increased 
interest of the British in Sierra Leone undermined the superior economic and political position 
obtained by the Krio throughout the previous century, with housing, trade, and professional 
positions increasingly taken by European settlers (Harris, 2012). While the Krio did manage to 
maintain some of their economic dominance during this period, they rapidly lost political power 
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to the indigenous Africans of the protectorate. The Krio were further undermined when the 
British began a process of integration of the colony and protectorate in 1921. In the years leading 
up to decolonization, divides between the colony and protectorate continued to characterize 
Sierra Leone’s politics, with British colonial administrators deliberately fostering competition 
and tension between the two groups (Harris, 2012).  
 Contentious relationships between the colony and protectorate were exacerbated by the 
slave trade and its legacy in the region throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Though Freetown 
was created by the British to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the “African Diaspora 
could be re-settled in Africa and effectively transfer ideals of free trade, civilization, and 
Christianity to indigenous communities,” the colony was characterized by exploitative labor 
relationships both internationally and domestically (Whyte, 2015, p. 232).  One way this 
occurred was through apprenticeship programs designed to “civilize” newly freed slaves through 
indentured labor for established Freetown settlers. Later, settlers began to import labor from the 
protectorate in the form of indentured servants and children referred to as “wards.” These forms 
of exploitative labor were combined with the use of slavery in the protectorate throughout the 
19th century and until its legal abolishment in 1928 (Whyte, 2015). Following the legal end of 
slavery, both the colonial administration and tribal elites circumvented the prohibition through 
systems of communal labor that took advantage of former slaves and the poor through unpaid 
work in the name of development (Whyte, 2015).  
 Another notable occurrence of the colonial period was the discovery of diamonds, gold, 
and other valuable resources by the British. In 1926, a geological survey from Britain revealed 
the presence of significant amounts of iron, gold, platinum, chromite and rutile (D'Angelo, 
2016). Encouraged by this discovery, Britain extended its geographic exploration of the area; and 
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in 1930, the first diamond deposits were located in the country (D'Angelo, 2016). In the 
following years, international interest in the area skyrocketed as resource producers became 
aware of Sierra Leone’s potential for resource extraction. In 1933, “the Consolidated African 
Selection Trust (C.A.S.T.), a company created… in the early nineteen twenties to extract 
diamonds at Akwatia in the Gold Coast” was granted a monopoly on diamond production by the 
government of Sierra Leone, beginning the process through which Sierra Leone’s natural 
resource economy would become “integrated into the complex global commercial network 
monopolized by De Beers” (D'Angelo, 2016, p. 140). This process was completed in 1934, when 
the “Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a subsidiary of the De Beers group – a South-Africa-
based business conglomerate, was granted a 99-year diamond trade monopoly” in the country 
(Wong, 2012, p. 84).  
 The discovery and subsequent importance of the diamond trade in rural Sierra Leone 
further contributed to shifting power relationships between the Krio and indigenous populations. 
In order to most efficiently access and utilize resource deposits in Sierra Leone, the British 
colonial administration allowed significant power to tribal chiefs, granting them relative 
autonomy in matters such as “migration, land tenure and re-settlement, and the authority to 
pacify the local population” (Wong, 2012, p. 84).  Tribal chiefs also had increasingly intimate 
relationships with mining companies, which viewed cooperation with groups in the protectorate 
as a way of ensuring stability in the diamond market. These dynamics contributed to the formal 
inclusion of tribal chiefs in the state bureaucracy in 1953, an occurrence that further tilted the 
balance of power in their favor (Wong, 2012).  While the power of tribal elites grew during this 
period, there is evidence to suggest that their influence often led to heightened inequality in the 
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protectorate, where a continuing lack of education and the labor structures described above 
prevented the majority of the population from achieving upward mobility (Harris, 2012). 
 However, while it did allow for the incorporation of traditional indigenous leaders into 
the fabric of the colonial state, the discovery and subsequent mining of diamonds, gold, iron ore, 
and rutile in Sierra Leone also had important impacts on land ownership and use practices in 
ways that undermined traditional customs and, in the long term, eroded the base of power that 
had traditionally supported community hierarchies and tribal chiefs in the hinterlands. In the 
precolonial and initial colonial period, Sierra Leone used a “centuries old customary West 
African landlord-stranger, or tutorat-tuteur, land management institution” that was characterized 
by the use of local power associations to determine who was permitted to occupy land and how 
that land was to be used by those to whom it was allocated (Akiqumi, 2014, p. 774). Under this 
system, a reciprocal relationship existed in which landlords were given trading rights and a 
portion of the ‘strangers’ profits in exchange for the use of the land; and local tribal chiefs were 
tasked with protecting that land and ensuring land use that would contribute to the long-term 
success of the community with which it was associated (Akiquimi, 2014). 
 In 1927, one year after the discovery of diamonds by the British, the colonial government 
of Sierra Leone drafted the Protectorate Land Ordinance of 1927 in order to modify these 
traditional forms of land management to be more favorable to a large-scale resource extraction 
industry. The ordinance reformulated the landlord-stranger relationship by making ‘strangers’ 
who were employed in industry exempt from their customary obligations to tribal leaders 
(Akiquimi, 2014). By doing so, the colonial government weakened the ability of communities 
into which mining was expanding to regulate and manage the people using the land and the ways 
in which they were using it. In 1933, the Provinces Land Ordinance repealed the 1927 ordinance 
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and replaced it with a more specific exemption that stated that non-natives employed in industry 
were not obligated to adhere to the traditional landlord-stranger management system. While this 
legislation appeared to be a step toward regaining the traditional power relationships between 
Sierra Leoneans despite the expansion of mining, its actual impact was to allow for the 
expansion of foreign economic interests into the country’s mining industry at the expense of host 
communities. The primary actors in the mining industry quickly became multinational 
corporations, who brought in expatriate engineers, wage laborers, and geologists who quickly 
became the socioeconomic elite in mining regions, while land-holding subsistence farmers and 
traditional stranger-farmers were pushed to the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder (Akiquimi, 
2014).  
Decolonization 
Despite tensions over political and economic power, the twentieth century in Sierra 
Leone was generally peaceful and the transition to independence relatively smooth. The process 
of decolonization began in 1951 with the drafting of a constitution and framework for 
independence in response to growing pressure from the populations in both the colony and the 
protectorate (Coleman, 2015). In the same year, the predominantly protectorate based Sierra 
Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) was formed and went on to win elections against Krio dominated 
parties throughout the 1950s (Harris, 2012). While these elections represented the official end to 
Krio ambitions of continued domination, they did not represent the end of political division 
along socioeconomic lines, and politics in the 1950s were increasingly characterized by tribal 
chief domination in the political arena (Harris, 2012). 
 Colonialism ended with the official creation of the independent state of Sierra Leone in 
April of 1961, at which point Sir Milton Margai of the SLPP was elected the first prime minister 
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with strong backing from tribal chiefs (Chauveau & Richards, 2008). By the time of 
independence, almost two centuries of problematic colonial policy and development had resulted 
in huge economic and political gaps, as well as strong patron-client political tendencies. 
Independence brought few meaningful structural changes, and these problems translated to the 
creation of a “developmentally unbalanced state… presided over by a politically and 
economically overcentralized, institutionally weak, somewhat patronizing and numerically 
restricted regime in which the SLPP leaders had been steeped” (Harris, 2012, p. 44). This 
underdevelopment of the state interacted with existing social tensions in a way that created 
instability in the post-colonial period and contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. 
Post-Independence Sierra Leone 
 Despite its democratic beginnings, the post-colonial state in Sierra Leone was 
characterized by instability, military coups, and authoritarian regimes throughout the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. In the initial period following independence, Milton Margai attempted to 
institute a liberal democratic regime (Wong, 2012). However, following his death in 1964 and 
the election of his brother, Albert Margai, the country took a turn away from multi-party 
democracy and moved toward becoming an authoritarian regime (Wong, 2012).  The SLPP was 
voted out of power in 1967 following increased discontent with the regime, and Siaka Stevens of 
the All People’s Congress (APC) was elected (Coleman, 2015). However, following the 
announcement, Stevens and Margai were placed under house arrest by the commander of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMP), David Lansana, who then attempted to seize 
control of the government (Coleman, 2015). A group of senior military officers blocked 
Lansana’s move for power, suspended the constitution, and created the National Reformation 
Council (NRC). The NRC was then overthrown by mid-ranking military officials of the Anti-
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Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) in April of 1968, which led to the establishment 
of a state of emergency and suspension of constitutional rights (Coleman, 2015). 
 Following the government takeover by the ACRM, Stevens was invited to return from 
exile in Guinea, and he quickly returned and established a national coalition government (Zack-
Williams, 1999). By 1971, Stevens’ government had become a de facto one-party regime, with 
Stevens and his deputy, Ernest Bai Koroma, using violence and political manipulation to 
maintain power (Zack-Williams, 1999). Stevens ruled Sierra Leone for seventeen years, passing 
the leadership role to his Army Force Commander, Joseph Momoh, in 1985. When Momoh came 
to power, the population of Sierra Leone demonstrated a relatively strong belief in his ability to 
resolve the country’s declining economic and political situation; and Momoh immediately 
announced several grand plans for a revolution that would lead to increased prosperity and 
security (Vidler, 1993). In an attempt to separate himself from the failures of his predecessor, 
Momoh instituted a “New Order Regime” in 1986, imposing a number of economic reforms that 
devastated the already struggling economy (Zack-Williams, 1999). One of the most damaging 
components of Momoh’s new economic regime was the introduction of structural adjustment 
programs designed to allow for the incorporation of the country into the global economy through 
encouraging free markets and privatization of the country’s industries. While the role of these 
structural adjustment programs in the instability and conflict will be addressed at length in the 
following chapter, it is important to note that they led to significant political and economic 
upheaval at a time when the populace was seeking increased stability with the new regime 
(Vidler, 1993).  
Momoh’s economic failures were made worse by his lack of power in Congress, which 
included a significant number of corrupt opponents who viewed the leader as having been 
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imposed by Stevens and posing a threat to their existing positions as the country’s elite. These 
opponents, many of whom had been part of the “old guard” under Stevens’ rule, had a vested 
interest in resisting Momoh’s attempted economic overhauls, which included efforts to curtail 
corruption, smuggling, and irresponsible fiscal management (Vidler, 1993). Given their 
involvement in these activities for their own financial gain, many members of Congress were 
unwilling to allow Momoh to allocate the resources necessary to tackle these problems, 
rendering his efforts ineffective. Over the first three years of his presidency, Momoh’s 
contentious relationships with his fellow political elite continued to prevent progress; and 
problems such as limited electricity, frequent communications breakdowns, and crumbling 
infrastructure were characteristic of his lack of success (Vidler, 1993). The final blow to his 
presidency came when Momoh ordered the execution of opposition leader Francis Minah, 
resulting the loss of support of a large group of Sierra Leone’s population, who felt that he was 
attempting to strip the Southern Provinces of their political influence (Zack-Williams, 1999).  
 During this time period, opposition to the government and its numerous economic and 
political failures arose in the form of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The foundations of 
what would become the RUF were laid in Freetown during the 1980s, when a group of 
discontent students and unemployed youth came together in opposition of the government 
through a Pan-Africanist platform (Day, 2015). Initially, opposition to Stevens’ government and 
the economic and political climate of the country was led by students involved in Fourah Bay 
College’s (FBC) Mass Awareness and Participation (MAP) union, which was a loose coalition of 
a Green Book study group that supported Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi’s political 
ideology; the socialist club; the gardeners’ club; and members of the Pan-African Union 
(PANAFU) (Abdullah, 1998). In 1982, Abdul Gbla became the first MAP student union 
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president to visit Libya. A few short years later, the new president of the student union, Alie 
Kabba, would visit Libya and go on to establish the link that led to the eventual military training 
of RUF founders and combatants in the country. Following his return from his initial visit to 
Libya, Kabba and three other students from FBC were expelled on charges of maintaining 
connections with Libyan mercenaries and were then accepted to Legon University in Ghana. 
From Ghana, they continued to develop relationships with the Libyan government and received 
monetary support to sponsor several more Sierra Leonean students in Ghana. They also 
developed close ties with political dissidents from other Sub-Saharan African countries, 
including Charles Taylor of Liberia and Kukoi Samba Sanyang of Gambia. Through these 
connections, Kabba was encouraged to recruit Sierra Leonean youth willing to undertake 
military training in order to initiate a violent revolution to take power in Sierra Leone (Abdulllah, 
1998).   
In 1987, Kabba spearheaded a call for recruits from Accra, Ghana, and the PANAFU 
congress in Freetown organized a vote to determine whether the organization would support and 
participate in military training in Libya with the purpose of organizing a violent revolution in 
Sierra Leone. In the end, the majority of the organization voted against the move into Libya, and 
the minority in favor of the action were eventually expelled from the organization. Among the 
minority in favor of the relationship with Libya were Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Rashid 
Mansaray, all three of whom would become the top leadership and backbone of the RUF four 
years later (Abdullah, 1998). In 1987, the three men traveled with a number of recruits from 
Freetown and the hinterland to attend training in Libya at Gaddafi’s “rebel school” in Benghazi, 
Libya, where they made connections with Liberian opposition leader Charles Taylor (Day, 
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2015).  They were followed by another group, made up almost entirely of high school students 
from Sierra Leone the following year (Abdullah, 1998).  
When Sankoh and his fellow revolutionaries returned to Sierra Leone in 1988, they chose 
to move the organization, which had still not been officially consolidated into the RUF, out of 
the capital of Freetown and into the hinterland. Having left the country’s urban center, they then 
began to travel throughout the rural areas of the country in an attempt to garner further support 
for their political and military objectives. It was during this period that the future RUF and 
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) established concrete ties. By the mid 
1989, Sankoh’s group had made a deal with Taylor in which they promised to support his 
military efforts in Liberia in exchange for being provided a base in Liberia from which to launch 
their own military struggle in Sierra Leone once Taylor had successful gained controlled of the 
country (Abdullah, 1998). In 1989, while Momoh struggled to maintain power and stabilize the 
country, Taylor initiated his plan to take control of Liberia, triggering the eruption of civil war in 
the country. At this point, leaders of the RUF began to recruit fighters from Sierra Leonean 
populations in Liberia, as well as in Sierra Leone itself (Zack-Williams, 1999).  Between 1989 
and 1991, the political situation continued to deteriorate in Sierra Leone, leading to the outbreak 
of the conflict in March of 1991. 
Civil Conflict: 1991-2002 
 The Sierra Leone civil war began on March 23, 1991, when RUF troops under Sankoh 
invaded eastern Sierra Leone with the support of Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) (Day, 2015). Following the invasion, Taylor continued to provide the agreed upon 
military support to the RUF though the provision of training facilities, practical training of RUF 
soldiers in guerrilla warfare tactics, and the provision of combatants and weapons from Liberia 
 58 
and neighboring Burkina Faso (Silberfein, 2004). During the first year of the war, the RUF took 
control of territory in eastern and southern Sierra Leone, also gaining control over large deposits 
of alluvial diamonds (Gberie, 2005). In April of 1992, the Sierra Leone Army’s (SLA) failure to 
defeat the RUF contributed to a military coup in which Valentine Strasser and a group of other 
young officers took control of the government and established the National Provincial Ruling 
Council (NPRC) (Coleman, 2015). The new government suspended the 1991 constitution and 
took a hardline stance on dealing with the rebel insurgency (Coleman, 2015). 
 Initially, the NPRC was relatively successful at quelling the conflict, and by December of 
1993, NPRC troops had recaptured most of the territory gained by the RUF (Gberie, 2005). This 
included Pendembu, the rebel’s headquarters, the loss of which caused the RUF to admit defeat 
and retreat into forest areas on the border. However, in early 1994, the conflict escalated again 
and the rebels recaptured the areas they had controlled previously, moving on to gain additional 
territory (Gberie, 2005). In 1995, the RUF staged its first attempt to capture Freetown with arms 
purchased through illegal diamond trade, and it was only driven back after the government hired 
the support of Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African mercenary company (Coleman, 2015). 
EO was supported by troops from Guinea and Nigeria, who provided support and carried out 
raids against rebels in the Eastern and Southern provinces (Gberie, 2005). 
 During this same time period, Stasser’s government responded to domestic and 
international pressure by agreeing to remove political restrictions and allow democratic elections 
(Coleman, 2015). However, Strasser then attempted to stay in power by portraying himself as a 
civilian candidate rather than a military leader, resulting in him being overthrown by his deputy, 
Julius Maada Bio, in 1996 (Gberie, 2005). Despite attempts by the RUF to prevent the elections 
from moving forward, Bio proceeded with the process, and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was 
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democratically elected at the head of the SLPP in March of 1996. Kabbah engaged in peace talks 
with the RUF leadership, and a peace accord was signed by Kabbah and Sankoh in Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire in November of 1996 (Gberie, 2005). However, the stipulations of the peace accord 
were never put into effect, and the peace process was stalled by the arrest of Sankoh for arms 
trade in Nigeria in 1997 (Coleman, 2015).  
 Shortly after the breakdown of the peace accords, army major Johnny Paul Koroma 
overthrew Kabbah in a military coup, and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) (Coleman, 2015). Koroma invited Sankoh and the RUF into the new government, and 
the two forces merged in 1997, creating the AFRC/RUF. This move caused international 
condemnation, sanctions, and armed resistance from ECOWAS intervention forces. In February 
of 1998, ECOWAS troops defeated the AFRC/RUF in Freetown and drove them back into their 
strongholds in the rural areas; and in March of 1998, Kabbah’s government was reinstated 
(Coleman, 2015). However, in December of 1998, AFRC/RUF troops invaded and captured the 
diamond rich district of Kono and used the proceeds from diamond sales to finance another 
attack on Freetown in January of 1999. During this period, violence reached an unprecedented 
level, and ECOWAS forces found themselves unable to defeat the rebel forces or protect civilian 
populations (Coleman, 2015). 
 In July of 1999, a peace agreement was signed in Lomé, Togo, making Sankoh vice 
president in exchange for blanket immunity for all war crimes committed during the conflict 
(Coleman, 2015). However, Sankoh severed ties with the AFRC shortly after signing and the 
fighting continued. In late 1999, a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) replaced 
ECOWAS; and in May of 2000, Sankoh was captured and removed from his leadership position 
in the RUF (Coleman, 2015). In November of 2000, the RUF signed a cease-fire agreement 
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allowing UNAMSIL to secure the areas under RUF control and begin a process of disarmament. 
Throughout 2001, the United Nations utilized the largest peacekeeping force in the world to 
secure the country and facilitate political negotiations between the parties; and in January of 
2002, Kabbah announced the official end of the war (Coleman, 2015).   
Factors Contributing to Immediate Outbreak of Conflict 
A number of interrelated processes contributed to the instability and conflict in Sierra 
Leone, many of which were related to the political and economic structures of the state in the 
post-colonial period. Two of the most problematic aspects of the state structure in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone were corruption and the existence of patron-client relationships. This problem 
became particularly pervasive during Stevens’ leadership, during which time he established a 
large-scale “shadow economy” through which he controlled the diamond market and other 
valuable economic networks (Zack-Williams, 1999). During this period, Stevens and the 
ministers in his government acquired economic assets and wealth far beyond those afforded by 
the offices they held. This is evidence by the fact that Stevens acquired properties, 23 vehicles, 
and cash in amounts far above his salary during his time in office (Potter & Thompson, 1997). 
When government expenditures in excess of revenue made it impossible for Stevens to 
maintain a shadow economy, he appealed to international finance institutions for assistance, 
beginning a disastrous structural adjustment program that caused massive unemployment, 
inflation, and poverty (Zack-Williams, 1999). These problems were then exacerbated by the 
introduction of more structural adjustment programs under Momoh that further impacted already 
struggling populations in both rural and urban areas. During this same time period, agricultural 
output was also plummeting as a result of inefficient pricing policies that resulted in farmers 
being forced to decrease their agricultural production due to negative profits and often, a 
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complete lack of payment for their products (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations). The lack of financial stability that accompanied agricultural work during this period 
created an uncertain environment for investment in crop production and pushed large numbers of 
Sierra Leoneans out of their traditional forms of work and into low-paying, undesirable jobs with 
diamond mining companies (Zack-Williams, 1999).  
 In addition to the above economic and political conditions, there were a number of other 
inequalities that contributed to tensions in Sierra Leone. One area of inequality that was 
particularly problematic was the education system.  During the 1980s, economic decline and a 
lack of prioritization of education by the government resulted in decreased spending on 
education and the de facto privatization of education services, tilting a traditionally unequal 
school system even further in the direction of elite exclusivity (Zack-Williams, 1999). Further, 
there continued to be a gap in education availability between rural and urban areas, resulting in 
large populations of uneducated rural youth (Zack-Williams, 1999). The problem of education 
was further exacerbated by the inability of those who completed tertiary education to find 
employment. The lack of employment opportunity available to university graduates was largely a 
byproduct of the economic downturn and its impacts on public sector job creation. Prior to the 
economic crises, the government was the primary employer of labor in the country, particularly 
with regard to skilled jobs for educated members of the middle and elite classes (Abdullah, 
1998).  
 When the state responded to continuing economic decline by decreasing the number of 
state employees on its payroll and neglecting to hire additional employees for public positions, 
university graduates were particularly vulnerable to unemployment. Compounding the problem 
of unemployment caused by the shrinking of state employment was the simultaneous downsizing 
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of the private sector that was also occurring in response to economic decline (Abdullah, 1998). 
This resulted in large numbers of educated and unemployed youth being forced into ghettos that 
had formerly been reserved for uneducated groups (Lahai, 2015). It was in these ghettos that 
these educated and unemployed youth became part of the informal sector; and it was also these 
educated youth with few employment opportunities who provided some of the first recruits for 
military training in Libya. This is evidenced by the fact that, of the approximately thirty-five 
Sierra Leonean men who went to Libya for military training between 1987 and 1988, only three 
were engaged in any form of formal employment, despite the fact that at least two thirds had at 
least some university education (Abdullah, 1998).  
 Another form of inequality that contributed to the conflict was the disproportionate 
amount of power obtained by rural tribal chiefs in the pre-war period. This was largely driven by 
the actions of the state, which often withdrew economic support from areas it viewed as being in 
opposition to the government, leaving entire areas to be ruled through traditional governance 
systems (Chauveau & Richards, 2008). This policy of punishing local leaders who refused to 
cooperate with the central government became particularly prevalent under Stevens, whose 
approach to tribal leaders shifted in accordance with changes in the economic circumstances of 
the country. Upon his initial ascent to power, the bulk of Stevens’ political support was located 
in the relatively diamond-free northern region of the country; and his initial approach was to 
expand his base of power through investing in employment opportunities and education in rural 
areas. With the economic crises of the 1970s and the introduction of structural adjustment, his 
ability to invest in public services was compromised, and he increasingly relied on his ability to 
install chiefs that were sympathetic to his regime in the hinterlands in order to maintain control 
of the territory. However, chiefs in Sierra Leone were elected for life; and in cases in which he 
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was forced to deal with a hostile tribal leader, Stevens’ policy was to deny these areas access to 
state resources (Chauveau & Richards, 2008).  
One area that was consistently denied state resources and participation in state politics 
was the Kailahun District in the eastern province of the country, which served as a base for 
groups in opposition to the government throughout the 1970s and 1980s. When violent 
suppression failed to subdue this opposition, Stevens responded by cancelling infrastructure 
projects, refusing to pay teachers’ salaries, and neglecting to provide basic services such as the 
maintenance of local roads. This policy had a number of negative outcomes related to inequality. 
First, it left the youth in these rural areas completely without access to education and other 
services. Perhaps more importantly, it cut off revenue sources for tribal elites in those areas, 
forcing them to rely on traditional power structures through which they coerced labor and money 
from the youth populations of their territories. One way that youth were manipulated by tribal 
elders was through traditional rules on marriage, which required young men to obtain permission 
for marriage from community elders. Tribal leaders utilized this norm as a way of obtaining 
labor and money from men who wished to marry, bringing court cases against those who married 
without their approval (Chauveau & Richards, 2008).  
 When combined with economic decline and a general lack of quality living conditions, 
the highly unequal nature of Sierra Leone’s political and economic structures was a direct 
contributor to the recruitment of youth into the RUF. There is evidence to suggest that the bulk 
of the early RUF was made up of youth who were negatively impacted by the economic 
conditions of the country, many of whom were unable to obtain employment or education (Zack-
Williams, 1999). The blatant corruption and elite-driven business practices of the state also 
provided a selling point for leaders of the RUF and other opposition groups hoping to attract 
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young combatants (Zack-Williams, 1999). Rural youth from provinces that had been cut off from 
the state were also disproportionately represented among the RUF, and many combatants 
claimed that their decision to join in the violence was largely driven by the incentive of money 
and their frustration with being unable to afford marriage through traditional forms of 
employment (Chauveau & Richards, 2008).  
Conclusion 
 Historical examination reveals that the pre-conflict development of Sierra Leone was 
characterized by a number of problematic patterns that contributed to instability and conflict.  
First, the analysis suggests that colonial development of extractive industries led to a particular 
experience of economic development that was characterized by the representation of the interests 
of foreign corporations and the state’s elite at the expense of more equitable development for the 
general population. It also suggests that the post-colonial state inherited particular tensions along 
regional and tribal lines that were largely a result of those processes of unequal economic 
consolidation under the British. Importantly, the case of Sierra Leone clearly illustrates the 
marginalization of rural communities and youth, whose precarious position in society was further 
damaged by the economic decline of the 1970s and 1980s and the consequent economic shocks 
that accompanied economic structural adjustment. 
2.3 Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire   
Introduction 
 While the relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire was significantly different from 
the relationships between the other countries and their respective colonial or ‘pseudo-colonial’ 
powers, colonialism was also a key factor in the development of Côte d’Ivoire’s economy in both 
the colonial and post-colonial periods. This is evidenced by their focus and dependence on 
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agricultural cash crops such as coffee and cocoa, which remained the primary drivers of 
economic growth following independence. Importantly, like the other two countries, historical 
analysis also suggests that the particular economic composition and trajectory established during 
the colonial period contributed to particular divisions along regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
lines in the post-colonial period. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire these divisions were fueled by 
large-scale migration from within and outside of the country, as well as targeted economic 
development in the coffee and cocoa areas of the South at the expense of development in other 
regions.  One area in which Côte d’Ivoire was different from Liberia and Sierra Leone was its 
experiences with economic prosperity and decline, and Côte d’Ivoire experienced levels of 
growth and stability not observed in the other two countries through the 1970s. However, Côte 
d’Ivoire later exhibited similar symptoms of economic decline and significant proportions of the 
population appear to have been impacted by the initial economic decline and the subsequent 
decline that followed with structural adjustment programs.  
French Colonialism 
 The territory of modern Côte d’Ivoire was first recognized as the sovereign territory of 
France following an 1889 convention with Great Britain. However, at the time of the convention, 
the limits of the territory were not decided upon, leaving questions as to where the international 
borders would be drawn. France began the process of delimiting those borders when they sought 
to draw a border with Liberia in 1892. They then engaged in negotiations to draw an eastern 
border with the British-occupied Gold Coast between 1893 and 1898. Between 1895 and 1904, 
the French announced a series of decrees that resulted in the inclusion of Côte d’Ivoire in a larger 
territorial unit known as French West Africa; and several decades later, in 1947, they were 
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successful in establishing northern boundaries with Mali and the Upper Volta. It was at this point 
that the official territory of the country known as Côte d’Ivoire was established (Tice, 1974).  
 While bilateral agreements between colonial powers were effective in the legal creation 
of the state of Côte d’Ivoire, the area was home to a variety of different ethnic groups with no 
conception of a single unified state at the time of its creation. In 1947, over sixty ethnic groups 
lived within the boundaries of the newly established colonial state, many of which had languages 
and cultures completely unique from those surrounding them. While there were existing 
relationships between various ethnic groups that were based on historical rivalries and economic 
interests, the majority of the population in the territory viewed themselves as primarily members 
of the ethnic group to which they belonged rather than members of a larger political entity in the 
form of a state, colonial or otherwise (Keita, 2013). 
 In contrast to the British approach of indirect rule in its West African colonies, France 
applied a more direct method of colonialism in Côte d’Ivoire through a centralized state 
bureaucracy that displaced traditional political and economic hierarchies. This method of direct 
rule was characterized by the French government’s use of local chiefs as “mouthpiece[s] for the 
new administration, [and] not as functioning sovereigns with their own base of authority” 
(Maclean, 2002, p. 69). Through this process, chiefs lost the power traditionally accorded to 
them, instead becoming representations of French sovereignty over the population of Côte 
d’Ivoire. While this policy of central control resulted in the provision of certain social services 
such as education and health care, it also had the effect of creating a political and social 
framework predicated on European institutions and ideals, leaving little room for traditional 
norms around family, community, and social roles. Further, the centralized government 
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considered ideal by the colonial French became increasingly hegemonic as all other forms of 
political power were undermined by its activities and operations (Maclean, 2002). 
 While the above structure of rule was used relatively consistently by the French, there 
were a number of developments that led to shifts in colonial policy in Côte d’Ivoire, one of the 
most important of which was World War II. Prior to the outbreak of the war in 1939, the French 
economy experienced a period of prosperity and economic growth, much of which was attributed 
to production growth in its colonies. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, principal crops such as coffee, 
cocoa, and wood contributed largely to the economic growth of France between 1936 and 1937, 
with the economy of the colony growing from 34.79 million French Francs in 1936 to 78.88 
million French Francs in 1937. However, with the onset of World War II, Côte d’Ivoire quickly 
experienced difficulties exporting its products, effectively halting the economy. This was 
particularly problematic in the case of Côte d’Ivoire because the colonial administration had 
established the colony as a site of extraction for resources, resulting in a complete absence of 
facilities to refine the products domestically. With no way to export or refine their agricultural 
products, the economy of Côte d’Ivoire plummeted as the conflict wore on (Keita, 2013).  
The problematic impacts of the economic crisis in Côte d’Ivoire were worsened by the 
response of the German-allied Vichy government that took power in France early in the conflict. 
The Vichy government, which adhered to Nazi racial theories and prejudices, promoted 
increasingly repressive policies in the economic sphere in order to maintain control over the 
Ivorian population. Some of these policies included intensification of coercive labor recruitment 
practices and production quotas designed to ensure the supply of food to armed forces at the 
expense of local laborers who were already suffering from a sharp decline in imports from 
Europe. In addition to these harsh practices, the Vichy government enforced a policy of forced 
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military conscription in Côte d’Ivoire, forcing Ivorians into service while simultaneously 
preventing them from expressing any form of Ivorian nationalism. The openly racist and 
undemocratic nature of Vichy politics in Côte d’Ivoire stimulated opposition from local Ivorian 
populations, particularly elite intellectuals (Roberts & Handloff, 1991).  
 In addition to the economic impacts of the war, Côte d’Ivoire’s direct participation in 
combat in World War II also altered expectations about the colonizer-colonized relationship in 
the post-war period. During the conflict, Ivorians supported the Free French government in 
liberating French territories by fighting with the allied forces, which forced Charles De Gaulle’s 
government to negotiate with the elite of Côte d’Ivoire for the first time in the colony’s history. 
While France’s position in the war necessitated a shift in the relationship between France and its 
African colonies, negotiations in the 1940s were centered on ideas of greater political 
participation for the indigenous populations of Côte d’Ivoire and not on notions of total 
independence for the country. This was evidenced by the 1944 Conference of Brazzaville, during 
which the French agreed to allow the participation of elite Ivorians in running the French 
colonial state in Côte d’Ivoire (Roberts & Handloff, 1991).  However, while the inclusion of the 
elite class in the political sphere was a victory for the colonized state, the main beneficiaries of 
the shift in French policy were wealthy agrarian elites, and the general population did not 
experience significant changes in their relationships with the state (Keita, 2013). 
  Another aspect of colonial rule that had long term implications for the region was the 
state’s approach to labor in the country’s resource economies, particularly the cocoa industry. As 
the sector grew and began to provide a large percentage of the economy’s GDP, France began to 
promote large-scale migration from the poorer northern regions of the colony in order to recruit 
labor for cocoa production in the south. At the same time, the colonial administration was 
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engaged in land grabs of any land that was believed to be of value to the state, undermining 
traditional landholding practices of indigenous populations. The combination of these two 
processes resulted in increased tensions between the colonial administration and indigenous 
Ivorians, as well as new tensions between ethnic groups forced together by their shared 
employment in agricultural industries. Importantly, the system of labor and land exploitation 
employed by the French during their colonial rule was carried into the post-colonial period, and 
elite Ivorians took advantage of the arrangement to perpetuate inequality and elitism in the 
agricultural industry (Mitchell, 2011). 
Decolonization 
 Begun during the Second World War, the independence movement in Côte d’Ivoire had 
two distinct periods characterized by unique attitudes and approaches to the colonial power and 
decolonization process. The first decade of the movement from 1940 to 1951 was led by agrarian 
planters and characterized by revolutionary attitudes and demands for radical structural reforms 
by the independent African Agricultural Labour Union (SAA) (N'Guessan, 2015).  Their efforts 
resulted in France establishing national elections in Côte d’Ivoire in October of 1945, the 
purpose of which was to select two delegates for the French Constituent Assembly in Paris. The 
outcome of the election was the selection of a French citizen residing in Côte d’Ivoire as the first 
delegate and the election of Felix Houpouet-Boigny as the second delegate through the votes of a 
restricted African electorate. When the Assembly met in Paris, 63 African delegates from the 
colonies pressed for reforms in the colonial structure and were supported by French communist 
and socialist delegates. In response to their demands, the French agreed to the abolishment of the 
forced labor system in Côte d’Ivoire in 1945. They also passed a number of decrees allowing 
freedom of speech, association and assembly for residents of the colonies; providing funds for 
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economic and social development; and granting citizenship to all inhabitants of French colonies. 
However, while these reforms were extensive, the French government was deliberately vague in 
its definition of citizenship for the populations in the colonies, preventing Ivorians from 
exercising a number of civil rights (Roberts & Handloff, 1991).  
One of the consequences of the 1945-46 reforms was the opportunity for the development 
of African political parties, and a number of parties were formed in Côte d’Ivoire in the 
following years. One of the first and most influential of these parties was the Democratic Party 
of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) which was created from Houphouet-Boigny’s SAA in 1946 and soon 
became the dominant party in the country. During this time, the PDCI initiated the second period 
of the decolonization movement, which was characterized by increasingly close ties between the 
French government and Ivorian political elite (Roberts & Handloff, 1991). One of the most 
important factors in this shift was the PDCI’s decision to break away from the French 
Communist Party (P.C.F.) with whom they had been closely aligned. The split was a result of the 
Ivorian elite’s increasing allegiance to the governmental French majority in order to preserve 
their dominant position in the socioeconomic hierarchy of colonial Côte d’Ivoire (Keita, 2013). 
While many Ivorians viewed the PDCI’s shifting approach as supporting continued French 
dominance over Africa, the less radical approach gradually led to increasingly autonomous rule 
for the country. In 1956, the Overseas Reform Act transferred a significant number of powers 
from the central government in Paris to elected territorial governments in West Africa; and in 
1958, the French granted Côte d’Ivoire the status of an autonomous republic within the French 
community. On August 7, 1960, Côte d’Ivoire became an independent republic (Milhomme, 
2005).   
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Post-Independence Côte d’Ivoire 
 Following independence, Houphouet-Boigny became the first head of state, presiding 
over the process of drafting the constitution and establishing the country’s political institutions. 
Initially, it was the desire of Houphouet-Boigny and other PDCI members to “establish a strong 
and stable government based on democratic principles… [through] a presidential system based 
on the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government and 
an independent judiciary” (Roberts & Handloff, 1991, p. 24). However, concerns about national 
unity and the danger of political dissent resulted in the ruling party opting for single-party rule 
with the PDCI as the sole party. In addition, the newly established government deliberately chose 
not to restructure the majority of colonial institutions in the economic sphere, continuing policies 
of plantation development and large-scale labor migration. Perhaps most importantly, 
Houphouet-Boigny’s government maintained strong economic and political ties with France in 
the years following independence, allowing French consultants a large degree of influence in 
politics and signing several agreements on defense and economic cooperation with France 
(N'Guessan, 2015).  
 The initial years following independence were marked by economic growth and political 
stability, and the country experienced an economic boom between 1960 and 1978 that was 
largely attributable to increases in agricultural production and government expenditure (Klaas, 
2008). As in the colonial period, the agricultural sector continued to develop around the 
production of cocoa and coffee; and cocoa remained the country’s primary agricultural 
commodity in the post-independence period, resulting in Côte d’Ivoire becoming the world’s 
primary cocoa producer when its share of global production rose to 40 percent of the global 
market (Crook, 1990). The growth observed in the cocoa industry was the result of government 
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spending to subsidize the industry, which allowed the percentage of the workforce employed by 
the state to increase to approximately 40 percent and GDP growth to skyrocket over the 18-year 
period (Crook, 1989). 
 Despite the promising economic start of Côte d’Ivoire, the country experienced economic 
hardship when global cocoa prices decreased in 1978. While the price change was relatively 
small, the country’s dependence on the cocoa industry resulted in a rapid descent into economic 
crisis that forced the Ivorian government to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
economic assistance. IMF assistance took the form of a structural adjustment agreement (SAP) 
that required a number of drastic changes to the structure of Côte d’Ivoire’s economy, one of the 
most damaging of which was “extensive cuts in ‘inefficient’ allocations of resources, such as 
social spending” (Klaas, 2008, p. 113). While social services such as education and healthcare 
virtually disappeared, the IMF insisted on higher investment in the cocoa industry, making the 
economy increasingly vulnerable to global price fluctuations. As a result, cocoa production in 
Côte d’Ivoire increased to 39.8 percent of the country’s GDP over the next decade while cocoa 
prices decreased to approximately a third of their late 1970s prices by the early 1990s (Klaas, 
2008). This process left the Ivorian government with little choice but to accrue additional debt to 
keep the economy afloat, resulting in external debts that were equal to several hundred times the 
national GDP by 1990 (Klaas, 2008).  
 Another important aspect of Houphouet-Boigny’s presidency was the government’s 
liberal approach to immigration. In contrast to leaders in neighboring countries such as Ghana, 
Houphouet-Boigny advocated for open immigration policies and equal treatment for non-Ivorian 
West Africans from neighboring Francophone countries. During his time in office, immigration 
skyrocketed as migrants sought better economic opportunities and political stability in Côte 
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d’Ivoire. Houphouet-Boigny’s government encouraged this process by appointing immigrants to 
high-level positions in the government. However, while Houphouet-Boigny’s strong belief in a 
Pan-Africanist vision was the catalyst for his immigration policies, his views were not shared by 
the majority of Ivorian elites, and resentment against immigrants and non-Ivorians increased 
steadily in the latter years of his presidency (Mimiko, 2006). In addition to these tensions, the 
Ivorian population became increasingly vocal in their opposition to the authoritarian, one-party 
state, prompting Houphouet-Boigny to agree to multiparty elections for the first time in the 
country’s history in 1990. During these elections, the PDCI defeated the Front Populaire Ivoirien 
(FPI) which was led by Laurent Gbagbo. Houphouet-Boigny died in 1993, and was succeeded by 
his political protégé, Henri Bédié. However, Bédié failed to gain the support of the PDCI, 
beginning a political struggle that would continue until the outbreak of the conflict in 2002 (Bah, 
2010). 
Instability and Outbreak of Conflict (1993-2002) 
 The political struggle following the death of Houphouet-Boigny was characterized by a 
splinter within the PDCI and power struggles between the PDCI and the FPI. The split within the 
PDCI resulted in the formation of the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) which was led by 
Djéni Kobina and attempted to gain control of the country through the nomination of former 
Prime Minister Alassane Outtara as their presidential candidate in the 1995 elections. Bédié 
attempted to hold on to power and gain support by restricting the activities of opposition parties 
and introducing divisive ethnic politics to the election process through the doctrine of Ivoirité. 
One aspect of these ethnic politics was the introduction of a law that required all presidential 
candidates to prove that they and their parents were native Ivorians (Bah, 2010). This law was 
instrumental in winning the presidency for Bédié, as Outtara was ultimately excluded from 
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candidacy due to accusations that he was in fact from Burkina Faso and not a true Ivorian 
(N’Guessan, 2015). 
 Bédié’s presidency ended in 1999, when General Robert Guei took power in a military 
coup. Elections were scheduled for the next year, and Guei put himself forward as a candidate of 
the Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), using the Ivoirité law to attempt 
to exclude Ouattara from elections a second time. Guei’s attempts to manipulate the elections 
became more apparent when a Supreme Court that he had appointed disqualified all major 
candidates of the opposition parties from the presidential election. By the latter stages of the 
election Guei had attempted to secure his presidency by claiming that the other candidates were 
engaging in electoral fraud, disbanding the electoral commission, and declaring himself the 
official winner of the race. This provoked large-scale protests by civilians and members of the 
military, who engaged in violent attacks on the presidential palace and other government 
buildings. As the violence spread, Guei was forced to leave the country, and Laurent Gbagbo 
took control of the government (Collett, 2006). 
 When Gbagbo took power, he refused to overturn the obviously fraudulent electoral 
process that had allowed him to take the presidency with Guei’s flight, instead using “ivoirité to 
consolidate governmental power in the south at the expense of the northerners and Muslims, who 
he increasingly associated with foreigners” (Collett, 2006, p. 626). This caused the RDR and 
northern populations to oppose Gbagbo’s FPI backed government with the justification that it 
was illegitimate, leading to further instability throughout 2000. In 2001, an electoral commission 
pressured Gbagbo to reinstate Ouattara’s citizenship and Gbagbo agreed to municipal elections, 
which resulted in the transfer of a significant number of elected positions from the FPI to the 
RDR. These developments suggested a shift toward more democratic politics in Côte d’Ivoire, 
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sparking optimism about peace prospects among the international community. However, these 
illusions were shattered when Guei led an unsuccessful coup attempt on September 19, 2002, 
providing an opportunity for northern opposition groups to seize control of large amounts of 
territory and triggering the start of the First Ivorian War (Collet, 2006).  
Civil War: 2002-2009 and 2010-2011 
 Following the coup attempt, rebel forces under the command of Gillaume Soro of the 
Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) quickly gained control of the northern half of the 
country and demanded a power sharing arrangement with more equal terms. Gbagbo refused to 
engage in negotiations with the group, instead appealing to the French government to provide 
military aid under the terms of the defense accord signed between the two countries. The French, 
however, were slow to respond; and on September 29, 2002, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) intervened in the conflict with a peacekeeping force comprised of 
troops from Togo, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau. ECOWAS facilitated the 
negotiation of a ceasefire agreement that was signed in October of 2002 but faced continuing 
opposition from the MPCI, who demanded a number of drastic reforms such as the revision of 
the constitution and new elections to replace Gbagbo (Charbonneau, 2012). The fighting broke 
out again in November when a new rebel group, the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great 
West (MPIGO), which was comprised of mostly Liberian mercenaries and Sierra Leonean RUF 
troops, launched attacks on the border between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire (Charbonneau, 2012; 
Silberfein, 2004). At this point, the French intervened to halt their advance; and French and 
ECOWAS peacekeepers began a process of mediation that resulted in a second ceasefire 
agreement in May of 2003 (Charbonneau, 2012). 
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 Despite the signing of the second ceasefire agreement, fighting continued until the 
signing of a more comprehensive peace agreement in March of 2007. Following the agreement, 
France, the United Nations, and ECOWAS oversaw the arrangements for a democratic election; 
and after a number of extensions were made to the initial transition plan, elections were held in 
October of 2010 (Adeyeri, 2015). The election period was characterized by the resurgence of 
tensions surrounding citizenship and ethnicity, with both parties resorting to violent tactics to 
secure votes and political support. When early counts showed that Ouattara would likely be the 
victor in the presidential election, Gbagbo’s supporters responded by preventing the 
announcement of the election results and pressuring the Constitutional Council to cancel 
approximately 650,000 votes for Ouattara with the justification that there had been widespread 
vote fraud in the north of the country. The situation continued to deteriorate and Gbagbo’s forces 
increasingly used violence against protestors, West African nationals, and northern Muslims in 
the capital. At the same time, violence between ethnic groups erupted in rural areas, quickly 
spreading throughout the country (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).  
 By December of 2010, the United Nations Security Council had concluded that Ouattara 
was the winner of the November elections, but Gbagbo refused to cede control of the 
government. This created a situation in which the internationally recognized government of Côte 
d’Ivoire was different from the de facto government controlling the country. In an attempt to 
force Gbagbo into compliance, international actors moved to restrict the government’s access to 
funds and banking services, as well as imposing harsh economic sanctions on the government. 
Over the next several months, threats of military force by ECOWAS and attempts at peaceful 
negotiations by the United Nations failed to resolve the conflict, which became increasingly 
brutal as rebel groups and government forces committed numerous atrocities against civilian 
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populations. In March of 2011, the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the UN 
mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to use any means necessary to protect the civilian population, 
using the resolution to justify military bombardment of government military camps and weapons 
stores. These actions debilitated Gbagbo’s forces and resulted in Ouattara’s victory in April of 
2011 (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). 
Factors Contributing to Immediate Outbreak of Conflict 
 There were a number of factors that contributed to the instability and conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire, most of which are related to economic conditions and political developments in the 
colonial and post-independence periods. One factor that was particularly relevant in the conflict 
was the existence of inequalities between regional and ethnic groups that were rooted in the 
colonial state structure and exacerbated by economic deterioration in the years leading up to the 
conflict. As previously mentioned, the agricultural industry in Côte d’Ivoire was a leading driver 
of migration into the southern region of the country during and after the colonial period, resulting 
in a system of economic gain for southern agrarian elites at the expense of migrant plantation 
workers and Ivorians in the northern and central regions of the country (Langer, 2005). This 
trend was exacerbated with the introduction of structural adjustment programs in the early 1980s, 
which were designed to increase the volume and value of coffee and cocoa production and 
further tilted the balance of income distribution toward rural landowners (Grootaert, 1995). This 
continued to be the case even when incomes of cocoa and coffee farmers were impacted by a 
decline in global prices for the two commodities, with the likelihood of poverty incidence much 
more likely among public service workers and plantation workers than among farmers during the 
period of economic decline in the 1980s (Grootaert & Kanbur 1995; Grootaert, 1997). 
 78 
With the continuing economic crises of the 1980s, gaps between social, ethnic, and 
economic groups increased further as struggling southern economies were overwhelmed by the 
presence of excessive numbers of migrants from other areas of the country. This resulted in 
increased tensions between migrants and locals, as well as native Ivorians and foreign 
immigrants from neighboring countries, all of whom were competing for limited economic 
resources in an increasingly difficult economic environment. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, these 
tensions increasingly took on another dimension, as the migrants and immigrants were often 
Muslim and from different ethnic groups than the predominantly Christian groups in the south. 
When combined with the deliberate use of ethnic politics by elites vying for power, struggles 
over economic resources were a driving force in the conflict (Langer, 2005).  
 Another consequence of migration and economic shifts in the post-independence period 
was increased tensions over access to land and land rights that led to inequalities in wealth in the 
form of property ownership along class and ethnic lines. Beginning in the 1980s, economic 
decline resulted in a shift in policy on the rights of migrants and foreign immigrants with regard 
land acquisition and ownership; and by the late 1990s, the government had adopted laws 
preventing non-natives from gaining access to land in many parts of the country. This was 
upheld by local leaders, who relied upon Ivoirité notions to galvanize local populations into 
preventing migrants from settling on land in their villages and regions. As a result, migrants were 
often reduced to inferior socioeconomic positions when they arrived in the south, fostering 
resentment between ethnic groups and villages (Chauveau & Richards, 2008). With the onset of 
the conflict in 2002, rural communities became more aggressive in defending their control over 
the land surrounding their villages, and continuing disputes over the rights to these lands was a 
significant contributor to the resurgence of conflict in 2010 (Chauveau & Richards, 2008).  
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 Also related to economic decline and problematic policy decisions was the negative 
trajectory of education and its consequences for youth mobilization in the years leading up to the 
conflict. As a result of economic decline, SAPs, and increasing economic inequality, access to 
education was severely restricted beginning in the 1980s. This is evidenced by the fact that, in 
1997, the net enrollment rate for primary school was only 58.3 percent and illiteracy rates above 
50 percent by 2000 (Sany, 2010). The lack of access to education observed in Côte d’Ivoire 
during these years had a number of significant impacts on the youth of the country, the most 
obvious of which was the concentration of large numbers of children who did not have the 
stability of school and the economic benefits offered by an education to provide a disincentive 
for participation in armed opposition. A large proportion of child soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire were 
not enrolled in school at the time they became involved in the conflict, citing an inability to pay 
school fees and a lack of accessibility of quality education as reasons for being out of school. 
The problems with the educational system were magnified by the first several years of conflict, 
contributing to larger numbers of uneducated youth who were susceptible to recruitment in the 
second conflict (Sany, 2010).  
 While lack of education was a major area through which youth were impacted and given 
the incentive to participate in the conflict, it was not the only area in which the economic and 
political upheaval of the pre-war period affected their opportunities and quality of life. In 
addition to lack of opportunity in the education sector, youth in Côte d’Ivoire faced a number of 
problematic constraints with regard to employment opportunities and economic stability in 
general. A study of demobilized youth in 2010 found that the majority of former combatants 
surveyed reported having been engaged in labor that provided only petty cash and an unstable 
source of income in the years leading up to the outbreak of the first conflict. Most of the rural 
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youth reported being employed in agriculture on plantations growing coffee, cocoa, maize, or 
rice, with the majority suggesting that they did not receive regular payment for their work, 
instead being given occasional informal payments of items such as clothing and food (Chelpi-
den, 2010). In contrast, youth from urban areas were often engaged in forms of apprentice work 
in the shops of tailors, mechanics, and other specialized merchants. The majority of them were 
not paid anything for their services and were unable to earn incomes of their own until after 
having completed the apprenticeship and starting businesses of their own (Chelpi-den, 2010). 
 Another challenge faced by youth in pre-war Côte d’Ivoire was the existence of unstable 
family and social networks and relationships that was largely a byproduct of the economic 
instability of the time period. Many of the former youth combatants interviewed reported that 
they had never lived with their nuclear families and that they had been subjected to numerous 
moves to the homes of extended family, friends, and acquaintances. The cause of these living 
arrangements was often reported to be the lack of opportunity in their home villages and cities, 
as well as their immediate families’ lack of resources. Importantly, these youth reported the 
regular use of informal networks of friends, acquaintances, and extended family as a way to 
survive from day to day, and they suggested that they could not rely on the support of their close 
family to provide security or support (Chelpi-den, 2010). This situation is exemplified by the 
story of one ex-combatant, who describes being sent back and forth between his mother’s home 
in the village and his aunt’s home in town before being sent as an apprentice to an acquaintance 
of his mother’s in town. This person later abandoned the child, who was reduced to pushing 
wheelbarrows around town for petty cash and sleeping at his cousin’s house in town (Chelpi-den, 
2010). Stories like the one above suggest that many youths in Côte d’Ivoire were in extremely 
precarious positions, both economically and socially in the pre-conflict years. 
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 The above conditions led a significant population of Côte d’Ivoire’s youth to believe that 
the previous generation had created a country in which the “normal routes” to stable lives and 
employment through education had been blocked, leaving them with the alternatives of poverty 
or the attainment of political and economic power through conflict (McGovern, 2011). However, 
while they blamed the older generation for their lack of alternatives to violence, these elders 
simultaneously played the role of patrons to younger Ivorians, providing them the means and 
opportunity to utilize political violence to achieve economic and social mobility. Interestingly, 
the above attitude was not limited to segments of the population at the very bottom of the 
socioeconomic and educational distribution, but was shared by large numbers of educated urban 
elites, whose attempts to use nontraditional pathways to success began in the University of 
Abidjan prior to the actual outbreak of conflict. It was here that two students, Charles Blé Goudé 
and Guillaume Soro, who would lead opposing youth militia groups in the first and second 
conflict provided a foreshadowing of the events to come when they took control of the student 
union and used their positions of authority to create a criminal network in which they extorted 
students for money for housing and other items (McGovern, 2011). Eventually, these nonviolent 
forms of coercion became violent, and the same youth that had spearheaded the coercion in the 
University became the leaders of the multiple parties to the conflict.  
Conclusion 
 Côte d’Ivoire is a valuable addition to the analysis on conflict, as it represents a case 
where a country that experienced a relatively long period of stability and economic prosperity 
deteriorated into violent conflict. However, closer analysis reveals that the inequalities that 
contributed to the outbreak of conflict had roots in the colonial period, particularly in the labor 
and employment structures facilitated by the colonial and post-colonial interests in coffee and 
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cocoa production. This economic focus created migration and regional pockets of wealth in rural 
areas of the South at the expense of other rural and urban populations. Importantly, the analysis 
also suggests that the economic decline of the 1980s and 1990s highlighted these inequalities in 
ways that they had not been highlighted during the period of relative prosperity, paving the way 
for group tensions and violence. As with the other countries, the marginalized population that 
appears to be one of the most significant in Côte d’Ivoire is the youth population, whose 
increasingly limited political and economic opportunities may have contributed to their 
willingness and desire to participate in violent opposition to the status quo.  
2.4 Summary of Findings 
 The above profiles on the historical trajectories of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire reveal several shared characteristics across the three cases. The first of these is the 
existence of socioeconomic inequalities along class, regional, and ethnic lines; and in each of the 
three countries, these inequalities appear to be rooted in processes of colonial state and economic 
development and magnified by the development crises of the pre-war years. The second common 
factor is the presence of large numbers of youth with limited educational and economic 
opportunities, who appear to have viewed violent conflict as a means through which to attain 
economic and political mobility. The final, and perhaps most important characteristic across the 
three cases is economic decline and the introduction of conditional structural adjustment loans.  
 Overall, this chapter illustrates the importance of the colonial period in the formation of 
the economic and political structures of the three countries in the post-independence period, as 
well as demonstrating the ways through which these structures impacted the post-colonial 
trajectory of the countries leading up to the outbreak of conflict. Further, the chapter highlights 
important domestic characteristics such as economic decline, structural adjustment, and limited 
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opportunities for mobility that were key components in the literature on conflict and conflict 
diffusion. The prominence of these factors in all three cases provides the basis for my argument 
regarding the relationship between colonial intervention, neo-colonial economic intervention 
through structural adjustment, and the outbreak of conflict. This chapter has provided support for 
the first part of my argument regarding the tendency of colonial intervention to facilitate the 
development of unequal economic structures that are then institutionalized and carried into post-
colonial processes of development. In the following chapter, I will analyze structural adjustment 
programs in each of the three countries in order to provide support for the second part of my 
argument by illustrating the ways through which adjustment directly contributed to the 
exacerbation of existing inequalities in the three countries.  
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Chapter 3 
Structural Adjustment and Conflict 
 This chapter examines the history and implications of structural adjustment in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. In order to provide context for the experiences of the three 
countries, I begin with an overview of the structure and economic assumptions of structural 
adjustment programs, followed by a brief outline of their history in Sub-Saharan Africa. In these 
sections, I argue that structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa was predicated on questionable 
Western assumptions regarding the superiority of neoliberal modes of economic growth and was 
effectively forced upon African government by Western powers with a vested interest in 
maintaining control over the economic structures of the region. These interventions were 
justified through Western powers’ deliberate portrayal of African economies as inept and 
structurally deficient, which was achieved through a manipulation of facts about the relative 
importance of domestic policies and exogenous economic shocks in the failure of development 
in African economies in the decade prior to adjustment. I argue that these processes allowed for 
the expansion of neo-liberal control over the economies of African countries, constraining 
development and undermining the ability of domestic governments to generate stable and equal 
growth and development in the latter decades of the 20th century. 
 Following this general analysis of structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa, I examine 
the impacts of structural adjustment in each of the three case study countries, beginning with a 
pre-structural adjustment profile. I then analyze changes in socioeconomic conditions from the 
introduction of the first program to the onset of civil conflict in each of the three countries. I 
argue that, across the three cases, the introduction of structural adjustment failed to deliver the 
economy recovery promised by international financial institutions, instead contributing to 
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worsening socioeconomic conditions. In particular, I find that standard of living indictors such as 
GDP per capita and levels of primary school enrollment decreased markedly during the 
adjustment period and in the years prior to the onset of conflict. More importantly, I find that the 
effects of adjustment were not evenly distributed across populations, instead impacting certain 
groups based on the structure of the programs and the areas of the economy they favored. In the 
final section of the chapter, I summarize my findings on the socioeconomic consequences of 
structural adjustment and link them to the occurrence of conflict. I argue that, in the case of 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, the uneven impacts of adjustment and the general 
economic decline they facilitated exacerbated existing tensions along regional, ethnic, and age 
cohort lines in ways that encouraged civil conflict.  
3.1 Overview of Structural Adjustment 
Structural adjustment became a vital component to global development in the 1980s with 
the introduction of World Bank and IMF lending and economic adjustment programs. The IMF 
was created in 1945 and began lending programs for developed European countries beginning in 
1952. Its original lending programs were designed to provide short term economic stabilization 
for countries recovering from depression and the economic devastation caused by the Second 
World War. It was not until the late 1970s, when a protracted global crisis impacted developing 
economies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa that the IMF began the development of longer-
term lending programs for these low-income countries (Reinhart & Trebesch, 2016). In the 
following years, the developing world’s participation in structural adjustment grew rapidly, as 
the programs were one of the few avenues through which developing countries could access debt 
rescheduling and financing from other international finance organizations. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) formed the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in March of 1986 to 
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facilitate the expansion of structural adjustment in the developing world in cooperation with the 
World Bank (United Nations). Responding to the high demand for international loans from the 
IMF and the World Bank, the SAF was further developed into the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in September of 1987, accelerating the process through which the 
IMF and the World Bank became key players in the economies of the developing world in the 
latter decades of the 20th century (United Nations).  
 The SAF/ESAF was designed as a lending organization that provided financial 
assistance to developing countries under highly concessional circumstances that Western 
governments and international financial institutions believed would lead to high and sustained 
levels of economic development in the developing world. Under the SAF/ESAF, financial 
assistance was only given to countries that agreed to implement a three-year policy change 
program. This program consisted of three annual programs that varied by country but were based 
upon specific objectives for economic growth to be achieved through restructuring of the 
economy and macroeconomic policies. The annual objectives included in each individual 
program were accompanied by a set of annual policies and benchmarks to measure their success 
(IMF, 1986). Aside from the disbursement of funds, the IMF and the World Bank played a direct 
role in monitoring the timetable of each annual program through oversight by SAF/ESAF 
personnel (United Nations). The structural adjustment programs developed by the IMF and the 
World Bank were based upon neoliberal economic models of growth and the underlying 
economic assumptions that accompanied them. Rooted in outward-oriented, market-driven 
economic structures, neoliberal growth models assume that free market and pro-trade policies are 
the key to economic growth in the developing world.  
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Dominant, and primarily Western, opinions on the ideal conditions for economic growth 
in the post-WWII period were formalized with the term “Washington Consensus” in a 1989 
paper for a conference on development economics in Latin America. The Washington Consensus 
included ten basic tenants for economic growth: (1) fiscal discipline, with an emphasis on the 
importance of a balanced budget; (2) the reordering of public expenditure priorities, which is 
generally characterized by cuts in government expenditures; (3) tax reform that combines a 
broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates; (4) liberalization of interest rates; (5) 
competitive exchange rates; (6) trade liberalization; (7) liberalization of inward foreign direct 
investment; (8) privatization of industry; (9) deregulation with the aim of reducing barriers to 
entry and exit in markets; and (10) strong and institutionalized property rights systems 
(Williamson, 2004, p. 3).   
Dominated by a small number of key, Western states, which shared a consensus on the 
optimal conditions for economic growth, international financial institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank operated on the assumption that the economic problems observed in developing 
countries in the decades prior to the introduction of structural adjustment were largely the result 
of domestically-oriented development approaches that were characterized by high levels of 
government involvement and regulation of the economy (United Nations).  In response, they 
advocated a transition from protectionist, inward-oriented economic structures to free market 
economies based upon high levels of trade and minimal regulation by domestic governments. 
The IMF and the World Bank asserted that these macroeconomic and structural changes would 
contribute to higher economic growth and external trade through reduced inflation, increased 
savings, and increasingly efficient resource allocation and government spending (United 
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Nations). It was with these assertions in mind that the lending institutions developed the 
conditions upon which their international loans to developing countries were contingent. 
Though the conditions of loan programs varied slightly on a country-by-country basis, 
they shared a number of common characteristics and had a number of similar consequences for 
the economies in which they were introduced. One of the main conditions of IMF lending 
agreements was currency devaluation, which was encouraged based upon the assumption that 
local purchasing power in borrowing states was overvalued in relation to its actual international 
worth. As a consequence of the required devaluation of national currency, the value of local 
currency in terms of imported goods was reduced; exported goods became cheaper, reducing the 
value of the country’s exports; and the cost of local essential goods such as industry inputs 
increased. In addition to currency devaluation, structural adjustment agreements required the 
effective removal of the government from the economic sphere through privatization and 
deregulation of key industries and the removal of government subsidies from developing 
industries. Related to the removal of the government from the economic sphere was a focus on a 
balanced fiscal budget through the reduction of government expenditures, often in the area of 
public goods provisions by the state. Lastly, IMF lending programs required borrowing 
governments to begin a process of trade liberalization that allowed for their integration into the 
international economy through increased exports, often of agricultural and other primary goods 
(Riddell, 1992).  
Despite the apparent consensus reached by international financial institutions about the 
ability of SAPs to deliver economic success to developing countries, the 1980s and 1990s were 
characterized by continuing economic instability and decline in borrowing countries. From the 
initial implementation of conditional IMF programs, assessments of their success indicated a low 
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rate of achievement on the majority of performance criteria objectives, suggesting that the 
conditions insisted upon by the IMF were not necessarily conducive to economic development as 
was claimed by dominant Western opinion. This is evidenced by the fact that, between 1980 and 
1990, the cumulative success rate measured by all IMF program reviews was between one 
quarter and one half of all programs initiated during that time period (Best, 2014). Rather than 
raising questions about the effectiveness of the structural changes being imposed upon 
borrowers, the lack of success of the initial structural adjustment programs resulted in 
increasingly aggressive policies on the part of the IMF and the World Bank, and both institutions 
continually expanded their influence over borrowing countries’ policies throughout the decade, 
transitioning from a focus on solely macroeconomic policy to include microeconomic issues 
such as prices, financial regulations and labor market policies in their loan conditions. At the 
same time, the IMF and the World Bank were becoming increasingly vocal about their belief in 
the universality of the neoliberal market policies underlying structural adjustment programs, 
dismissing growing concerns that domestic conditions and exogenous shocks were impeding 
their success in much of the developing world. This approach allowed international financial 
institutions to ignore domestic political constraints and treat them as unusual circumstances that 
did not need to be accounted for in the formulation of lending programs (Best, 2014). 
In addition to the relative lack of success of SAPs in achieving the growth objectives 
outlined by the IMF and the World Bank, there is evidence to suggest that the conditional 
lending programs introduced in the 1980s and 1990s had a number of negative consequences for 
socioeconomic conditions in borrowing countries. One of the most important side effects of the 
structural changes implemented through SAPs was an increase in poverty and inequality in the 
developing world. Adjusting countries in Latin America and Africa not only failed to show 
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improvements in poverty rates during the 1980s, but a significant number of countries for which 
data exists showed worsening poverty during the adjustment period. This has been attributed 
primarily to increases in underemployment, which was a side effect of reductions in demand 
caused by shifting trade terms and domestic prices. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that, in 
countries in which SAPs did contribute to increased productivity and growth, the benefits of that 
growth were largely concentrated in the hands of a small, elite segment of the population, failing 
to contribute to higher incomes or job availability for the majority of the population  (Stewart, 
2016).  
Throughout the latter half of the 1990s, the failure of SAPs to deliver the poverty 
reduction and stability promised by international financial institutions facilitated growing 
criticism in the developed and developing world, prompting the IMF and the World Bank to 
reassess their approach to international lending programs. As a result, the ESAF was restructured 
in the late 1990s; and in November of 1999, it became the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF), with the IMF voicing a desire to shift its objectives to include poverty reduction 
as a main focus for its work in developing countries. This was a significant change, as the ESAF 
had presented poverty reduction as an implicit by-product of economic adjustment rather than a 
core goal of the structural adjustment process. Under the PRGF, lending is still conditionally 
based upon the implementation of policy programs by the receiving countries. However, the 
programs differ from ESAF programs in that they allow receiving countries to participate in 
developing the policy change program and policies are evaluated on their ability to contribute to 
poverty reduction in the country in which they are being implemented (IMF, 2001).  
The process of structural adjustment through the PRGF is facilitated through the creation 
of poverty reduction strategy papers by national authorities in borrowing countries in cooperation 
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with various stakeholders such as donors and civil society. The borrowing country then works 
with the IMF and World Bank to incorporate the lenders’ economic conditions into the poverty 
reduction plan they have created. However, while the PRGF’s policies have differed somewhat 
from those of the two earlier facilities, structural adjustment programs of both the IMF and the 
World Bank maintain a number of economic requirements and objectives in their interactions 
with borrowing countries. Under this system, the structural conditions of the lending institutions 
are constrained to four areas that include fiscal management, tax reform, financial sector reform, 
and governance; and country-specific lending agreements have significantly fewer conditions 
than they did under the ESAF (IMF, 2001). However, while the PRGF’s policies differ 
significantly from those of the ESAF, lending agreements have maintained the core economic 
tenants and objectives developed under the original SAF, forcing borrowing countries to pursue 
neoliberal economic growth trajectories, regardless of domestic political and economic 
conditions. In addition, changes to the lending structure have not taken into account the role of 
debt cycles in the future development of borrowing countries, many of whom have found it 
impossible to escape the debt that has accompanied decades of conditional lending with a 
relative lack of success in achieving greater economic stability.  
3.2 Structural Adjustment in Africa 
Pre-Structural Adjustment Development (1960-1980) 
 Many African countries demonstrated a significant amount of economic promise during 
the wave of African decolonization in the early 1960s. During this time, newly established 
African leaders implemented economic strategies that centered around industrialization and 
import-substitution. As a result, development processes were characterized by the state’s 
prioritization of national development over foreign trade through the support of consumer goods 
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production for the domestic market, a classic protectionist approach to economic development 
(Makki, 2015). Protectionist economic policies are characterized by the use of trade restrictions 
that discourage import dependence through the use of prohibitively high trade tariffs on imported 
goods and the use of import quotas, both of which have the effect of increasing the cost of 
foreign goods on the local market and making the price of domestically produced goods more 
attractive in comparison (Ng & Yeats, 1997). In addition to these measures, protectionist 
governments in many sub-Saharan African countries heavily subsidized domestic firms and 
industries that were not yet competitive on the global market (Makki, 2015).  
In describing the general approach to development in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
immediate post-colonial period, Makki (2015) states that African governments utilized “fiscal 
and monetary policies, tariff barriers, and preferential taxation… to get foreign investors to 
manufacture products domestically, and where they could… they established state-owned heavy 
industry” (p. 133). Behind these inward-oriented strategies was the belief that African economies 
would benefit from a reduction in their dependence on manufactured imports and increased 
development in sectors outside of agriculture and primary commodity production. In addition, at 
the time that these economic policies were being developed, the dominant sentiment throughout 
the continent was that the private sectors of African economies were dysfunctional and backward 
enough to warrant strong state participation in development. As a result, many African states 
took a socialist approach to development, assigning responsibility for all aspects of economic 
development to the government (Heidhues & Obare, 2011).  
 During the first decade of development, African states’ state-driven approach to 
economic development was relatively successful. Development during this period was 
characterized by rapidly increasing numbers of trained professionals; large-scale investments in 
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power, roads, and communication networks; and significant advances in health and education 
(Heidhues & Obare, 2011). It was also characterized by considerable growth of African industry, 
with Africa’s industrial sector as a whole increasing twice as fast as its overall GDP between 
1965 and 1973 (Makki, 2015). Despite initial development success,  beginning in the early 
1970s, many African countries that had experienced high rates of growth began to experience 
economic slowdowns caused by a number of external and internal factors; and by the mid-1970s, 
Africa’s economic performance was significantly lower than that of other regions of the 
developing world (Heidhues & Obare, 2011).  
One of the main causes of the economic decline observed in Africa and much of the rest 
of the world in the 1970s was an oil crisis that began in 1973 and initiated a period of sharp 
increases in the global price of crude oil. The oil crisis was particularly damaging for oil 
importing countries in Africa, who faced huge imbalances in their oil imports as a percentage of 
total GDP throughout the decade. As a result, oil importing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
experienced an average negative rate of growth in gross national product per person of -0.4 
percent per year between 1970 and 1980, a change of over 2 percent from the GNI per capita 
increase of 1.7 percent between 1960 and 1970 (Overseas Development Institute, 1982). 
Compounding the economic strain caused by rising oil prices was a decrease in the price of 
primary commodities during the same time period. While these price changes affected 
economies throughout the world, the relative dependence of African states on a narrow range of 
primary commodities resulted in plummeting export revenues for a number of countries 
(Overseas Development Institute, 1982). 
In addition to the exogenous shocks caused by the oil crisis and global decrease in 
primary commodity prices, many African countries also faced a number of structural limitations 
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that made development increasingly difficult throughout the decade. Principal among these 
issues was an inability to attract foreign capital outside of extractive industries as a result of 
limited institutional development, shortages of skilled labor, and weak infrastructure. In addition, 
African states faced increasing productivity differentials in the world market and a decline in the 
terms-of-trade for the primary products that contributed large amounts of their total GDP. In 
addition, the import substitution development processes followed by many African states were 
characterized by the protection of domestic industries from global competitors, which often 
resulted in the subsidization of inferior products that were more expensive than those of global 
competitors, preventing these industries from participating in a competitive global market 
(Makki, 2015). These structural issues were compounded by rampant corruption in African 
states, where leaders utilized the power allocated to the state in the economic sphere to extend 
existing patron-client networks that facilitated growing disparities in income and wealth 
distributions (Akude, 2009).  
As a result of the aforementioned developments in the global economy and individual 
African states, the majority of African economies were characterized by decreased foreign 
investment and rapidly increasing government debt in the latter half of the 1970s. These 
problems were most severe for oil importing countries; and between 1973 and 1975, the current 
account deficit of sub-Saharan Africa’s oil importing countries increased from 3.6 percent to 9.5 
percent of total GDP. By 1980, the deficit was at 9.2 percent of GDP, which was double the 
average deficit for all developing regions in the world. A similar pattern occurred with regard to 
outstanding external debt, which increased by five times between 1970 and 1980; and the 
percentage of export earnings used for interest payments and loan repayment doubled during the 
same time period (Overseas Development Institute, 1982). The crippling debt of African states 
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combined with continual decreases in exports, making it increasingly difficult for African 
governments to support the maintenance of infrastructure and industry. These troubling 
economic developments continued to worsen in the latter years of the 1970s, and by 1980, 
economic output in many African countries was declining (Overseas Development Institute, 
1982).   
 Attempts to deal with Africa’s economic crises were complicated by disagreements 
between African leaders and major international financial institutions, with African leaders 
overwhelmingly choosing to continue state-led economic approaches despite their lack of 
success (Heidhues & Obare, 2011). The failure of state-led, protectionist approaches was due to 
several factors, both exogenous and endogenous. First, the external shocks of the oil crises and 
declining primary commodity prices that had contributed to the initial economic decline in the 
early 1970s continued unabated throughout the 1970s and made it increasingly difficult for 
governments to obtain the revenue necessary to fund domestic industries, as well as lowering 
overall global demand for many of the commodities upon which these countries relied for 
revenue (Overseas Development Institute, 1982; Makki, 2015). In addition, the previously 
mentioned domestic structural limitations and conditions such as corruption, limited institutional 
development, and underdeveloped infrastructure made successful implementation of state-led 
development approaches increasingly difficult (Makki, 2015).  
Despite these limitations, many African leaders remained convinced that a long-term 
commitment to state-led development was the best solution to the economic challenges faced by 
their individual countries, and they developed a set of policies based on these ideas. As a result 
of this collaboration, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Regional Food Plan for Africa 
(AFPLAN) were drafted based upon the proposal of the development of a “bourgeois national 
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state within the Third World with a capacity to make progress in solving the problems of 
underdevelopment… [through] the continuation of state driven development through ISI” 
(Heidhues & Obare, 2011, p. 56). However, rather than contributing to economic recovery, the 
LPA and the AFPLAN contributed to further economic decline in the majority of participating 
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One of the main reasons for this was that the 
programs encouraged and made possible the continuation of inefficient public sector structures in 
which cash-strapped domestic governments were overwhelmed with the financial burden of 
supporting domestic industries that remained uncompetitive on the global market, while leaving 
them with few additional financial resources to develop the infrastructure necessary to diversify 
the economy further (Makki, 2015). In addition, leaders who chose to pursue the above policies 
faced the issues of increasing institutional inability to enact policy change, as well as IMF, 
World Bank, and Western donor disapproval (Heidhues & Obare, 2011).  
 In response to the inability of African states to successfully utilize the LPA and AFPLAN 
to reverse economic decline and the international community’s lack of support for those policies, 
a second set of policies for economic recovery was proposed by the IMF and the World Bank 
through the World Bank’s 1981 report Towards Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The report posited that the observed economic decline in Africa was largely the result of 
government failure and poor policy approaches, citing resource management problems, 
inappropriate levels of state intervention, corruption, and protectionist policies with regard to 
domestic production of goods. However, the report did not address the role of exogenous global 
economic conditions in the failure of African economies in the 1970s, nor did it account for the 
relative success experienced by these economies in the years prior to these global economic 
shifts. Instead, the report represented only the dominant Western opinions on the importance of 
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neoliberal market structures in its recommendations for free trade and non-interventionist 
government policies; and it made these economic principles a precondition for the lending 
programs that would become known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) (Heidhues & 
Obare, 2011). This was a key component to the Western worlds’ deliberate attempts to 
undermine state-centered development in Africa and promote adherence to the neo-liberal modes 
of development that so closely aligned with the economic interests of Western powers in the 
developing world. These political maneuvers were successful; and faced with insurmountable 
levels of debt, floundering domestic industries, and rampant poverty, many African states had no 
option but to turn to Western donors, often the former colonizers, and implement their SAPs 
through the World Bank and the IMF.  
Traditional Structural Adjustment (1980-1999) 
 IMF and World Bank SAPs were first introduced in Africa in the early 1980s, and they 
were in effect in the region throughout the following two decades. Between 1980 and 1989, 36 
Sub-Saharan African countries contracted 241 loans with the IMF and the World bank in the 
name of adjustment and stabilization. Out of these 36 countries, eleven received at least ten 
different loans during the ten-year period (Van De Walle, 2001). Though the loan amounts 
varied by country, the average loan size between 1980 and 1995 was $160 million dollars, a 
significant debt for countries experiencing severe economic crises (Dollar & Svensson, 2000). 
The programs were implemented by both the World Bank and the IMF, who worked together to 
enact macroeconomic and structural change in African economies. However, while both 
organizations were concerned with similar policy changes with regard to economic development, 
each of the two organizations developed conditions that were dependent on their development 
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priorities. The IMF was largely concerned with setting macroeconomic development and policy 
agendas, and the World Bank was responsible for structural adjustment lending.  
When combined, the approaches of both organizations were designed to mitigate what 
international financial institutions and Western donors believed to be Africa’s key economic 
weaknesses. These perceived weaknesses were entirely related to domestic policy decisions 
during the previous decade; and principal among them were ineffective management of the 
public sector, price distortions caused by government intervention in the economy, and 
ineffective resource allocation through the subsidization of noncompetitive domestic industries 
(Heidhues & Obare, 2011). However, while there is evidence to suggest that these domestic 
factors did contribute to the economic issues experienced in the region, there is also an 
abundance of evidence to suggest that the previously described exogenous shocks and 
endogenous economic constraints of the time period were also instrumental in the failure of 
Africa’s development progress in the 1970s. With their refusal to acknowledge the role of these 
global and domestic factors in their assessments of the challenges faced by African countries in 
the early 1980s, international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank were 
able to portray African governments as economically incompetent, paving the way for universal 
acceptance of neoliberal market adjustments to replace all state-centered aspects of African 
economies. In this way, Western governments and the international financial institutions they 
controlled were able to continue patronizing neo-colonial models of development that allowed 
them cheap access to the resources of the developing world.  
 While the assertions of the IMF and the World Bank were largely accepted and the 
dominant conversations regarding SAPs were positive in the 1980s, there was significant 
criticism of the conditional aspect of the programs on the basis that they did not acknowledge or 
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adequately address the institutional challenges faced by the countries in which they were being 
implemented. This criticism came from a variety of actors that included political leaders in both 
the global North and the global South, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in 
developing countries, and academics who were measuring the often catastrophic failures of these 
programs across Sub-Saharan Africa (Best, 2014). One of the primary causes of the backlash 
against the initial structural adjustment programs was the IMF and World Bank’s dismissal of the 
importance of domestic political and economic contexts in the development of their programs, as 
well as the tendency of both organizations to present the complications that arose from these 
contexts as unusual and unforeseeable circumstances that had little relevance for the fundamental 
conditions of the country’s lending agreement (Best, 2014). There were also criticisms about the 
lack of concern shown for the social aspects of development by international financial 
institutions and donors, which were accompanied by claims that structural adjustment programs 
were actually to blame for the exacerbation of issues such as poverty and inequality throughout 
Africa. These claims were primarily voiced by leaders, academics, and NGOs in the developing 
world. However, they were also supported by politicians in some developed countries such as the 
United States, as well as by a minority of internal critics working for the IMF and World Bank 
(Best, 2014).  
While they were not particularly popular on a global scale, the criticisms of structural 
adjustment’s impacts on poverty and inequality were supported by a pattern of decreased 
government capacity to address the social needs of their populations due to required cuts in 
government spending (Rutten, Leliveld, & Foeken, 2008). The shortcomings of SAPs in Africa 
were acknowledged by the World Bank in its 1989 report titled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis 
to Sustainable Growth. In the report, the World Bank acknowledged that, by 1989, expenditure 
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on social services had plummeted, school enrollments were decreasing, nutrition worsening, and 
infant mortality remained troublingly high in numerous African countries in which SAPs had 
been implemented. The report stated that future development approaches needed to be “human-
centered,” presenting a “sustainable development strategy” that aimed to build institutional and 
social capacity, decrease poverty and increase health outcomes, and promote long-term financial 
and industrial growth (The World Bank, 1989). However, at the same time that they were 
asserting their commitment to human-centered, socially-oriented growth, the World Bank, 
representing its position and the position of the IMF, continued to emphasize market friendly, 
neoliberal economic approaches in its plans for future lending programs, arguing that these 
policies were not to blame for the failures of SAPs in the 1980s (Heidhues & Obare, 2011). 
 Instead, the World Bank argued that African governments had “made a dash for 
‘modernization,’ copying, but not adapting, to Western models… the result [of which] was 
poorly designed public investments in industry; too little attention to peasant agriculture; too 
much intervention in areas in which the state lack managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial 
skills; and too little effort to foster grass-roots development” (The World Bank, 1989, p. 3).  In 
doing so, the report attributed the blame for the social costs of adjustment to domestic 
government policy, rather than accepting them as a side effect of the adjustment policies 
themselves. With this position, the World Bank was able to acknowledge the failures of 
development under structural adjustment while refusing to acknowledge that the underlying 
economic assumptions of the adjustments themselves were inherently incompatible with human-
centered development approaches. This attitude continued throughout the following decade, 
despite increasingly vocal insistence from African governments and economists that the 
neoliberal economic adjustments required for IMF and World Bank loans were continuing to 
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contribute to suboptimal social outcomes in spite of the supposed change in focus and direction 
on the part of international financial institutions (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). 
3.3 Structural Adjustment in Sierra Leone 
 Analysis of Sierra Leone’s experience of adjustment highlights several important 
patterns. First, it reveals the problematic economic conditions and structures of the period 
immediately prior to the introduction of structural adjustment, suggesting that dependence on 
resource extraction, corruption, and an inefficient state combined with the exogenous economic 
shocks of the oil crises and declining primary commodity prices to create a dire economic 
situation by the introduction of structural adjustment at the end of the 1970s. More importantly, 
the analysis of socioeconomic indicators suggests that, rather than contributing to economic 
recovery, adjustment was followed by additional economic decline. The analysis also suggests 
that the impacts of adjustment were skewed in favor of certain populations due to the fact that 
programs were structured to promote macroeconomic growth through the removal of safety nets 
such as subsidies on basic commodities for the country’s poor populations. Lastly, analysis of 
Sierra Leone reveals the importance of debt cycles and the ways through which the country was 
forced to continue to borrow in order to maintain the growing debt caused by structural 
adjustment loans.  
 Sierra Leone experienced significant economic growth in the first decade of 
independence, with the economy growing by an average of four percent per year between 1960 
and 1969 (Davies, 2000). Most of this growth was driven by high growth in the mining and 
agriculture sectors of the economy, with the value added to GDP from industry increasing from 
$60.4 million in 1964 to $92 million in 1970 and the value added to GDP from agriculture 
increasing from $79.3 million in 1964 to $94.1 million in 1970 (World Bank, 2016). Mining was 
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a particularly important component to economic growth during this period, and diamond mining 
was the backbone of the economy during the decade following independence. This is evidenced 
by the fact that, between 1960 and 1970 diamond production had increased from approximately 
700,000 carats to approximately 2 million carats per year (Kargbo, 2011). In addition to diamond 
deposits, Sierra Leone was also home to vast deposits of gold and rutile, both of which 
contributed an increasingly large amount to the country’s GDP between 1961 and 1970 (Kargbo, 
2011). The agricultural sector was also a major focus of economic development in the 1960s, 
with the government of Sierra Leone focusing on the production of rice in order to achieve food 
self-sufficiency in the country. With this aim in mind, the government allocated over 50 percent 
of government expenditures on agriculture to rice production, initiating a series of rice 
production programs across the country and setting price controls on domestic rice products that 
were processed and distributed in urban centers through government controlled processes 
(Kargbo, 2011). However, while they encouraged the domestic production of rice, the 
government of Sierra Leone also continued to import rice to cover the shortfall in domestic 
production caused by the movement of farmers into mining throughout the decade (Kargbo, 
2011).  
Despite its initial economic successes, Sierra Leone’s economic conditions in the 1970s 
and 1980s were impacted by a number of external factors. An oil-importing economy that 
depended on foreign oil for mining and other domestic uses, Sierra Leone was particularly 
vulnerable to the impacts of the 1973-74 oil crises. In addition, the country faced deteriorating 
terms of trade and ‘soft’ commodity and mineral markets in which the prices of key export 
commodities were decreasing and the number of global sellers far outpaced buyers (Luke & 
Riley, 1989). One industry that was particularly problematic for Sierra Leone’s economic 
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development was the diamond industry, upon which the majority of export GDP was dependent 
in the early 1970s.  This dependence combined with a lack of government control over illicit 
diamond production and resulted in a sharp decline in legal diamond exports throughout the 
1970s and 1980s (Harris, 2012).  
The government’s lack of control over diamond exports was due primarily to the political 
aspirations of Stevens, who used promises of open access to the country’s diamonds to garner 
political support, initiating a period in which elites engaged in illegal diamond mining with 
impunity. Stevens also participated directly in illegal mining activity and allowed for the 
funneling of diamonds from the state-owned National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) 
through illegal markets (Davies, 2000). As a result of these activities, reported diamond exports 
fell from two million carats to only 595 thousand carats between 1970 and 1980 (Harris, 2012). 
Compounding this problem was a decrease in the global price of diamonds, which further 
decreased the GDP gained from diamond production and exports. In addition to the direct 
consequences of the informal diamond economy and decreasing diamond prices on Sierra 
Leone’s overall economic development, the failures of the diamond industry also resulted in a 
rapid decreased in foreign capital investment in diamond mining and other industries throughout 
the 1970s (Zack-Williams, 1999).  
 In addition to the above economic problems, Sierra Leone suffered from a number of 
internal policy constraints and approaches that impeded economic growth and exacerbated 
existing economic inequalities. Among these were a lack of adequate and effective government 
actions in balancing public expenditure, establishing competitive exchange rates, and promoting 
investment in industry (Luke & Riley, 1989). The lack of attention paid to these aspects of 
economic development can be directly tied to Stevens’ corrupt approach to governance of the 
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political and economic spheres, which was characterized by a “deliberate paring down of formal 
governmental institutions in favour of the construction of a ‘shadow state,’ an arena of illicit 
transactions where formerly the state would have had jurisdiction” (Harris, 2012, p. 56). This 
was largely due to the political climate of Sierra Leone at the time at which Stevens took office, 
which was characterized by a weak state that faced significant competition from rural chiefs and 
urban elite. Within Stevens’ government, economic transactions were primarily based upon 
informal, patron-client relationships, with little attention paid to the restructuring of the economy 
for sustainable development in the future. Under this system, the allocation of economic 
resources and opportunities became privatized and politicized, with import-export licenses and 
access to foreign currency used as favors for political supporters (Harris, 2012). The state also 
utilized questionable economic policies to prevent uprisings of discontent citizens, importing rice 
and selling it at subsidized prices to urban populations, while the informal economy was 
overseeing the production and illegal exportation of homegrown rice crops in the countryside at 
the same time (Harris, 2012).  
 By the late 1970s, the government of Sierra Leone was struggling to maintain the existing 
system, and Stevens turned to IMF stabilization assistance to keep the economy afloat. While the 
original IMF loans obtained by Sierra Leone were not the full-fledged conditional structural 
adjustment programs that would be developed in the 1980s, they involved one-year balance of 
payments support that was contingent upon a number of similar policy conditionalities. These 
conditionalities included “public expenditure cuts, tighter financial discipline, reduction of 
imbalances on the external account, and depreciation of the currency” (Luke & Riley, 1989, p. 
137). The IMF programs in Sierra Leone faced difficulties with implementation almost 
immediately, when the government demonstrated that it was both unable and unwilling to meet 
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the agreed upon conditions put forward in the loan. The government was particularly resistant to 
changes with regard to “exchange rates, higher returns for agricultural producers, reduced 
subsidies for specific commodities (including rice, petroleum, and electricity), reforms in the 
structure of public expenditure, and the surrender of foreign-exchange earnings by exporters to 
the central bank” (Luke & Riley, 1989, p. 137). Their unwillingness, and inability, to comply 
with these conditions was due to the government’s hesitance to undermine the regime’s stability 
through the removal of patron-client relationships and subsidies that pacified the urban 
population. However, faced with an increasingly untenable economic situation, Stevens appeared 
to be “tak[ing] a ‘stop-go’ approach to economic reform…” in order to temporarily maintain his 
position in power (Luke & Riley, 1989, p. 137). 
 The problematic economic environment of the 1970s continued in the first several years 
of the 1980s, and by the time Stevens was replaced by Joseph Momoh in 1985, the country’s 
economy was in shambles and socioeconomic indicators had reached alarmingly low levels. By 
1986, Sierra Leone was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GNP per capita of only 
$310, an average life expectance of only 41 years, and an infant mortality rate of 154 of every 
1,000 live births (Luke & Riley, 1989). In response to these problems, Momoh entered into a 
long-term structural adjustment facility agreement with the IMF in 1986 as part of a 
domestically-developed Economic Recovery Programme. The agreement with the IMF provided 
that the organization would lend Sierra Leone SDR 40.53 million on the condition that they 
implement a number of macroeconomic conditionalities (Zack-Williams, 1999). The primary 
economic adjustments included reforms in the exchange rate system, strict controls on public 
expenditures, liberalized prices, and reduced external payment arrears (African Development 
Bank, 2005). However, the government again found itself unable to successfully implement the 
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entirety of the agreement, while the adjustments they did make to exchange rates, public 
expenditure, and subsidies resulted in decreasing per capita income, high rates of unemployment, 
and widespread poverty (Davies, 2000). One consequence that was particularly rapid and 
problematic was an increase in prices for basic commodities in the immediate aftermath of 
currency devaluation. In the capital city of Freetown, the price of a bar of soap increased from .5 
leone to 2 leone, the price of a gallon of kerosene from 9 leone to 23 leone, and the price of a 
chicken from 20 leone to 80 leone almost overnight (Riddell, 1992). 
Faced with growing economic problems in the months following the introduction of the 
Economic Recovery Programme, Momoh declared a State of Economic Emergency in 1987, 
providing the government with extensive authority to address economic issues such as illicit 
commodity smuggling (Zack-Williams, 1999). In the following three years, his administration 
made a concerted effort to implement the conditions agreed upon with the IMF, entering another 
agreement that required the removal of all subsidies on basic commodities and large-scale public 
sector retrenchment in 1989 (Davies, 2000). Despite his efforts to comply with the conditions of 
the IMF and to curtail problematic economic practices, Momoh failed to comply with 
requirements regarding payment of arrears; and in 1990, the IMF repealed the lending agreement 
in response. Momoh’s lack of compliance with the repayment agreement was not due to an 
unwillingness to repay the loans, but to the government’s financial inability to pay them as a 
result of continuing economic decline and continually growing foreign debt. By this point in 
time, the country’s concessional loan debt to international financial institutions had reached 
almost $300 million dollars (Figure 1), while the total external debt owed on concessional loans 
and all other forms of foreign lending amounted to almost $1.2 billion dollars (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
Figure 2.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
By the time the IMF repealed the lending agreement in 1990, economic indicators had 
worsened significantly and over 80 percent of the population was living below the poverty line 
of $1 per day (Davies, 2000). In addition to high rates of poverty, life expectancy at birth had 
decreased by over two years between 1985 and 1990 (United Nations Development Programme, 
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decreasing from 65.41 percent in 1985 to 51.91 percent in 1990 (Figure 3). Another indication 
that living standards were decreasing during the time period was the decrease in the country’s 
GDP per capita, which fell from approximately $245 in 1975 to approximately $165 in 1990, a 
decrease of 32 percent (Figure 4). Having lost the financial support of the IMF, Momoh chose to 
continue the process of adjustment without the assistance of an international loan, eliminating 
any possibility for the loans to mitigate some of the worst side effects of the post-adjustment 
period (Zack-Williams, 1999). In the immediate aftermath of this decision, prices of basic 
commodities skyrocketed, and inflation had hugely detrimental effects on wages and savings. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the country experienced a percentage change in inflation of 
110.95 in 1990, compared to a percentage change in inflation of 60.8 the year before 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015). Within a year of Momoh’s pursuit of economic adjustment 
without the assistance of an international loan, the country deteriorated into violence, with 
economically marginalized groups leading the onslaught against the state.  
Figure 3. 
  
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute 
for Statistics 
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Figure 4.  
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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loss of additional funds and left the government with little choice but to attempt adjustment 
without the necessary funds, increasing the extent of the economic shocks caused by adjustment.  
3.4 Structural Adjustment in Liberia 
 Analysis of structural adjustment in Liberia highlights several important patterns in the 
years prior to the outbreak of conflict in 1989. First, the pre-adjustment profile suggests that the 
country was experienced significant economic decline and instability in the decade prior to 
adjustment. This appears to be a result of the combined impacts of (1) domestic policies favoring 
Liberian elites and foreign concession holders, and (2) exogenous shocks caused by the oil crises 
and declines in primary commodity prices on the global market. Second, analysis of structural 
adjustment in Liberia illustrates negative trends in income levels and education levels in the 
adjustment period. As with Sierra Leone, these consequences appear to have been unevenly 
experienced by various segments of the population. This was due to the fact that adjustment 
policies continued to favor foreign companies and economic elites, while targeting poor 
populations through cuts in social spending and unfavorable tax policies. Lastly, Liberia’s 
experience during the adjustment period also suggests a problematic cycle of debt in which the 
government was increasingly unable to meet repayment requirements, while worsening 
economic conditions simultaneously encouraged further borrowing.  
 Liberia’s economy performed remarkably well in the two decades preceding 1970, with 
economic growth skyrocketing between 1951 and 1961. At the peak of the growth, Liberia’s 
economic performance outstripped that of every other country in the world except Japan, with an 
astounding annual growth rate of 15 percent between 1952 and 1957 (Gifford, 1993). During this 
time, gross domestic income and net tribal household incomes increased fourfold and the labor 
force increased threefold (Clower, et al., 1966). The discovery and extraction of iron ore that 
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began in 1950 was the largest determinant of growth between 1950 and 1968; and by 1965, 
Liberia was one of the world’s largest exporters of iron ore. While iron ore became increasingly 
important to economic growth during this time, the rubber industry in Liberia continued to 
employ significantly more labor than any other sector of the economy throughout the 1950s and 
the first half of the 1960s, with approximately two-fifths of the country’s labor employed in 
rubber production (Clower et al., 1966).  
 In addition to the growth experienced by the mining industry in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Liberia’s agricultural sector also experienced a significant amount of growth during the time 
period, with the value of output in the sector increasing from $68 million to $109 million 
between 1964 and 1972. However, while the 6 percent annual increase in agricultural output 
demonstrates a remarkable level of sector growth, that growth was restricted almost entirely to 
growth in rubber production and forestry, and there was little growth in the production of food 
crops or other cash crops during the time period. By 1975, traditional agriculture remained 
almost entirely outside of the country’s monetized economy, despite the fact that approximately 
50 percent of the total population was employed in traditional subsistence agriculture. As a 
result, the average income of traditional farmers was measured at approximately $70 per capita 
in 1972, which was significantly lower than the national per capita income of approximately 
$200 in the same year. In addition, the majority of rubber and forestry was controlled by foreign 
concessionaries, limiting the economic gains derived from those industries (World Bank, 1975).  
Despite the promising growth of the 1950s and 1960s, Liberia’s economic circumstances 
changed significantly beginning in the early 1970s, prompting the initiation of a lending 
relationship with international financial institutions. As an oil-importing country that was highly 
dependent upon exports of primary commodities such as rubber and iron ore for the majority of 
 112 
its GDP, the Liberian economy was significantly impacted by the global downturn in primary 
commodity prices and the oil crises of the 1970s (Harris, 2012). At the same time that the 
country was experiencing economic decline associated with external shocks, international 
economic investment in the country continued to be significant, with foreign firms engaged 
heavily in resource extraction in Liberia’s key industries (Wong, 2012). This foreign 
involvement in Liberian industry did little to promote economic growth, as it occurred through 
concessional agreements that allowed foreign firms to export the majority of profit from the 
country’s most lucrative industries to companies in the United States and Europe. While they 
were engaged in lucrative economic schemes in Liberia, the United States was also providing a 
significant amount of financial assistance to the government through development assistance and 
loans, which contributed to growing external debt. As a result of such loans, Liberia’s foreign 
debt grew from $158 million to over $600 million between 1970 and 1979 (Pham, 2004).  
 Unlike many other African economies in the post-colonial period, the Liberian 
government favored liberal capitalist economic policies in its development beginning in the 
1800s. However, throughout the 1970s, the government of Liberia attempted to respond to 
disadvantageous economic circumstances, particularly excessive foreign involvement in Liberian 
industry, through a shift toward state-led, planned economic development that focused on 
industrialization and domestic self-sufficiency in food and other basic commodities. With these 
aims in mind, the government of Liberia increasingly turned to socialist-oriented countries such 
as the Republic of China and the Soviet Union for international ties, deemphasizing their 
relationships with capitalist countries in Europe and North America. The government also began 
the process of renegotiating concessions agreements with foreign companies in an attempt to 
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reach a more equitable arrangement, creating tensions with these companies and the countries in 
which they were based (Hahn, 2014).  
However, while tensions with the United States and other Western powers were high for 
much of the decade, the relationship between the United States and Liberia remained significant, 
and the United States continued to provide economic support ranging from $21 to $76 million 
dollars per year throughout the 1970s (USAID, 2016). In exchange for this support, the United 
States was able to use Liberia as a base from which to influence politics in the region, and by the 
early 1970s, the United States had established the largest US Embassy in Africa in the capital of 
Monrovia. In addition, the United States government established a security and intelligence 
presence through the establishment of the Voice of America’s media relay system for Africa, a 
US intelligence and diplomatic communication station, and a global-range radio navigation 
system that was controlled by US citizens stationed in Monrovia (Hahn, 2014). The country also 
served as the command center for the C.I.A.’s Africa division and as a base from which the 
United States supported war efforts against socialist regimes in countries such as Angola and 
Mozambique (Wong, 2012). Interestingly, while they traded economic assistance for a stronger 
political foothold on the continent, the United States continued to engage in covert operations 
against President Tolbert’s increasingly socialist-oriented government, supporting civil society 
groups such as the Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL), who went on to lead the 1979  
protests known as the “Rice Riot,” which resulted in the killing of protestors by government 
security forces and seriously weakened Tolbert’s regime (Hahn, 2014).  
 In addition to the international dynamics at play in the Liberian economy throughout the 
1970s, a number of domestic dynamics were responsible for accelerating the process of 
economic deterioration. One factor that was particularly damaging to the Liberian economy was 
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the existence of patron-client networks, which facilitated the accumulation of the country’s 
resources in the hands of the urban elite. Inequality and socioeconomic disparities, which had 
been present since the establishment of the republic of Liberia were exacerbated during these 
years; and by the mid-1970s, 4 percent of the population owned over 60 percent of the country’s 
wealth (Harris, 2012). Extreme wealth concentration in the country was accompanied by 
ineffective government policies in the economic sphere that allowed the urban elite to maintain 
their wealth at the expense of the urban and rural poor. These policies included government 
chosen increases in the prices of basic necessities, as well as policies to protect industries that 
contributed to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of elite officials and newly established 
industrialists (Pham, 2004).  
By the latter years of the 1970s, economic indicators had begun to reflect the problematic 
economic condition of Liberia, with high levels of unemployment and skyrocketing consumer 
prices suggesting that the economy was hovering on the brink of economic crisis (Radelet, 
2007). In 1979, the government of Liberia further added to the country’s financial strain when it 
hosted the sixteenth summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which cost the country 
an estimated $200 million (Pham, 2004). That same year, global oil prices jumped again, pushing 
the country further into economic decline. It was at this point in time that the Liberian 
government turned to the IMF and the World Bank for financial assistance for the first time. 
Beginning in 1980, the government of Liberia began to engage in stand-by lending agreements 
with the IMF to obtain economic support. Between 1980 and 1984, the country was approved for 
five IMF loans (Mills-Jones, 1988). This had the effect of increasing the country’s total 
outstanding debt on concessional loans from approximately $211 million in 1980 to 
approximately $398 million in 1984 (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
The measures outlined in the IMF stand-by arrangements for Liberia were designed to 
stabilize the country’s economy through currency devaluation, balanced government 
expenditures, and a complete overhaul of the taxation system. Despite assertions that these 
structural changes would contribute to economic growth, Liberia experienced a decline of over 
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(Mills-Jones, 1988). Similarly, the adjustments failed to correct issues with budget balance; and 
Liberia’s budget deficit was higher in 1985 than it had been at the introduction of the programs 
in 1980, increasing from 10 percent to 20 percent of GDP by 1985 (Claasen & Salin, 1991). 
 In addition to the lack of success of the adjustments with regard to economic 
stabilization, IMF conditions had a number of negative social consequences. Principal among 
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capita decreased from approximately $451 in 1980 to approximately $387 in 1985, a decrease of 
almost 15 percent (Figure 6). In addition, the measures imposed by the IMF required salary cuts 
for government employees, and salaries for state employees suffered cuts ranging from 
approximately 17 to 25 percent in January of 1983 (Mills-Jones, 1988). Adjustment also had 
negative impacts on education levels; and primary school enrollment decreased from 48.94 
percent in 1980 to 39.39 percent in 1984 (Figure 7).  
Figure 6.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Figure 7.  
 
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute 
for Statistics 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Liberia: GDP per capita, 1975-1991 (Current 
US$)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Liberia: Primary School Enrollment, 1975-1991 
(% gross)
 117 
During the years that the government was entering into adjustment agreements with the 
IMF, Liberia was also experiencing renewed economic closeness with the United States, which 
was characterized by continued US interests in Liberia. During the early years of the 1980s, the 
US government increased its foreign aid to Liberia; and over the first five years of the 1980s, 
they provided a total of $500 million to the government (Harris, 2012). However, while the 
amount of aid given to Liberia was high, the profits garnered by US corporations were much 
higher, totaling $1 billion in US trade, banking, and investment interests in 1980 alone (Harris, 
2012). In 1986, Liberia was declared ineligible for continuing IMF assistance due to the 
accumulation of arrears, but a different program was approved the next year in 1987 (Claasen & 
Salin, 1991; Riddell, 1992).  
Figure 8.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
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6). During this time, the country’s debt continued to increase unabated, with the total 
concessional debt reaching approximately $569 million by 1989, an increase of over $350 
million from 1980 (Figure 5). The country’s total debt was also increasing, reaching almost $1.9 
billion by 1989, compared to a total external debt of approximately $685 million in 1980 (Figure 
8).  
Overall, the above profile of structural adjustment in Liberia suggests measurable 
negative impacts on living standards and economic conditions between 1980 and the outbreak of 
conflict in 1989. The period was characterized by a general decline in GDP per capita and 
education. However, there are two things worth noting regarding the two indicators. First, with 
regard to GDP per capita, the largest drop in GDP occurred during the first year of the conflict 
between 1989 and 1990, rather than during the period of pre-conflict adjustment. Second, given 
the lack of data on primary school enrollment after 1984, it is difficult to determine whether 
education continued to be impacted by adjustment between 1985 and the outbreak of conflict in 
1989. However, even with these factors, the data suggests a general downward trend in living 
standards in the pre-conflict period. Another important pattern revealed in this section is 
structural adjustment’s exacerbation of inequalities through adjustment policies favoring foreign 
concession-holders and Liberian elites at the expense of the country’s poorer populations. Lastly, 
concessional debt and total debt figures suggest that the country’s accumulation of debt exceeded 
the government’s ability to pay arrears, further impacting financial stability in the adjustment 
period.   
3.5 Structural Adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire  
 In contrast to Sierra Leone and Liberia, the pre-adjustment profile of Côte dIvoire in the 
1970s and early 1980s suggests that the country experienced an unusual period of economic 
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decline in the pre-adjustment period that was in sharp opposition to its general trend of economic 
growth and development in the post-colonial period. Though some of this economic decline was 
a product of domestic economic structures, such as a reliance on cash crop exports, the primary 
cause of economic decline in the case of Côte d’Ivoire was exogenous shocks to commodity 
prices in the immediate pre-adjustment years. What is interesting about Côte d’Ivoire as a case 
study of structural adjustment is that, despite the above differences in pre-adjustment economic 
conditions, the country experienced similar declines in living standards as the other two countries 
in the post-adjustment period. In addition, adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire also appears to have had 
unequal impacts by favoring increased commercial agricultural production at the expense of 
urban populations and civil servants. Lastly, Côte d’Ivoire also experienced significant increases 
in external debt, though there is no clear indication that they were unable to meet the payment of 
arrears requirements like Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 Unlike Sierra Leone and Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire’s post-independence economic 
development was high and sustained throughout the first two decades after independence. This 
economic growth survived the oil crises and shifts in primary commodity prices in the 1970s, 
and the country experienced an average annual GDP growth of over seven percent between 1960 
and 1980 (Grootaert, 1995). The ability of Côte d’Ivoire to avoid the economic decline occurring 
throughout much of the region was largely due to the country’s economic profile and the role of 
coffee and cocoa production in its economic growth. In contrast to the declining price of 
commodities such as rubber and diamonds, coffee and cocoa prices experienced price increases 
at several points throughout the decade. When combined with the increase in production of these 
commodities that was occurring in Côte d’Ivoire and the decrease in the production of these 
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commodities that was occurring in countries such as Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire was able to become an 
increasingly important international player in the cocoa and coffee industries (Ikpo, 2015).  
 In addition to economic growth, Côte d’Ivoire also experienced significant progress in 
the development of infrastructure and social services. During this time, relative economic 
prosperity made it possible for the government to invest heavily in economic and social 
development, and real government spending rose by about 60 percent throughout the 1970s.  
Significant amounts of this expenditure was allocated toward the development of health and 
education services, with a large number of health centers opened in rural and urban areas 
throughout the decade (Thomas, Lavy & Strauss, 1996). However, despite the promising growth 
experienced in the 1970s, Côte d’Ivoire continued to rely on coffee and cocoa for the majority of 
GDP, a pattern that had begun in the colonial period. In 1980, the country’s dependence on these 
two commodities resulted in an abrupt halt to economic growth when global prices of coffee and 
cocoa plummeted (Grootaert, 1995). 
 In 1981, Côte d’Ivoire responded to the sudden economic downturn by entering into a 
structural adjustment program with the World Bank, beginning a period of reform that aimed to 
“restore fundamental macro-economic balances, and to correct major distortions in the incentive 
system” (Grootaert, 1995, p. 380). The initial structural adjustment agreement implemented 
through the World Bank was comprised of three main areas. These three areas included changes 
to public investment policy, agricultural reform, and a number of studies that were expected to 
obtain the information necessary to implement future reforms in industry, the public sector, and 
public expenditure. One of the most immediate changes required through the program was a 
sharp decrease in public investment, with a decrease of 9.5 percent between the late 1970s and 
1981. With regard to agricultural policy, structural adjustment policies emphasized decreasing 
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food imports and increasing agricultural exports. The program also introduced studies on the 
pricing of agricultural goods such as cotton, coffee, and cocoa, while abstaining from making 
any price changes to those commodities under the 1981 SAP  (Grootaert & Kanbur, 1990). 
Despite the relatively conservative changes made during the initial structural adjustment 
period, poverty rates during the first four years of the 1980s were increased, with an annual rate 
of poverty growth of 4.96 to 5.59 percent between 1980 and 1984 (Kakwani, 1993). During this 
same time period, GDP per capita also decreased from $977 to $700, a decrease of almost 30 
percent and the lowest level of per capita GDP the country had experienced since nearly a decade 
before in 1976 (Figure 9). However, unlike Liberia and Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire’s education 
levels were not significantly impacted in the initial adjustment period, with primary school 
enrollment rates fluctuating over the four-year period and ending at 74.03 percent in 1985, a 
slight increase from the enrollment rate of 73.9 in 1980 (Figure 10).  
Figure 9.  
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Figure 10. 
 
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute 
for Statistics 
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p. 7). The program’s focus on agricultural reform was particularly important; and the conditions 
required the removal of subsidies on cotton and an increase in producer prices for cocoa and 
coffee for the 1983 to 1984 harvest season.  
Figure 11.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Figure 12. 
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These policy changes had a significant impact on the distribution of income in Côte 
d’Ivoire, providing economic benefits for rural agricultural producers (Grootaert, 1995). 
However, while the policy changes implemented through the World Bank program did fulfil the 
aim of increasing agricultural output, they were not successful in bringing increased economic 
prosperity to the country, and poverty rates continued to increase at the same pace as they had 
between 1980 and 1984 (Grootaert & Kanbur, 1990). In addition to the impacts of agricultural 
policies, attempts to reform state expenditure policies resulted in significant wage cuts in the 
parastatal sector and the freezing of civil service wages in 1984 (Grootaert, 1995). This further 
tilted the balance of the negative impacts of structural adjustment policies toward urban Ivorians 
and away from rural agricultural producers.  
 In 1985 and 1986, large harvests of primary agricultural commodities combined with an 
upswing in global coffee and cocoa prices to provide a period of economic growth in Côte 
d’Ivoire; and in 1985 and 1986 the country experienced growth rates of 4.9 percent and 3.4 
percent respectively. In 1986, Côte d’Ivoire entered into a third structural adjustment program 
through the World Bank, bringing structural adjustment debt to a total of $650 million 
(Grootaert, 1995). The conditions of the 1986 agreement addressed similar issues as the 1983 
agreement, but they were significantly more targeted and specific than the conditions of the 
previous two programs. This was particularly true with regard to agricultural reform, and the 
1986 SAP set conditions designed to further shift the rural-urban terms of trade that had been 
addressed through price and subsidy changes in the 1983 agreement. Through this process, 
income was further shifted toward rural producers of export commodities such as coffee, cocoa, 
and cotton, while civil servants and other urban workers continued to experience decreases in 
their wages (Grootaert & Kanbur, 1990). This shift is evidenced by the fact that, between 1986 
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and 1988, the incidence of poor households in small urban areas increased from 2.3 percent to 
31.7 percent, while the incidence of poor households in rural areas decreased from 57.4 percent 
to 51.2 percent during the same time period (Sahn, Dorosh, & Younger, 1997).  
 Despite the myriad of changes implemented under the 1986 SAP, 1987 marked a return 
to economic decline with another drop in the prices of coffee and cocoa, with real GDP growth 
plummeting from 3.4 percent in 1986 to -1.6 percent in 1987. When the economy continued to 
deteriorate, Côte d’Ivoire interrupted the adjustment effort, choosing not to go forward with 
additional structural and policy changes between 1987 and 1989. During this time period, 
socioeconomic conditions continued to worsen, and poverty incidence increased by 32 percent in 
1988 alone. Near the end of 1989, the government of Côte d’Ivoire implemented a new 
economic reform program with the support of the World Bank and the IMF, beginning a second 
phase of structural adjustment that would continue throughout the 1990s (Grootaert, 1995). 
Between 1989 and 1993, the World Bank issued six structural adjustment loans to the country, 
and the IMF engaged in two stand-by loan arrangements in 1989 and 1991.  
During this period, the primary objectives of the IMF and World Bank were the reduction 
of the government’s budget deficit through reduced government expenditures, reduced capital 
expenditures, and tax increases; privatization of state enterprise; and general finance reform. 
Adjustment continued in 1994, when Côte d’Ivoire entered into a three year ESAF program 
through the IMF. The stated objectives of the ESAF agreement were the generation of budget 
surplus to be used to financing the country’s debt, GDP growth of at least 5 percent by 1995, and 
the economic protection of vulnerable groups during the adjustment period. The IMF asserted 
that these objectives would be accomplished through “labor market deregulation, price decontrol, 
trade reform, reductions in civil service employment, and faster privatization” (Naiman & 
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Watkins, 1999). Unlike the earlier period of structural adjustment, which saw only a slight 
increase in external debt, the second phase of programs in Côte d’Ivoire contributed to 
skyrocketing debt between 1989 and 1996; and by 1996 the country’s concessional debt had 
reached a staggering $4.8 billion, an increase of over $2 billion from the 1989 level of debt of 
$2.16 billion (Figure 11). The country’s total external debt also increased during this period, 
from $14.82 billion in 1989 to $19.52 billion in 1996 (Figure 12).  
Despite promises of economic recovery on the part of the IMF and the World Bank, the 
second phase of structural adjustment also failed to deliver growth and address poverty. Between 
1988 and 1995, the incidence and intensity of poverty doubled, with the percentage of the 
population earning less than one dollar per day increasing from 17.8 to 36.8 in a seven year 
period (Naiman & Watkins, 1999). GDP per capita was also affected, decreasing from $830.8 in 
1989 to $763.7 in 1995 (Figure 9) Social service provision was also negatively impacted by the 
economic conditions of the adjustment period, with the education sector suffering the brunt of 
budget cuts by the government. Between 1990 and 1995, real per capita government spending on 
education decline by over 35 percent; and by 1995, the gross enrollment rate for secondary 
school was at only 31 percent, a decrease of 3 percent from the enrollment rate of 34 percent in 
1986 (Naiman & Watkins, 1999). While the IMF and World Bank programs did not enjoy initial 
success in stimulating economic growth, the country appeared to be recovering beginning in 
1995, and it sustained an average rate of GDP growth of approximately 6 percent between 1995 
and 1998 (International Labor Rights Fund). 
 In 1998, citing their success in facilitating economic recovery, the IMF put forth a 
second ESAF agreement for the 1998-2000 period, including similar objectives to those of the 
1994 program, while also putting forward a strategy for more expansive reforms for the private 
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sector and fiscal policy (IMF, 1998).  These optimistic plans for economic reform were 
complicated when global cocoa prices again plummeted in 1999, beginning a regression toward 
economic decline in the country. In 1999, the growth rate of Côte d’Ivoire’s GDP declined from 
approximately 6 percent to just 1.6 percent; and the situation continued to worsen in the 
following year, with the economy experiencing decline in GDP of -2.4 percent in 2000 
(International Labor Rights Fund). The economy recovered only slightly in 2001, reaching a 
GDP growth of 0.1 percent; and at the outbreak of the conflict in 2002, growth was expected to 
reach a maximum of 3 percent by the end of the year (OECD, 2003).  
Examination of Côte d’Ivoire’s experience with structural adjustment highlights several 
key factors related to the relationships between adjustment, economic conditions, and conflict. 
First, analysis of socioeconomic indicators demonstrates that GDP per capita and primary school 
enrollment declined in the two decades following the introduction of adjustment and prior to the 
outbreak of conflict in 2002. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the decline in GDP per capita was 
largest after the introduction of the first programs between 1981 and 1985. However, it remained 
well below 1980 levels throughout the introduction of additional programs in the latter half of 
the 1980s and the 1990s. Post-adjustment changes in primary school enrollment levels were less 
significant, and it is unclear whether education was seriously affected by the programs based on 
this data. In addition to the general impacts on socioeconomic conditions, there is evidence that 
structural adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire disproportionately impacted urban Ivorians and Ivorians 
outside of coffee and cocoa production, magnifying existing gaps in economic prosperity and 
opportunity.   
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3.6 Summary of Findings 
 The above analysis on structural adjustment and its impacts on the economies and 
socioeconomic conditions of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire reveals several patterns. 
First, data on standard of living indicators such as GDP per capita and education suggest that the 
overall socioeconomic conditions of all three countries declined following the introduction of 
structural adjustment in the 1980s and prior to the onset of the first conflict in each country. The 
most obvious effects were in GDP per capita, which declined precipitously in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire in the years leading up to the conflicts. The impacts on education were 
less uniform across the three case studies, with Côte d’Ivoire demonstrating little variation in 
primary school enrollment in the years following the introduction of structural adjustment and 
leading up to the conflict. This raises interesting questions about the relationship between 
structural adjustment and declining socioeconomic conditions, given that education levels in 
were significantly higher than those of those of the other two countries prior to the introduction 
of structural adjustment.  
Côte d’Ivoire also experienced a decade or so more of structural adjustment before 
descending into conflict in 2002. This is in contrast to Liberia and Sierra Leone, which 
descended into conflict in 1989 and 1991 respectively, which was within approximately a decade 
of the introduction of adjustment. These factors suggest that the initial level of development may 
be a factor in determining the extent to which structural adjustment impacts socioeconomic 
conditions. The three case study countries also demonstrated a steady increase in external debt in 
the pre-conflict adjustment period. Importantly, increases in debt were not restricted to 
concessional structural adjustment loans, but included significant increases in total debt that 
included other forms of international assistance and loans. This suggests that, when faced with 
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the economic failures of adjustment, the countries were forced to obtain additional forms of 
credit outside of structural adjustment lending, further destabilizing their economies.  
While the above data suggests a relationship between structural adjustment and economic 
decline in all three cases, one question that remains is whether economic decline would have 
occurred in the absence of conditional lending agreements. Given the historical nature of the 
study, it is not possible to determine what the economies of the three countries would have 
looked like without structural adjustment; and this raises the question of whether we can blame 
the programs for processes of decline that may have occurred had conditionality agreements not 
been implemented. However, while economic collapse may or may not have been caused by 
structural adjustment, the data reveals a second pattern that suggests that, in either case, 
structural adjustment played a role in determining the distribution of economic hardship in ways 
that contributed to conflict by determining who was affected by economic decline and how they 
were affected by it. In other words, the data on economic development in the adjustment period 
reveals a tendency for structural adjustment programs to exacerbate inequality and exclusion in 
the economic sphere based on their focus on specific sectors of development and the shrinking of 
other areas of the state and economy. 
 Though the mechanisms through which this occurred varied by country, it is clear that 
the programs favored certain groups in each society, often at the expense of others. In Liberia, 
adjustment favored foreign concession-holders at the expense of Liberians at the lower end of the 
socioeconomic ladder, while simultaneously targeting public sector employees and youth 
through the shrinking of the state bureaucracy and declining public expenditure. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
adjustment was structured to enhance production in the coffee and cocoa industries, and the 
programs were effectively designed to promote growth in those sectors at the expense of urban 
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populations, and particularly public sector employees. In Sierra Leone, the magnification of 
inequality and exclusion through structural adjustment is less obvious than in the other two 
cases. However, the analysis above suggests that the removal of subsidies on basic commodities 
was one of the more devastating aspects of the programs and that they resulted in increased 
economic hardships for the urban and rural poor, both of whom were marginalized and excluded 
populations in the post-colonial period.    
 Based upon the combined findings of the historical profiles and structural adjustment 
profiles, I argue that the magnification of inequality and exclusion of select groups that occurred 
as a result of structural adjustment led to conflict by shifting realities and perceptions of 
opportunities for socioeconomic mobility among significant proportions of the populations in 
each country. In Chapter 2, analysis of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire revealed the 
importance of marginalized groups in the development of conflict in each of the countries, with 
unemployed and uneducated youth playing a pivotal role in instigating violent conflict. What is 
key to my argument is the evidence presented in the previous chapter that suggests that the 
choice of these youth to participate in violence in all three countries was driven by the absence of 
‘normal’ routes to economic stability and the perception that violence was a means through 
which to attain access to greater educational and economic opportunities. Though limited 
educational and economic opportunity was a challenge faced through much of the colonial and 
post-colonial periods in these countries, the extent of these limitations was significantly altered 
through structural adjustment’s impacts on per capita income and education, and this process was 
one avenue through which foreign economic intervention in the form of structural adjustment 
exacerbated existing structures of inequality and exclusion.  The second mechanism through 
which structural adjustment magnified inequality was the tendency of structural adjustment to 
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favor elite groups in the economic and political spheres at the expense of already marginalized 
groups that had previously been dependent on state provision of services such as education to 
achieve upward mobility.  
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Chapter 4 
Conflict Spillover? 
4.1 Overview 
In the preceding chapters, instability and violent conflict in each of the three individual 
case study countries were explored through historical profiles and an analysis of the impacts of 
structural adjustment on domestic political and economic conditions, exposing a number of 
common themes in the processes of conflict development in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire. An analysis of the three countries reveals that, while each country had unique experiences 
with state building and development in the colonial and post-colonial periods, they also shared 
several key experiences, chief among them a particular type of foreign economic intervention that 
evolved in the years prior to the conflicts, eventually taking the form of structural adjustment 
programs. Though the available data on the impacts of these programs is limited and imperfect in 
nature, it does suggest that the programs had detrimental impacts on the economies and political 
stability of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire in ways that directly impacted the trajectory 
of instability and conflict in each of the three countries. 
While the findings regarding the occurrence of conflict in each individual country are 
relatively clear, what is less clear is whether the three conflicts occurred in relative isolation or 
were causally related. In other words, there is still the question of whether conflict in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire can be attributed primarily to transborder processes of conflict 
diffusion or to the existence of similar domestic conditions that made conflict more likely in each 
individual case. In Chapter 2, the sections detailing the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire reveal clear transnational connections between state and non-state parties both before and 
during the conflicts. The connections suggest that the leaders of these groups had a number of 
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political and economic incentives for offering both direct and indirect support to various parties to 
the conflicts throughout the region at various points in time. They also suggest that participants in 
rebel groups experienced some degree of interaction that facilitated the involvement of non-
national rebel troops in conflicts in neighboring countries. However, while these links demonstrate 
a connection between the parties to the conflicts, they do not necessarily demonstrate that the 
actual occurrence of conflict in one country was the causal factor explaining the occurrence of 
conflict in the others. In other words, the existence of political, ideological, and even economic 
ties between the parties to the conflicts does not explain the willingness and ability of the 
populations within those countries to become the primary participants in instigating domestic 
conflict. Further, these connections do not explain how, and if, the existing networks between these 
countries shifted in the years preceding the conflicts in ways that incentivized cooperation and 
violence on the part of domestic combatants in each of the three countries.  
In this chapter, I will explore these questions in order to determine whether the conflicts in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire were primarily isolated instances of domestic conflict 
driven by similar climates of inequality and exclusivity, or related instances of conflict in a regional 
conflict system. The existing literature on conflict diffusion that was presented in Chapter 1 
suggests that there are a number of possible processes through which conflict spillover occurs, the 
most likely of which are through the existence of transnational formal and informal economic 
networks and trans-border ethnic ties that promote the extension of violence based on ties to ethnic 
groups in neighboring countries. In the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, distinct 
colonial experiences resulted in widely divergent configurations of ethnic contracts and salience 
between the countries; and the historical analysis does not suggest that common transborder ethnic 
ties played a significant role in the conflicts in any of the three countries. For this reason, I will 
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focus solely on transnational economic networks in assessing the possibility of conflict spillover. 
I will situate this exploration within my broader findings on the impact of foreign economic 
intervention on domestic stability, exploring the link between foreign economic intervention in 
each of the three countries and changes in regional economic dynamics. In particular, I will focus 
on shifts in trade patterns, both formal and informal, following the introduction of structural 
adjustment and in the years immediately preceding each of the conflicts in order to assess whether 
the propensity of structural adjustment programs to magnify inequality and exclusion domestically 
was transmitted across borders through its impact on formal and informal trade.  
4.2 Structural Adjustment and Trade 
Structural Adjustment and Formal Trade 
 The data on trade between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire is incomplete and, 
therefore, provides only an incomplete picture of the dynamics at play in the years immediately 
following the introduction of structural adjustment programs1. However, given the data that is 
available, there does not appear to be a clear and measurable link between the introduction of 
structural adjustment and levels of trade; and the three countries demonstrate significant variation 
in trading patterns throughout the 1980s. In the case of the trading relationship between Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, the general trend was a decrease in exports from Liberia to Sierra Leone in the 
first half of the 1980s and an increase in exports from Sierra Leone to Liberia during the same time 
period. This is in contrast to the latter half of the 1970s, when exports from Liberia to Sierra Leone 
were increasing and exports from Sierra Leone to Liberia decreasing (Table 1). However, while 
the direction of trade between the countries had shifted toward Sierra Leone by 1985, the available 
                                                 
1 Incomplete data is due to inconsistent data collection and data collection methods of the three 
governments that were exacerbated by the outbreak of conflict in the region.  
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data shows significant variation over the five-year period, with Liberia’s exports increasing more 
than $2.5 million between 1981 and 1982, before plummeting in 19862 (Table 1). 
Table 1.  
Direction of Trade, Liberia and Sierra Leone: 1975-1995 (Millions of US$) 
Exports 
Year Liberia to Sierra Leone Sierra Leone to Liberia  
1975 0.37 0.81 
1976 0.34 0.25 
1977 0.48 0.58 
1978 1.13 - 
1979   - 
1980 1.25 - 
1981 0.89 - 
1982 3.43 0.88 
1983 1.05 0.96 
1984 1.03 1.58 
1985 0.99 2.2 
1986 0.31 - 
1987 - - 
1988 - - 
1989 - - 
1990 0.31 - 
1991 0.34 - 
1992 0.38 - 
1993 0.45 - 
1994 0.54 - 
1995 0.66 - 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics  
As with Sierra Leone, the available data suggests that Liberia’s trading patterns with Côte 
d’Ivoire shifted dramatically and often throughout the 1980s, while also demonstrating a general 
decrease in exports from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire and a general increase in exports from Côte 
d’Ivoire to Liberia. This is evidenced by the fact that Liberian exports to Côte d’Ivoire decreased 
from $1.7 million in 1980 to only $0.02 million in 1987, while exports from Côte d’Ivoire to 
                                                 
2 Conflict broke out in Liberia in 1989, Sierra Leone in 1991, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. 
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Liberia increased from $4.99 million in 1980 to $37.19 million in 1989 (Table 2). Interestingly, 
the biggest increase in exports from Côte d’Ivoire to Liberia occurred between 1982 and 1983, 
during which time a number of structural adjustment programs were being introduced in both 
countries (Table 2). However, without more detailed data about the commodities being traded 
between the countries, it is difficult to ascertain whether the shifts in favor of Côte d’Ivoire were 
the result of structural adjustment policies that focused on cocoa and coffee as primary export 
commodities or simply a result of Côte d’Ivoire’s significantly higher level of economic 
development during the time period.  
Table 2.  
Direction of Trade, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire: 1975-1995 (Millions of US$) 
Exports 
Year Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire to Liberia  
1975 0.71 3.85 
1976 1.5 - 
1977 1.72 - 
1978 2.45 - 
1979   - 
1980 1.74 4.99 
1981 0.5 7.47 
1982 0.13 9.98 
1983 - 16.64 
1984 - 16.93 
1985 - 12.14 
1986 0.02 - 
1987 0.02 - 
1988 - - 
1989 - 37.19 
1990 0.2 14.32 
1991 0.1 15.16 
1992 0.08 23.44 
1993 0.04 3.88 
1994 0.73 4.55 
1995 3.57 19.05 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics  
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In the case of trade between Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire following the introduction of 
structural adjustment, a lack of available data on trade between the two countries makes it 
difficult to draw concrete conclusions. The only pattern that becomes apparent from the limited 
data available is that, as with Liberia, exports from Côte d’Ivoire to Sierra Leone increased 
significantly between 1975 and 1995, with exports skyrocketing from only $4.93 million in 1989 
to over $20.52 million in 1995 (Table 3). However, given that this increase occurred a full ten 
years after the introduction of conditional structural adjustment in both countries, as well as the 
fact that a significant portion of the increase in exports occurred after conflict had already broken 
out in Sierra Leone, it is difficult to argue that this trend is a direct result of structural adjustment.  
Table 3.  
Direction of Trade, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire: 1975-1995 (Millions of US$) 
Exports 
Year Sierra Leone to Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire to Sierra Leone 
1975 0.06 0.66 
1976 - - 
1977 - - 
1978 - - 
1979 - - 
1980 - - 
1981 - - 
1982 - - 
1983 - - 
1984 0.69 - 
1985 0.21 - 
1986 - - 
1987 - - 
1988 - - 
1989 - 4.93 
1990 - 16.32 
1991 - 21.92 
1992 - 26.02 
1993 - 26.68 
1994 - 26.51 
1995 - 20.52 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Overall, a macro level analysis of formal trade between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire does not suggest that the devastating domestic impacts of structural adjustment outlined 
in the previous chapter had measurable and significant impacts on regional trading patterns in 
ways that would support a conflict spillover argument. However, given the limited amount of 
data available on Liberia and Sierra Leone during the time period, the inability to draw a 
conclusion about the connection between structural adjustment and regional trading dynamics 
may be a function of incomplete information and flawed data. In describing the dataset used 
above, the IMF states that the direction of trade statistics are compiled from domestic statistics 
agencies when possible, and estimated based on a number of other sources in other cases. As a 
result, there is often a large margin of error in the estimates provided, and this has the potential to 
skew the data toward countries with more sophisticated and reliable data collection capabilities. 
Given these limitations, I will not argue that the data proves definitively that there were no 
spillover effects in formal trade. Instead, I argue that the data simply does not indicative any 
particular pattern with regard to structural adjustment and regional trade.   
Structural Adjustment and Informal Trade 
 While the impact of structural adjustment on formal economic interactions is useful in 
understanding conflict diffusion processes, what is perhaps more important is assessing their 
impact on informal economic networks in the region. As outlined in previous chapters, the region 
in which the conflict occurred, and the country of Sierra Leone in particular, is home to valuable 
resources that have played a significant role in the development and informal economy of the 
region. Given this fact, an examination of these informal networks in the post-structural 
adjustment, pre-conflict years is imperative to understanding whether conflict diffusion did 
occur. However, as with the analysis of formal trade in the region, the data available on informal 
 139 
economic networks in the pre-conflict period is scarce and unreliable. Given the inherently 
secretive nature of informal trade, there is a large gap in data on levels of informal trade between 
the three countries specifically. However, there has been some quantitative work done on the 
overall size of the informal economies of the three countries; and it is these statistics that I will 
use to measure changes in transborder informal economic activity. While this will not provide a 
comprehensive picture of the specific trading dynamics between the countries in question, it will 
provide some understanding of whether informal economic networks were expanding in tandem 
with structural adjustment programs in the years leading up to the conflict.  
Similar to the data on formal trade, the limited data on the informal economies of Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire does not sufficiently link the introduction of structural 
adjustment to shifts in informal trading networks, and in particular, to an increase in informal 
trade that could have served as the mechanism through which conflict spread. Sierra Leone 
experienced significant growth in its shadow economy in the decade following structural 
adjustment and prior to the conflict; and it grew from 25.5 percent of GDP in 1986 to 38.1 at the 
outbreak of the conflict in 1991 (Figure 13). Importantly, the shadow economy was in a period of 
growth and not decline in the two years prior to the conflict. However, it is also important to note 
that, though it was growing in the two years prior to the conflict, the actual size of the shadow 
economy was smaller in the year prior to the outbreak of conflict than it had been three years 
earlier in 1987 (Figure 13). In addition, the most significant growth in its informal economy 
occurred after the conflicts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone had already begun (Figure 13; 
Figure 14). In fact, the informal economy of Sierra Leone was in one of its smallest periods both 
in the two-year period prior to the outbreak of conflict in Liberia and in the two-year period 
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following the outbreak of conflict in Liberia and prior to the outbreak of conflict in Sierra Leone 
(Figure 13; Figure 14). 
Figure 13.  
 
Source: Alm & Embaye (2013), Using Dynamic Panel Methods to Estimate Shadow Economies 
Around the World, 1984-2006  
 
In the case of Liberia, there is very limited data on the size of the informal economy, but 
the available numbers suggest that it was shrinking in the first half of the 1980s before it began 
to grow again between 1986 and 1988. While data is not available for the following years, the 
graph suggests an upward trajectory in the two years leading up to the outbreak of conflict in 
Liberia. However, even with the growth that occurred after 1986, the informal economy was still 
2.4 percent smaller in 1988 than it had been in 1984 (Figure 14). Due to the absence of data after 
1988, it is impossible to tell whether Liberia’s shadow economy grew following the outbreak of 
conflict in Sierra Leone (Figure 14). However, were there data demonstrating that trend, it would 
still not explain the actual outbreak of conflict in Sierra Leone, as the growth would not have 
occurred until after conflict began. The size of Côte d’Ivoire’s shadow economy fluctuated 
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between approximately 29 percent of GDP and 34 percent of GDP from 1984 to 1999 before 
skyrocketing to 50.4 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2002 (Figure 15). Like the other two 
countries, Côte d’Ivoire was experiencing an upturn in the size of the informal economy in the 
three years prior to the conflict, though this was almost two full decades after the introduction of 
structural adjustment in the country. Interestingly, Côte d’Ivoire is the only country of the three 
in which the size of the informal economy the year before the outbreak of conflict was the largest 
it had been since 1984. Also important to note is the fact that Côte d’Ivoire’s informal economy 
does not appear to have been significantly impacted by the outbreak of conflict in Liberia or 
Sierra Leone, with slight decreases in size at the outbreak of the Liberian conflict in 1989 and the 
outbreak of the conflict in Sierra Leone in 1991 (Figure 15).  
Figure 14.  
 
Source: Alm & Embaye (2013), Using Dynamic Panel Methods to Estimate Shadow Economies 
Around the World, 1984-2006  
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Figure 15. 
 
Source: Alm & Embaye (2013), Using Dynamic Panel Methods to Estimate Shadow Economies 
Around the World, 1984-2006  
 
4.3 Summary of Findings 
 Based on the available data on shifts in formal and informal trade between Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, it does not appear that structural adjustment impacted transborder 
economic networks in ways that facilitated conflict diffusion across borders. With regard to 
formal trade, structural adjustment appears to have had little measurable impact; and one of the 
the only clear patterns is significant fluctuations in trade volumes between the three countries 
between 1980 and 1995. The other pattern observed is a bias in favor of Côte d’Ivoire that 
appears to increase throughout the 15-year period. However, the data used in this study is not 
comprehensive enough to explain the cause; and it does not appear to coincide with structural 
adjustment specifically. In the case of informal trade, the findings more clearly demonstrate a 
lack of connection between structural adjustment, increased informal trade, and conflict in the 
three countries. These findings suggest that conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire 
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was primarily a product of domestic conditions and processes, rather than an example of conflict 
spillover from one country to another.  
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Conclusion 
 On the surface, the post-World War II decolonization of Africa appeared to signify the end 
of Western domination in the developing world and the beginning of economic and political self-
determination for newly independent African states. Over the next three decades, these states 
entered a distinct period of development during which they attempted processes of state-building 
and integration into an increasingly global economy. When states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Côte d’Ivoire deteriorated into civil conflict decades later, academics, international financial 
institutions, and state actors rushed to provide explanations for the lack of stability in the region, 
blaming the conflicts on the failures of the African people to transcend primordial ethnic feuds, 
establish good governance and strong institutions, and to prevent greed over natural resources from 
erupting into violent competition. However, the occurrence of conflict in the three neighboring 
countries and in clusters of countries in several other sub-regions of the continent also raised the 
question of whether African states were experiencing the development of regional conflict systems 
through which violent conflict spilled across national borders.  
Subsequent research on the phenomenon of conflict spillover found significant support for 
theories involving the transnational transmission of conflict through economic, political, and 
ethnic networks, sparking a debate over whether the prevalence of conflict in the various sub-
regions of Africa was a cause of domestic conditions or the spread of conflict from one country to 
others. In the course of this debate, the explanations for conflict and conflict spillover in Sub-
Saharan Africa have expanded to include factors such as colonial legacy and neo-colonial 
domination in the form of economic intervention in recognition of the importance of global power 
dynamics in analyses of the developing world. Despite the expansion and increasing depth of 
literature on conflict, explanations of the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire in 
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particular have fallen short of providing a comprehensive understanding of conflict dynamics in 
the individual countries and the sub-region as a whole. This is largely due to reliance on 
explanations involvement the existence of valuable natural resources and problematic ethnic and 
religious relationships. As a result, the role of foreign actors, both historically and in the immediate 
pre-conflict period, has been understudied and understated in explanations of the conflicts.  
It was with these gaps in the literature in mind that I designed my research on Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire; and the explorations in this paper were conducted with two 
primary purposes. The first purpose was to begin to fill some of the gaps in the literature on conflict 
in the region through a multilayered analysis of the international political economy processes of 
the colonial and post-colonial periods in order to determine the role of foreign economic 
intervention in the occurrence of conflict in each of the three countries. The second purpose of this 
paper was to determine whether Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire represent instances of 
conflict spillover from one country to another; and in the case of conflict spillover, to determine 
the mechanisms through which the conflicts were spread beyond the national borders in which 
they began. Though constrained by time and data limitations, my research revealed several 
important findings that have at the very least begun to answer the two questions outlined above.  
Foreign Economic Intervention and Domestic Conflict  
With regard to the relationship between foreign economic intervention and conflict, case 
study analyses of the three countries demonstrate a clear connection between foreign economic 
intervention in the colonial period and the establishment and entrenchment of unequal and 
exclusive economic and political structures in the post-colonial state. This connection was present 
despite widely divergent experiences of colonialism and pseudo-colonialism through direct rule, 
indirect rule, and “special relationships” under France, Britain, and the United States. While the 
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differences in governing approaches utilized by the various colonial powers shaped the post-
colonial states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire in unique ways, the institutionalization 
of economic and political inequality was a common feature in all three of the post-colonial states; 
and it was a feature that looked remarkably similar in all of the cases given the number of 
differences between them. Though the groups of elite and marginalized were not necessarily 
consistent across the three countries, there were similar patterns in the creation of divides along 
regional, rural-urban, tribal, age cohort, and other lines during the colonial period that were tied to 
colonial economic development and exploitation of extractive industries such as commodity crop 
agriculture and mining. In each of the three countries, these divisive lines were not dissolved with 
the end of colonialism, but instead were incorporated and cemented within the post-colonial state 
structure, allowing for the advancement of elite groups at the expense of other groups. As a result, 
development in the post-colonial period was constrained and informed by these inequalities and 
forms of exclusion in ways that encouraged tensions and competition between groups.   
 In the case of neo-colonial foreign economic intervention through structural adjustment 
programs, analysis of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire suggests two key relationships. 
First, in each of the three countries studied, structural adjustment appears to have contributed to 
overall economic decline and instability in ways that destabilized the countries’ governments and 
contributed to increased economic hardships in general. However, as previously mentioned, this 
finding cannot be proven definitively, given that it is not possible to determine whether the same 
level of economic decline would have occurred without the introduction of structural adjustment. 
The second, and more important, finding was that structural adjustment programs also facilitated 
the magnification of inequality and exclusivity in the domestic sphere through their inherently 
biased nature designed to promote economic growth in certain sectors at the expense of other 
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sectors and populations. Through this process, already struggling populations faced increasing 
economic marginalization in the adjustment period. It was within this increasingly limited 
economic environment that opposition arose in the form of marginalized youth and other segments 
of the populations with few alternative paths to the achievement of political and economic 
mobility. These findings suggest that foreign economic intervention provided the foundation for 
political instability in the colonial period, later providing the spark that would transform that 
political instability into violent conflict through further economic intervention in the form of 
structural adjustment lending.  
Absence of Regional Conflict Spillover 
The second key finding in my research was the surprising lack of evidence for the 
existence of conflict spillover in the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. Despite 
expectations that historical transborder trade relationships between the three countries would be 
impacted by colonial and neocolonial intervention in ways that encouraged their growth in the 
pre-conflict years, the limited data analyzed suggests that neither formal nor informal trade were 
significantly altered by structural adjustment. Further, the data does not suggest that the size of 
the informal economies in the pre-war years was a predicting factor in when the conflict would 
occur, and in two of the three countries the shadow economy was smaller at the outbreak of the 
conflict that it had been several years before. The results of the data on informal trade are slightly 
puzzling, as informal resource markets and arms trade across borders have been primary 
explanations for conflict diffusion in the region. However, based on the combined findings of the 
historical profiles, structural adjustment section, and analysis of transborder trade, conflict in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire does not appear to be attributable to processes of 
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transborder diffusion. Instead it appears to be the consequence of problematic domestic 
structures and conditions.  
  However, given the lack of data, the findings of this paper do not provide a definitive 
answer to whether the conflicts in the region were the result of conflict spillover; and the topic will 
need to be explored by further research. While it does not definitively answer the conflict spillover 
question, this thesis does support several key findings of the broader literature on structural 
adjustment, as well as making several important contributions to the literature on the relationship 
between structural adjustment and conflict. First, this thesis appears to support the findings of 
critics of structural adjustment who argue that it contributes to decreased state capacity, increased 
economic instability, and the exacerbation of existing societal divisions. More importantly, it 
seems to support the findings of authors who tie the problematic economic outcomes of structural 
adjustment to the outbreak of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the findings of this 
paper support arguments positing that many conflicts in Africa have been mislabeled as ethnic 
conflicts or political struggles, when they are in fact the consequence of the suboptimal outcomes 
of structural adjustment. In addition to supporting these findings, this thesis adds to the literature 
by suggesting that structural adjustment is not an isolated occurrence of foreign intervention with 
isolated consequences for economic decline and inequality. Instead, this thesis suggests that 
structural adjustment is a continuation of foreign intervention that impacts existing inequalities 
caused by previous occurrences of foreign intervention.  
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